

## State Integrationist Policies in Pakistan: An Analysis of the Impact over Bengal and Sindh (1947-1971)

### Abstract

*It is ironically believed that regionalism ushered political instability in Pakistan. In contrast, the creation of Pakistan is based on the bolstered slogan of full provincial autonomy for Muslims majority areas of India. Since independence, the rift between the Centre-provinces is overwhelming over the issue of provincial autonomy. Whenever minority provinces and East Pakistan reinforced the demand of provincial autonomy, the central government tried to alter its ways from earlier set motto and used different tactics and presented schemes which ultimately created blockade by implementing final stroke of One Unit Scheme. The scheme by nature was not to pacify the controversy over political issues rather accommodated personal interests of civil-military oligarchy and established ground for them to control over political structure of Pakistan. East Pakistan and Sindh—politically conscious units—as well the NWFP—recently tasted fruits of provincial autonomy under Government of India Act, 1935—were rightly determined towards their constitutional rights but their demands were coined as parochialism/provincialism and regionalism. Available literature has discussed One Unit merely as a scheme to merge provinces of West Pakistan into single unit but behind this, the objective of praetorians was not only to control political system but deprive East Pakistan demographically and Sindh from resources, which has hardly been discussed. The objective of this paper is to find out how integrationist schemes accommodated the civil-military bureaucracy and what subsequent results were over politics of Pakistan. To analyze these objectives, primary sources including India-Pakistan-Burma Association Reports and Constituent Assembly Debates as well secondary data is being used.*

*Keywords: Regionalism, Provincial Autonomy, Central Authority, One Unit, Civil-Military Bureaucracy*

### Introduction

Looking through different scholastic studies on modern South Asia, it is believed that Pakistan went through a series of critical changes during the year from 1947-1971. From a personal state of Governor General—to a parliamentary democracy cum oligarchic rule—to a dominant bureaucratic state in which civil-military bureaucracy emerged as a leading authority—to a strong martial rule. The objective behind these changes was not only to reduce East Pakistan's majority status and to control resources but also to diminish voices for provincial autonomy. In line with this objective, different so-called integrationist strategies were devised which could not only flattened provincial voices against centripetal forces but also established a garrison state to alter the dream of Jinnah's democratic and welfare state. In all this process, the civil-military bureaucracy (a Punjabi-Muhajir nexus) tends to mitigate the nurturing political system of a new born state in order to control over politico-economic system of Pakistan. The objective of this paper is to analyze state sponsored integrationist strategies, which are believed to be devised to accommodate the interests of praetorian oligarchy and the impact of such strategies over deep-rooted politico-cultural spectrum of Bengal and Sindh.

To make Pakistan—a strong federation, the political leadership from the quarters of East Pakistan and minority provinces of West Pakistan believed to devise future constitutional design according to the principles of Lahore Resolution, 1940, in which, it was stipulated that after independence, the provincial autonomy would be given to all province. Muhammad Waseem envisaged that the Lahore Resolution demanded “independent and autonomous states in the Muslim majority areas. However, this resolution was superseded by the resolution passed in the year 1946 by Muslim Legislator's Conference that sought to consolidate the areas covered by the former into one formidable entity”.<sup>2</sup>

During the framing of almost all the constitutions of Pakistan, the question of provincial autonomy had been surfaced at the top due to the aspirations of people, especially of the smaller provinces and peculiar

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<sup>2</sup> Muhammad Waseem, *Federalism in Pakistan*

circumstances of East Bengal. But the ruling oligarchy, time and again suppressed the voices of regional leadership and alleged that regional voices for provincial autonomy are destabilizing notions that may affect security and politico-economic mechanism of the state. For this concern, an integrationist strategy was designed to curb so-called parochialism/regionalism or provincialism. Under this integrationist strategy numbers of schemes were designed as under:

### **Integrationist Strategies: Urdu Speaking Emigrants and Urdu as State Language**

The integrationist strategy<sup>3</sup> in Pakistan was not only the One Unit scheme of 1955 but earlier to this the promotion of Urdu as the state language of Pakistan and influx of refugees in Sindh to relieve the mounting pressure in Punjab were the initial steps in the way of grand scheme—One Unit. Urdu was spoken as a mother tongue by only 3.24% of the population and the case was put forward to be made for categorizing the use of Urdu as a neutral language. According to Katharine Adeney, the promotion of Urdu had benefitted some linguistic groups more than others: Bengali and Sindhi were disproportionately engendered by the imposition of Urdu. Punjabi, Balochi and Pushtu did not have a strong literary tradition so were not as threatened by this decision.<sup>4</sup>

