

## THE CENTRALITY OF 'WILAYAH' IN SHIA POLITICAL THOUGHT

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**Key Words:** Wilayah, Wilayat-e Faqih, Taghut, Fiqh, Shi'ism, Political Theology, Intersubjective Base.

### Abstract

*Wilayah* (*Wilayat* in Urdu and Persian) can be considered as the central tenet in Shia belief system. The concept of *wilayah* has played a major role in the direction, evolution, and development of Shia political thought throughout the history of Shi'ism. It was on the basis of the doctrine of *wilayah* that Shia Muslims have rejected the rule of other-than-imam as illegitimate at the cost of either living in fear or shedding blood. A critical review of the institution of *marja' iyyat* (the center of religious reference) whereby a Shia juristconsult (*majtahid/faqih*) assumes, what Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sochedina has termed, the role of the 'functional imam of the community' (1) shows that the power of a *faqih* lies in that he is bearer of a kind (discussed below) of the *wilayah* of the infallible Imams, albeit in a downward vertical order. Imam Khomeini developed his theory of *wilayat-e faqih* on the very base of the said concept and overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy which resulted in the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). The central argument of this article, therefore, is that one cannot grasp the nature and essence of Shia political thought without taking into consideration the concept of *wilayah* in Shi'ism.

### Introduction: A brief historical account of Shi'ism

In order to understand something in a comprehensive way, it is imperative to consider it as 'becoming', rather than 'being', in the historical setting of its development. If we see the concept of *wilayah* as a 'finished ideological/intellectual product' in a specific historical epoch, we cannot understand it properly, coupled with our inability to relate it to other periods. It is in this way that the necessity of having a general understanding of Shi'ism becomes inevitable.

According to Shia historians and religious authorities, Shi'ism emerged with the emergence of Islam itself and it is not, to quote Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, 'a phenomenon that is incidental to Islamic society'. (2) They argue that it began 'with a reference made for the first time to the partisans of Ali (*Shia-tu Ali*)...during the lifetime of the Prophet himself'. (3) Many great companions of the Prophet (such as Ammar b. Yasir, Miqdad b. Amr, Abu Ayub al-Ansari, Buraida, Jabir b. Abdullah al-Ansari, Ubbay b. Ka'b, Hudhayfa b. al-Yaman, Sahl b. Hunayf, Uthman b. Hunafy, Abu Dharr b. Jundab, Salman al-Farisi, Khuzayma b. Thabit, Khalid b. Sai'd, Qais b. sa'd b. Ebadah (4), and the members of Bani Hashim) were considered as Shias of Ali. (5) When Abu Bakr assumed, after the demise of the Prophet, the Islamic caliphate by the decision of an elite of the companions, not by the consensus (*ejma*) of the companions, (6) many of the companions of the Prophet (listed above) refused to pledge

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their allegiance to the caliph, arguing that Ali was more entitled to rule the Muslim community. It is interesting to note that the supporters of Ali based their claims of Ali's right to rule primarily on 'spiritual and religious considerations', not on political ones. (7) The failure of Ali and his partisan in materializing their claim for authority resulted in, on the one side, the withdrawal of Ali from public life for coming 25 years and, on the other, the loss of 'open and active manifestations' of Shia tendencies. (8)

It was after Imam Ali's assumption of caliphate that the dormant Shia ideas and ideals, revolving around the nucleus of *wilayah*, resurfaced. It is not to claim that all those who gathered around Ali were his sincere supporters and staunch believers of his *wilayah*. His caliphate, nonetheless, provided the Shias with an opportunity to form an intersubjective base of what was a legitimate political rule. It was this intersubjective understanding of what constituted of a 'just rule' that led the Kufans to invite Imam Hussain to come to their city in order to establish his just rule and guide the Muslim community (ummah) to the right path.

The martyrdom of Imam Hussain, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Shi'i Imam, in 680 AD at Karbala proved to be a watershed in the history of the development of the Shia political thought. The immediate effects of the martyrdom of Imam Hussain was a 'complete revolution in the religious consciousness of the Muslims' that he aimed at. (9) Imam Hussain's martyrdom in his 'struggle for justice and virtue against tyranny and evil', writes Joanna de Groot, 'provided a paradigm of resistance to oppression and wrong conduct, and suffering in a righteous cause.' (10) It taught the Muslims, particularly Shias, that 'in the perpetual war of history every day is Ashura and every place is Karbala', (11) and that the war between the right and wrong and good and evil has just began. The martyrdom of Imam Hussain also resulted in the emergence of a, what this author prefers to call, 'mentality of revenge' among the Shias, symbolized by the slogan of '*ya latha'rat al-hussain* (revenge for the blood of Husain)' first raised by the *Tawwabun* (the penitents). This mentality of revenge was, later, manipulated by Abbasids for their own advantage.