The language issue became the first stumbling block in relations between the state and the provinces particularly between State and East Bengal. Ostensibly, language integrationist strategy reinforced Punjabi domination of the state and its institutions. In the words of Ian Talbot, ‘the gradual melding of Pakistan and Punjab identities had its longer-term historical roots in the colonial state’s decision to make Urdu rather than Punjabi the official language of government’.<sup>5</sup> He further argues that attempts to establish centralized state around the predominance of the Muslim League and the unifying symbols of Urdu and Islam created tensions with ethno-language groups in all provinces except Punjab which gradually emerged as the core of the new state.<sup>6</sup>

Adeney pointed out the consisting attitude of Muhammad Ali Jinnah towards linguistic regionalism and argues that Jinnah’s responsibility for the discrimination was limited; he set the tone before partition by marginalizing the Bengali speaking leaders of the AIML in favor of Urdu speakers from Calcutta.<sup>7</sup> Even ethnic discrimination attitude continued in post-partition, it is important to note that the Bengali identity for East Bengal was as important as their religious status.

Furthermore, the integrationist strategies altered the earlier promises for the constitutional rights of the provinces and constitutional safeguards for Muslim majority provinces of India. For example, during his struggle for the Muslims of India, Jinnah stressed over the separation of Sindh from Bombay Presidency and the constitutional framework for the NWFP within the British domain. The struggle further culminated into the demand of separate homeland for the Muslims of India in which communities constitute a separate state would not only enjoy religious, ethno-linguistic, cultural and economic rights within the constitutional framework rather provinces will also enjoy maximum provincial autonomy. This hope triggered Muslim majority provinces to participate in the movement of separate state with zest and zeal. Adeney while commenting on the revisionist historiography on South Asia presented by Jalal and Moon, portrays Pakistan demand as a strategy to secure rights for the Muslims within a decentralized, possibly confederal united India for safeguarding Muslims in minority provinces as those in majority one.<sup>8</sup>

The enthusiasm of provinces which was seen during the movement for Pakistan was devalued by centripetal forces that protected their interest from being brought into conformity with Islam. The new slogans—one religion, one culture, one nation and one language was ensued to curtail the constitutional rights of the provinces. In

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<sup>3</sup> As quoted in Katherine Adeney’s work, integrationist strategy in Pakistan had different objectives including a means of consolidating majority control and ignores ethnicity as a means of legitimizing the state.

<sup>4</sup> Katherine Adeney, “Federal Formation and Consociational Stabilization: The Politics of National Identity Articulation and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan”, PhD Thesis submitted to the London School of Economics, University of London, 2003, 185.

<sup>5</sup> Ian Talbot, “Introduction: Themes, Theories, and Topics in the History of Religion, Violence and Political Mobilization in Pakistan”, in *State and Nation-Building in Pakistan: Beyond Islam and Security*, ed., (London: Routledge, 2015), 6.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Katherine Adeney, 183.

<sup>8</sup> Katherine Adeney, 99.

line with centralized strategy, for instance, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the Governor General of Pakistan, dissolved two provincial ministries including Khan Sahib ministry in the NWFP (1947) and Khuhro's ministry in Sindh (1948). Sarah Ansari enunciated that Khuhro and his colleagues took steps to retard the outflow of non-Muslims. She further states that the central government recognized that his ministry's stance was increasingly coming into conflict with its own desire to admit the maximum possible number of Muslim refugees into the province so as to relieve the pressure that was mounting in the Punjab.<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, ruling elite, while pursuing integrationist strategy—promoted Urdu as the state language of Pakistan. In East Pakistan, those political factions were promoted, like Khawaja faction, by reorganizing the Bengal Muslim League, who was aligned with the interest of the central elites. Besides, the language issue was deliberately intensified and Urdu—a language of minority population—declared national language instead of Bengali. By this way emerging voices for provincial autonomy were turned down and further tried to be blocked by instigating ideological sentiments in the society. This was not an end of the beginning, but situation was complicated ahead when Abdur Rab Nishtar, Federal Communication Minister, expressed ideological inclination as early as January 1948, and said 'Regional patriotism is simply repugnant to Islam'.<sup>10</sup>