After the Martyrdom of Imam Hussain, the succeeding Imams realized that they could never be in power and, thus, concentrated their efforts on safeguarding the ideological frontiers of their Shias. They, even, discouraged their followers from joining in rebellion against the rulers. It is not to say that they accepted the rule of their opponents as legitimate. They always rejected the temporal authority

of, first, Umayyads and, then, Abbasids. The Imams, who followed the 3<sup>rd</sup> Imam, had realized that the hearts of the people were with them but their swords were against them because of the tight grip of the authorities.

The eight Imams, from Ali b. Hussain Zain al-Abideen to Hasan b. Ali al-Hadi, 'lived under', says Afshon Ostovar, 'some sort of house arrest', that is, they were 'political prisoners to the Sunni regimes' of Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, respectively. (12) The only path open to the Imams to live their lives was the adoption of *taqiyyah* (cautious dissimulation in religio-ideological matters). The Imams were aware that the ideology of the ruling dynasties was primarily based upon the concept of '*al-muku aqeen* (the authority is barren)' and that if they disclose their views regarding the just rule openly, they and their associates would be killed. The ideal way in such a state of matter, for the imams, was to keep the concept of *wilayah* to themselves and their close companions. In this way, the imam not only ensure their survival, to a certain period, they also keep the concept of *wilayah* alive in the hearts and minds of the shias.

To sum, after the martyrdom of Ali, the 1<sup>st</sup> Shia Imam, in 661 AD, the political leadership of the *Ummah* went in the hands of Umayyad (661-750 AD) and Abbasside (750-1258 AD) dynasties, respectively. For the Shias, however, the rightful rulers of the *Ummah* were their Imams and those in power were 'usurpers'. This rejectionist approach of the Shias towards the rule of 'other-than-imam' transformed Shi'ism into, what Hamid Dabashi has called, 'a religion of protest'. (13) The rejectionist approach always kept the Shias in opposition to the authorities which meant they never had favorable conditions to discuss and develop a coherent political theory. This situation did not changed even after the major occultation of the Last Imam; the Mahdi. The *foqaha* of the post-Ghibah (941 AD onwards) period also discussed the political ideology of Shi'ism in the lingering effects of *taqiyyah*.

### ***Wilayah*: meaning, Significance, and types**

The concept of *wilayah* (*Wilayat* in Urdu and Persian) may be described as the center of gravity in Shia belief system. In Shia canonical books (books of tradition), one can find several traditions that explicitly highlight its prominent position in Shia Islam. In *Wasa'il al-Shiah* (pronounce as *Wasa'il-lush-Shia*), Shaikh Hur Amuli has reported Abu Jafar (Imam Muhammad al-Baqir: the 5<sup>th</sup> Shia Imam) as saying, 'Islam is grounded on five things: on *salah* (formal prayers), on *zakah* (alms tax), on Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca), on *sawam* (fasting), and on *wilayah*. 'Which among them is higher in position

(*afdhal*)?, Zurarah, the narrator, asked the Imam. The Imam said, '*wilayah* reigns supreme because it is the key (*miftah*) for them (the other four things), and the *wali* (lit. bearer of the *wilayah*) is the proof/evidence/indicator (*daleel*) against them' .(14) In another tradition, Imam al-Baqir has argued for the superiority of *wilayah* as follows, 'God has granted (some) concessions (*rukhsah*) on the four (*Salat, zakah, hajj, sawam*), and He has not granted any concessions in *wilayah*. He who has no money is not obliged to give zakah or perform *hajj*; and he who is sick can offer *salah* sitting and can break fast. As for *wilayah*, it is obligatory for everyone to observe, whether he is healthy or sick, wealthy or impoverished.' (15) Elsewhere, Imam al-Sadiq has described *wilayah* as 'obedience to Imam', (16) and *wilayah* as '*wilayah* of *Ameer al-Momineen* (the master of believer: Imam Ali) and other imams from his descent' .(17)