Earlier to this statement, Sir Archibald Rowlands in a report to the Quaid-i-Azam stirred a new strategy, though on economic prospects, to succumb the powers and voices of the provinces. He had said, 'I personally think that on grounds of economy, both in terms of money and administrative manpower, there is in fact a great deal to be said for such an amalgamation of West Punjab, Sindh, the NWFP and Balochistan to be christened West Pakistan, but I recognize that such a solution is politically not possible at least in the immediate future'.<sup>11</sup> This idea was best suited for oligarchy to play the stroke at right time in order to control not only the economic-land resources of provinces but also to get strong grip over political system of the state. They were afraid that Islam as a tool might usher conflicting ways between Islamic and secular intelligentsia and further turn up system in favour of theocracy. So the ideological trends were modified and moderated in Objective Resolution in 1949 and the Rowlands' idea was pushed in political circle.

In the same month of March 1949, when the emerging complex debate and political and moral conflict regarding the legitimacy and *raison d'être* of Pakistan was moderated by presenting Objective Resolution in the Constituent Assembly, Feroz Khan Noon, from the same platform, aired the suggestion that it would be better to either merge Punjab-Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan as federating units of Pakistan or merge them all into One Unit. This idea was supported by Begum Shahnawaz and endorsed by Yusuf Khatak, the Pathan secretary general of the Muslim League. Later, it was revived in the late 1953 along with the alternative of a zonal federation for the western wing and finally in 1954, the One Unit plan received its biggest push after the Leagues defeat in east Bengal.<sup>12</sup>

### **Tendencies to Ease Way for Implementation of One Unit**

Muslim nationalists were struggling in India for a self-rule which could resolve the communal issues between communities particularly Hindus and Muslims. The struggle started predominantly in 1916, resultantly request for safeguard of the provincial interests was conceded in the Minto-Morely Reforms of 1919. But limited autonomy did not satisfy the Muslims, and it was stressed over that only the full provincial autonomy is in the interests of the Muslims of India. Jinnah continued to demand a 'greater quantum of autonomy for the provinces' until it was culminated as separate homeland—Pakistan. However, objective of the Muslim struggle was diminished with the creation of Pakistan and viceregal tendencies of Raj continued to suppress local voices for the demand of provincial autonomy.

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<sup>9</sup> Sarah Ansari, "Identity Politics and Nation-Building in Pakistan: The Case of Sindh", in *Pakistan: Beyond Islam and Security*, ed., (London: Routledge, 2015), 108.

<sup>10</sup> Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 57.

<sup>11</sup> Sir Archibald Rowlands' Report on the Economic Prospects of Pakistan. See Rowland to Quaid-i-Azam, No. 229/AGG, December 4, 1947. *Rizwan Collection*, (Hamdard Library, Karachi).

<sup>12</sup> Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defense* (Lahore: Vanguard Publisher, 1991), 197.

K. B. Sayeed enunciates that Jinnah who was an advocate of provincial autonomy and constitutional safeguards, before independence, was tend to follow the traditions and legacies that the British Raj had left behind.<sup>13</sup> The structure of government adopted at the very outset, was inclined towards certain arbitrariness in decision making which created a friction between the Centre and provinces.<sup>14</sup> Rather nurturing democratic system, Jinnah reposed greater trust in the bureaucrats who revitalized apolitical elements in Pakistan.<sup>15</sup> The Punjabi bureaucrats in further acceleration and in the name of governor general established a hitherto unknown post of 'secretary general' and a 'planning committee' that was directly responsible to Jinnah who by that time was bed-ridden.

The aim of the creation of above positions was to establish a greater degree of administrative centralization. This made it easy for secretary general to fill vacuum in administrative and commercial arena by his own choice. Secretaries of almost all ministries bypassed even cabinet and all issues were directly reported to the secretary general. Furthermore, civil services posts and properties, vacated by Hindus and Sikhs, were for the most part filled by Punjabis and Indian Muslims who opted to move Pakistan in order to obtain a fairly high number of posts and properties in the highly centralized system. It added impetus for consolidation of authority in the hands of praetorian oligarchy. The establishment of the strong Centre was the life line for the survival of praetorian oligarchy.