What is *wilayah*? In his seminal book *al-Ghadeer*, al-Amini has identified 27 meanings for the word '*mawla*' (18) (the bearer of *wilayat*), which is one of the derivatives of the root word '*waliya*' (*waw lam ya*). Yet, for the Shia Muslims, when the term '*wilayah*' is referred to the Prophet of Islam, the Imams or, by extension, to their deputies (jurisconsults in the age of *ghibah*), it exclusively means 'the right to be incharge/guardian of something or someone (*tawalli al-amr*); the right to exercise authority/sovereignty over something or someone (*tasarruf/istila*), and the right to manage and administer the affairs of the society (*tadbeer*).' (19) '*Wali*' and '*mawla*' are derivatives of *wilayah*, and are synonyms, especially when they are used to refer to someone in authority. When the Shias say '*mawla* Ali' or '*Ali wali-yullah*' (Ali is the *wali* of Allah), they bear in mind what they mean by *wilayah*. The author of *al-Ghadeer*, after analyzing the 27 meanings of the term '*mawla*' in the context of what the Prophet said for Ali in *Ghadeer-e Khum* (*man kuntu mawla-hu fa Ali-yun mawla-hu*; of whomsoever I am *wali*, Ali is his *wali*), concludes as: 'then, *mawla* has only one meaning, and that is *awla bi al-shaiy* (having greater claim on something than it has on itself). (20)

*Wilayah* is of two kinds: *wilayah al-takwiniyyah* and *wilayah al-tashri'iyyah*. *Wilayat al-takwiniyyah* (lit. natural or ontological guardianship) refers to 'the sovereign will and power of One Supreme Being (God) over the world of creation i.e. sovereignty over the natural order,' (21) or to 'exercising authority over the system of creation and the laws of nature' .(22) According to the Shia theologians, the ontological guardianship, in the first place, belongs exclusively to God, yet He has bestowed (and

bestows) a part of it (*martabatun min*) on whomsoever he chose (and chooses) among His creators such as angles, prophets, imams, and saints. (23)

*Wilayat al-Tashri'iyyah*, pertinent to the article in hand, literally means 'legislative guardianship/sovereignty/authority'. It is called '*wilayat al-tahri'iyyah or insha'iyyah*' because 'it is conferred through a decree'. God has granted this *wilayah* to prophets and imams (and imams to foqaha) so that 'they govern the human society according to the needs of the times'. (24) When we say that a person has legislative sovereignty, it means that he has 'the legal authority and right' of making laws and decisions (on social issues) and executing them, and the people must 'submit to him and comply with the laws'. (25) Like *wilayat al-takwiniyyah*, this type of *wilayah* also belongs exclusively to God, yet He has delegated it to his messenger and, via him, to imams, and further, via imams, to foqaha ('vertical chain of delegation').

According to the Shia foqaha, when an imam is present, the right to exercise authority over all affairs of the *ummah* (*wilayat al-tashri'iyyah*) belongs only to him. He can, however, delegate a part (or all) of his authority to a specific person to be exercised over a particular matter or a domain, as Imam Ali did in the case of Malik al-Ashtar Nakhaei. In *Nahaj al-Balagha*, there is a letter (called '*Ahad Nama*') the Imam wrote for Malik when the latter was sent to Egypt as its governor. This *Ahad Nama* not only shows how Malik had to govern Egypt, it also 'clearly indicates that Malik al-Ashtar was given all the powers and privileges normally reserved for the head of an independent government' (26) or, more accurately, for the Imam himself. "(o Malik!) you are ruler/sovereign over them (the people) and the wali al-amr (ruler; the Imam himself) is sovereign over you. And God is over the wali al-amr who (the imam) has made you the governor", the letter reads. (27) This letter shows that a fallible (*ghair-e massom*) can be deputy of an imam and is often invoked by the proponents of the theory of *wilayat-e faqih*.