The ultimate dominancy of Punjab not merely in the army and the bureaucracy, but in the ultimate political decision making power aggravated Bengalis and smaller provinces of West Pakistan. Resultantly they considered centralization process as Punjabization. The Punjabization including Punjabi origin civil-military bureaucracy along with the Punjabi landed feudal, according to Ejaz Hussain, had exploited the country politically and economically.<sup>16</sup>

Ultimately, the spirit of nationalism, which had been envisaged during the freedom movement, was shaken whilst the voices of provincial autonomy were escalated in the East Bengal and other smaller provinces of West Pakistan. The executive leadership of Pakistan relied almost on the centralized bureaucratic structure which strengthened the base of civil services in the so-called parliamentary form of government in Pakistan where all powers were enjoyed by dominant bureaucrats in the Prime Minister's cabinet.

Thus, numbers of officers from military and provincial services were appointed to federal civil services. Furthermore, the successors of Jinnah—whether political or apolitical—to arrogate unlimited powers for themselves had set a precedent of strong paternalistic state. Thus in process, the non-party representatives got foothold in the decision making process. After Jinnah's death, Punjabi-*Muhajir* dominated political leadership soon faced domestic opposition. Its weaknesses enabled bureaucracy to annex the power of the state and obstruct democratic development. In changing political scenario, military officers saw themselves as the state survival.

After Jinnah, all Prime Ministers including Liaqat Ali Khan, Nazimuddin, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali Bogra etc. had no hold on cabinet rather civil bureaucrats including Ghulam Muhammad, Mirza, Muhammad Ali, Zafar Ali Khan were enjoying all authority over cabinet and decision making. Liaqat Ali tried to sustain the limited process of shaping-up parliamentary institutions but, on the other hand, Pakistan's military officers saw themselves as the potential critical component of modernization and institutionalization as well the state survival.

Moreover, circumstances were shaped to refurbish the army at whatever cost to the central exchequer.<sup>17</sup> The army, as structural institution, not only controlled seventy percent budget of the country but inserted itself as modern institution and a big entrepreneur of the country. In all this process, the most significant development was the establishment of Fauji Foundation in 1953, which ventured into textile, sugar and cereals in the name of meeting army personnel's welfare.<sup>18</sup> Ayesha Jalal argued that the Pakistan army aligned with Britain and then with the US in an attempt to underscore national political forces.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> K. B. Sayeed, *Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Directions of Change* (Lahore: Peace Publications, 2015), 26.

<sup>14</sup> Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, 31.

<sup>15</sup> Tahir Kamran, *Democracy and Governance in Pakistan* (Lahore: South Asian Partnership, 2008), 10.

<sup>16</sup> Ejaz Hussain, "Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in Post-Colonial State", *PCD Journal*, Vol. IV, No. 1 (2012): 113-146.

<sup>17</sup> Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, 54.

<sup>18</sup> Ejaz, "Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in Post-Colonial State", 113-146.

<sup>19</sup> Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, 55.

The army backed the executive authority to sack noncompliant civilian cabinet of 1953, which hindered constitution making process and disbanded the central legislature in 1954, removed an elected government of East Pakistan in the same year, and finally succeeded in amalgamating provinces of West Pakistan into One Unit. The idea of One Unit was, in fact, linked to Ghulam Muhammad's centralizing tendencies as it owed to the salience of bureaucracy in country's political structures, and was seen as antidote to vocal East Bengali politicians seeking more powers and resources for their province.

On the other hand, Ayub Khan who had close eye over fractional politics in Pakistan since 1951, on his way to America designed a plan called 'London Hotel Plan', approved by Washington, in which he conceived a constitutional scheme for Pakistan. According to his plan, president should be made the final custodian of power in the country's behalf and should be able to put things right both in the provinces and at the Centre, if go wrong. No change in the constitution should be made unless agreed to by the president. This scheme is considered by or large a 'controlled democracy' which fully practiced in his military rule. Furthermore, the proposed constitutional scheme contained following ideas:

- (a) West Pakistan will be grouped together to form one single unit.
- (b) Unfitted democracy can, therefore, prove dangerous, especially nowadays when communism from within and without is so quick to make use of its weaknesses. We therefore, have to have a controlled form of democracy with checks and counter-checks.
- (c) Provincial and National Assemblies to be elected indirectly. Adult franchise to be introduced only at the base level, i.e. local punchayats and municipal bodies.
- (d) Governors to have powers of control over the cabinet and the services.
- (e) Parity between East and West Wing.
- (f) Supreme Commander should also be Defence Minister and ex-officio Cabinet member and all the armed services should be under him.