In the age of the occultation (*asr al-ghaibah*), *wilayat al-tashri'iyyah*, defined as '*haq al-tasarruf wa al-amr*' (28) (the right to exercise authority and to rule), is reserved for the foqaha through the decree of the Imam of the age. In general, this type of *wilayah* manifests itself in two types of command: *awamir al-mawlawi* (lit. authoritative commands) and *awmir al-irshadi* (lit. guiding commands). *Awamir al-mawlawi* are those commands that are issued by the *wali/mawla* qua *wali/mawla* and are legally binding. *Awamir al-irshadi* are those commands that a *wali/mawla* issues while conveying the divine injunctions to the people. Here, the obedience to the *wali/mawla* is actually obedience to God as the

role of the former is only to deliver what God has ordained. (29) It is incumbent upon every believer to obey both types of the command and to submit to the *wali/mawla*.

During the age of the occultation of the 12<sup>th</sup> imam, according to the Shia theologians, the *foqaha* have the right to exercise *wilayat al-tashri'iyah*, based on the decrees of the Imams (especially of the last imam; *Tawqi Sharif*). The *foqaha* have based their claim to the 'legal authority' largely on four traditions: Maqbola-tu Umar b. Hanzala, Riwaya-tu Abi Khadijah, the *Tawqi Sharif*, (30) and the Decree of Imam Hasan b. Ali al-Hadi. (31) All of the four traditions have directed the Shias to refer to the *foqaha* in their religious and social affairs. It is worthy to point out that the institution of the 'deputyship of the imam/s' (*niyabat*) is not the result of the occultation of the 12<sup>th</sup> Imam. Rather, it was functional in the pre-occultation era as well. The issue of *niyabat*, nevertheless, became more relevant when the 12<sup>th</sup> Imam went to occultation. 'The termination of the manifest imamate,' writes Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, 'gave rise to the institution of the deputyship of the Imam as the only feasible way to preserve the religious-social structure of the Imamite community.' (32)

### ***Wilayat-e Faqih***

In 1971, during his exile in the Shiite holy city of Najaf (in Iraq), Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhullah al-Mosawi Khomeini (henceforth Imam Khomeini) delivered a series of lectures (13 in number) on the desirability, necessity, and possibility of establishing (an) Islamic government. These lectures were, later, compiled and published under the title of *Hokumat-e Islami* (Islamic Government). His major ideas regarding the 'Islamic government', as discussed in the book, can be summarized in the following points:

- Both reason and the sunnah of the Prophet as well as the nature of divine commandments necessitate the establishment of a government to manage human affairs.
- A government can be called Islamic only if it is headed by the Imam or, in the case of his absence, his na'ib (designated-deputy).
- In the age of major occultation (*zaman-e ghaybat-e Kubra*), the *jame al-shara'it fuqaha* (the fully qualified jurists) are the general deputies (*nawab-e amma*, as against the *nawab-e Khassa* who had direct access to the hidden Imam during the period of 'minor occultation/*Ghaybat-e Sughra*) of the Imam and, thus, rightful rulers of the community of the believers.
- The Wilayah of *foqaha* (hence *wilayat-e faqih*) is the continuation of the wilayah of the Prophet of Islam and the Imams and, hence, enjoy the same scope of authority as of theirs', with the exception in very limited matters.

- The doctrine of wilayat-e faqih, its necessity, and validity is self-evident (badihi).
- Any government, regardless of its type, other than the Islamic government is illegitimate (in his words Taghut).(33)

The concept of the *Wilayat-e Faqih* was not essentially a new phenomenon to the intellectual minds of Iran of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in the sense that the authoritative status of the *foqahā*, at least in social and legal matters, was already well established. Imam Khomeini brought the authority of the *foqahā* to its 'logical conclusion' by developing the concept more systematically in a political fashion. Basing on his concept of *Wilayat-e Faqih*, he questioned the legitimacy of Pahlavi dynasty to rule Iran which later culminated in the fall of the dynasty and the establishment of IRI.

Imam Khomeini had an 'ideal' (the establishment of an 'Islamic state') and since 'Islam is never content with the mere exposition of its ideals, but constantly seeks the means to implement them- and power is an essential means towards this end', (34) he emphasized the necessity to seize power as a means to implement divine laws (*qanoon-e Elahi* or sharia). He *constructed* his 'ideal' around two premises: (i) the illegitimacy of monarchy (and by extension any polity other than 'Islamic government'), and (ii) the right of foqaha to rule the Islamic community (*ummah*). By employing, what Nukhet A. Sandal and Jonathan Fox have called, 'political theology' ('the set of ideas that a religious body holds about legitimate political authority'), (35) he declared the rule of Pahlavi monarchy 'illegitimate' and it, over time, became so because he spoke in his capacity as a faqih.