### **Objectives of the One Unit Politics**

Ayub Khan prescribed two fold objectives of his plan—political and administrative centralization—while economic centralization was by default aligned with both. The administrative centralization was culminated with the merger of the provinces and autonomous units of West Pakistan into a single province with its capital at Lahore. Politically, the process culminated in the two coups of October 1958—the first perpetuated by the constitutional president, Iskandar Mirza, the second by the army chief, Ayub Khan—against the president, which led to the direct military.<sup>20</sup> The process took gradual pace of merging western zone into One Unit. Local pride and, in the smaller units, jealousies and fears of the economically and numerically dominant Punjabis made acceptance of the idea a painful process of grudging concessions.<sup>21</sup>

The constitutional proposals of a federation of equal units in 1950 by interim report of the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) were being entirely unacceptable in East Pakistan. Later on in 1952, BPC proposed a solution abandoning the equality of units and providing equal representation for the two zones in each house was disliked in both parts of the country, and gave way in October 1953 to the Bogra Formula—a compromise drawn by the Prime Minister Bogra. The East Pakistan demand continued to dominate national scene and resultantly Punjabis from West Pakistan endorsed a 'One Unit Plan of Ayub' for the integration of all the provinces and states. At this stage, Daulana viewed that their interests would be best protected by extra-constitutional strategies and not through parliamentary politics. By getting circumstances as blessing, praetorians were working to strengthen the institutional structures at the expense of the political parties. The formation of One Unit, the dissolution of the constituent assembly, the formation of the cabinet of talents, was all, part of the blueprint prepared by Ayub Khan in early 1954.

The central government was aware about resistance against One Unit from different sections of the society, particularly politicians who had staunch support in the agrarian society. To arrest the influence of landlords and shift their loyalties towards the objective of the central government, strategy called 'Agrarian and Land Reforms' was

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<sup>20</sup> Ilhan Niaz, "Provincial Administration in Pakistan and the Crisis of Order and Development", *Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (August, 2011), 232-254.

<sup>21</sup> Richard S. Wheeler, *The Politics of Pakistan: A Constitutional Quest* (London: Cornell University Press, 1970), 189.

used. It had two fold objectives: one was to control the growth of communism in the country and the other was to curtail the powers of politicians who were at the same time big landlords.<sup>22</sup>

Before the implementation of One Unit, provincial lands which were at the behest of provincial authority to lease or sell, controlled by the central government with Governor General Order in 1954. To get above orders reversed, the Khuhro ministry of Sindh and Noon ministry of Punjab were both trying to please the central authority and they offered major proportion of irrigated land under upper and lower barrage scheme in Sindh and under tubewell schemes particularly Renala estate in Punjab respectively for civil military bureaucrats.

After assurance of land for civil-military bureaucrats, the earlier orders of Governor General were modified and permitted provincial governments to lease land to the tenants for purpose of cultivation. At the time, the central cabinet also issued an orders that 'one lac acre land, the Sindh government proposed to give military, under Ghulam Muhammad Barrage and the land Punjab government had proposed under tubewell scheme, should be placed en block at the disposal of the ministry of defence directly under the control of Ayub Khan.'<sup>23</sup>

### Political Centralism

The political centralization process started at the outset of Pakistan, when Muslim League was facing the challenge at the all-Pakistan level. The first manifestation of this process came with Jinnah's declaration of March 1948: 'Every Muslim should come under the banner of the Muslim League, which is the custodian of Pakistan, and built it up and make it a great state before we think of parties amongst themselves which may be formed on sound and healthy lines'.<sup>24</sup> In October 1950, Liaqat Ali Khan further declared that 'the formation of new political parties in opposition to the Muslim League is against the interest of Pakistan'.<sup>25</sup>

Attempt to establish a centralized state around the predominance of the Muslim League and the unifying symbols of Urdu and Islam, however, created tensions with regional ethno-linguistic groups. According to Talbot, centralization in post-Pakistan was justified in terms of the need for unity in the face of threats from India and Afghanistan.<sup>26</sup>

Through the pressure of civil-military establishment, longstanding demands of provincial autonomy by the East Pakistan and Sindh were reduced by the document drafted in the second constituent assembly that gave parity of representation between the two wings of the country.<sup>27</sup> Ziring argues that One Unit was a purely bureaucratic enterprise, it overrode western Pakistan's multiethnic base and was aimed at depriving the provincial politicians of their significant influence.<sup>28</sup> Hence a 'Cabinet of Talents' in which most powerful public officials, for instance, Iskandar Mirza, Ayub Khan and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, were included was formed. At this stage, Suhrawardy was proposed to become Prime Minister of the country but this decision was vetoed by Mushtaque Ahmad Gurmani; and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali was named as Prime Minister, simultaneously, the higher bureaucracy placed themselves at the heart of the decision-making process.