The doctrine of *wilayat-e fiqh* must be seen in the historical development of Shia 'political jurisprudence' or 'political theology' (*fiqh-e siyasi* or '*fiqh al-dawlat al-islamia*'). (36) Shia *fiqh-e siyasi* falls, at least theoretically, under the general rubric of *imamah*. Ironically, however, it has not been discussed in *fiqh* until after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. (37) The reason for this anomaly was the fact that when the *ijtihadi* (jurisprudential) 'movement' had begun among the Shias, they were virtually apolitical and, as a result, the focus of *ijtihad* (jurisprudence) was individual life, not society. (38) Later, the establishment of Safavid dynasty in Iran in 1501 and the resultant formalization of Shi'ism as state religion provided foqaha with the freedom to discuss matters pertinent to political theology, but again political theology could not make its place in *fiqh*, though the scope of *fiqh* got extended. The fall of Safavid dynasty and the inability of the subsequent dynasties to safeguard both the territorial integrity of Iran and the Islamic spirit of the society brought the matter of

political theology, to some extent, in the field of fiqh. The tobacco revolt of 1891-92 and the 'constitutional revolution' of 1905-09 further highlighted the necessity of dealing with fiqh-e siyasi among the jurists.

When Imam Khomeini began his ideological crusading for the establishment of the Islamic government, the Shia community in Iran had already been politicized. The politicized religious mind of Iran made it easy for Imam Khomeini to implant his 'ideal' of the Islamic government in it. By employing both the transmitted/textual (*naqli*, reported in books of tradition) and intellectual (*aqli*, based on logical reasoning) arguments (*adillah*, pl. of *dalil* which literally means evidence/proof/indication, and technically a substantiating source for any belief or ruling) coupled with historical evidences he concluded that the only legitimate government in the absence of the Imam is that of the fully qualified faqaha because they are, according to the traditions/*ahadith*, the 'vicegerent (*khulafa*) of the Prophet', 'trustees of the prophets' (*umana al-rosul*), 'fortresses/citadels of Islam' (*husoon al-Islam*), 'rulers over people' (*hukkam ala al-nas*), and 'inheritors of the prophets' (*warasat al-umbiya*), (39) and 'proof (*hujjah*)' of the last Imam. (40). On the *aqli* side of the construction, he build his arguments primarily on two premise; (i) the inseparability of politics and religion in Islam and (ii) the inevitability of a government to implement the Islamic sharia.

For the Shia Muslims, the 'ideal' government for managing the social affairs is the government of the infallible Imam, as Ayatollah Misbah Yazdi has maintained. And in his absence the 'nearest' to the ideal government is that of the a fully qualified faqih (41) whose legitimacy to govern is determined by the 'Divine Command' and by the 'decree of the Imam of the Age' (42) (*Sahib al-Zaman*), substantiated by the *tawqi al-sharif* (noble signed decree of the Imam of the Age), that is, a reply from the Imam to the letter of Ishaq b. Yaqub. In the *tawqi*, the Hidden Imam directed (*irjiou*) the Shias in 'occurring events/issues' (*hawadith al-waqiah*) to 'refer to those who transmit our traditions (*rowat-i hadithina*), for they are my proof/argument (*hojjat*) to you, and I am God's proof against them'. (43)

For Ayatollah Yazdi, the phrase '*hawadith al-waqiah*' does not refer to religious laws and issues because it is clear for the Shias whom (religious scholars) to refer in this regard. Rather, it actually refers to the occurring social issues. As for the term '*rowat-i hadithina*', he has asserted that it refers to only those who equipped with the necessary intellectual expertise that enables them to critically examine the authenticity of traditions (*ahadith*), not to someone who just cites or narrates traditions without the



knowledge of *elm al-rijal* i.e. the 'science of the men-transmitters in the chain of the transmission of a hadith. The term (*rowat-i hadithina*), ipso facto, refers to the *foqaha* and *ulama* and, in turn, corroborates the theory of *wilayat-e faqih*. (44)

It was on these bases that Imam Khomeini referred to un-Islamic governments as 'taghut'. (45) The dissociation from the *taghut* has a special bearing in Shia political theory as being a pillar of the principle of *bara'h/tabarr'a*. Shaikh al- Saduq Muhammad ibn-e Babuyah al-Qummi (d. 992), in his book *awsaf al-Shiah* (translated in Urdu as *Muhib-e Ahl-i Bait Kon?*), has reported a tradition from Imam al-Sadiq who said, 'He who affirm (*iqrar*) six things is the believer (*momin*): inter alia, the dissociation from and repudiation (*bara'ah*) of *tawagheet* (pl. of *taghut*), and the affirmation of the *Wilayah* (the guardianship and the authority of the Imams)'. (46)

The word 'taghut' has appeared in the Quran in eight different places (2: 256, 2:257, 4:51, 4:60, 4:76, 5: 60, 16:36, 39:17) in different contexts. In *Mufradat al-Quran*, Raghīb Isfahani has defined *taghut* as 'every person who transgresses and everything that is worshiped in place of God. Magicians, soothsayers/sorceress, transgressor djinn/genies, and everything that diverts from the right path are called *taghut* because of their transgression in disobedience'. (47)

In Chapter 2 (The Cow) of the Quran, *taghut* has been characterized as the one 'who takes them (who disbelieve) out of the light (*noor*) into the darkness (*zulumat*)' (2: 257). According to Allamah Tabatabai, here the words 'noor' and 'zulumat' are metaphors for guidance (*hidaya*) and misleading (*idhlal*). (48) If we look at the Islamic sources on *taghut*, we can define it, in general terms, as 'something that diverts human beings from the worship of God and the right path (*sirat al-mustaqeem*)'.

In sum, *wilayah*, on the one hand, and *bara'h min al-tawagheet*, on the other, convinced Imam Khomeini not only to stand against the Pahlavi regime, but also to reject both the eastern and western systems (*na sharqi, na gharbi*). Basing upon the doctrine of *wilayat-e faqih*, he established an Islamic government in Iran which is standard bearer of *wilayah* in the world.

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27. Sayyid Radhi, Nahaj al-Balaghah (the Way of Eloquence), Trans. Mufti Jafar Hussain, Letter# 53 (Ahad Nama) (Lahore: Karim Publications, 2008), 328.
28. Montazeri, Dirasaton fi Wilayat al-Faqih, 77.
29. Ibid., 35-36
30. See, al-Hur al-Amuli, Wasa'il al-Shiah, vol. 18, 5th ed. 99-101.
31. See, Abi Mansoor Ahmad b. Ali b. Abi Talib al-Tabresi, al-Ihtijaj, Vol. 2 (Najaf al-Ashraf: Dar al-Noaman, 1386/1966), 263-264.
32. Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sochedina, The Just Ruler (al-Sultan al-Adil) in Shiite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 118
33. For more details see, Imam Khomeini, Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist, trans. Hamid Algar (Tehran: The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini's Works, 2008).
34. Hamid Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought: The Response of the Shii and Sunni Muslims to the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982), 2.
35. Nukhet A. Sandal and Jonathan Fox, Religion in International Relations Theory: Interactions and Possibilities (New York: Routledge, 2013), 152.
36. The term 'fiqh al-Dawlat al-Islamia has been borrowed from the title of Ayatollah Montazeri's seminal book (in two volumes) on Wilayat-e faqih, entitled 'Dirasaton fi Wilayat al-Faqih wa Fiqh al-Dawlat al-Islamia.
37. See, for example, Ayatollah Muhammad Asif Muhsini, Taozih al-Masa'il Siyasi (Kabul: Kamesiyun Farhanghi Shura-ye Ulama-ye Shiah Afghanistan, 1432/2011).
38. Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Introduction to Islamic Political System, trans. M.A Ansari (Karachi: Islamic Seminary Publications, 2004), 45-46.
39. For the complete texts of the ahadith wherein these attributes of fuqaha/ulama have been reported, their references and commentaries on them see, al-Montazeri, Dirasaton fi Wilayat al-Faqih, vol. I, 461-475.
40. al-Amuli, Wasa'il al-Shiah, vol. 18, 5th ed. 101.
41. Ibid., 64.
42. Ibid, 50.
- 43 Ibid., 101. For a detailed commentary on the 'tawqi al-sharif' see, al-Montazeri, Dirasaton fi Wilayat al-Faqih , vol. 1, 478-482.
44. Ibid., 72-74.
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