Iskander Mirza was unhappy with the need to accept the parliamentary system, though; he acceded to the pressures by the constitution. To please head of the state, even Ayub Khan, along with One Unit formula, prescribed establishment of powerful presidency. So Mirza yielded to the need to play at politics by surrounding himself with strong personalities who could be expected to act in accordance with his ideas. Khan Sahib of the frontier was his choice for the leadership of the new One Unit of West Pakistan, who was opponent of the Muslim League. He, in collaboration of Gurmani, wanted to put a final nail in Muslim League party and replace it with Republican Party—a brainchild of Mirza.

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<sup>22</sup> National Documentation Centre, 1955. File No. 41, Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, Islamabad, 36-39.

<sup>23</sup> National Documentation Centre, 1955. File No. 64-65/CF/1955, Case No. 295/41/55, Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, Islamabad, 127.

<sup>24</sup> Yunus Samad, *A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan 1937-1958* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995), 129.

<sup>25</sup> Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), 57.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crossroads of History* (London: One-world Publication, 2003), 71.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

## Economic Centralism

In December 1947, Sir Rowland advised the federal government that ‘if Pakistan is to be strong, it must be strong at the Centre. In this regard, he recommended the transfer of some sources of revenues from the provinces to the Centre, placing industrial development on the Central list of the subjects, and setting up of strong planning organization at the Centre. This recommendation was put into effect in a very short time, and the Central government took the control of sales tax and income tax in order to meet the challenges of state siege but it never returned to the provinces.

The grievances of East Pakistan over economic issues were erupted in the very first decade of Pakistan which particularly categorized into three categories: (a) division of revenue between the Centre and provinces; (b) Jute and foreign exchange; and (c) development planning. Nurul Amin in the budget session of 1951-52 accused the Central government that it had adopted dubious method to encroach on provincial revenues. For instance, the statutory share of the provinces in the proceeds of income tax had been withheld by the Centre. Secondly, the constitutional provision regarding the share of East Pakistan in the jute export duty was unilaterally amended in its own favour by the Central government. Thirdly, the administration of the provincial sales tax—a source of revenue for provinces, was taken away by the Centre.

Before formation of One Unit, the income tax proceeds were distributed between units of West Pakistan as under:

East Pakistan	45 percent
Punjab	27 percent
Sindh	12 percent
NWFP	08 percent
Bahawalpur State	04 percent
Khairpur State	0.6 percent
Baluchistan States Union	0.6 percent
Residual	2.8 percent
<b>Total</b>	<b>100 percent</b>

After One Unit scheme, the share of smaller units and states went to the West Pakistan where areas of minority provinces and states were exploited by the oligarchy. Furthermore, with the inception of military rule in 1958, allocation of development funds for pre-One Unit minority provinces were at the mercy of civil-military bureaucrats.

## Resources Centralism

The architect One Unit scheme presumed that ‘One Unit will inevitably lead to the growth of stable markets and will remove obstacles like price disparities, local inflation and artificial scarcities. At that time it was argued that ‘the system of quotas; permits and licenses on provincial basis had created discontentment among West Pakistan’s mercantile community. Heat had been generated in the past over the use of the Indus water for irrigational and hydel purposes, the distribution of electricity produced in the Frontier province, the utilization of the Sui Gas reservoirs and the exploitation Balochistan coalmines’.

## Results of One Unit Strategy

One Unit ushered a gateway for opportunist to shifting their loyalties from provincial level politics and fed into national politics, which came to be increasingly marked by opportunism, shifting and unstable coalition. This was

epitomized, for example, Suhrawardy's reversal of his opposition to One Unit once he had become national Prime Minister in 1956. By this way the politicians became increasingly discredited and the bureaucracy and the military were emboldened to take more effective power into their hands, Talbot assessed 'hastening the demise of even a façade democracy'.<sup>29</sup>

Emergency Powers Ordinance was promulgated empowering the Governor-General to make provision for the framing of a constitution, to constitute West Pakistan as one administrative territory; to validate such laws as might have been passed by the constituent assembly, and to authenticate a budget. The first constitution of Pakistan which was made under the aegis of civil-military bureaucrats extended chief executives special prerogatives to the President and continued the viceregal traditions of the British Raj. Moreover, the office of the Prime Minister was made subordinate to the President in extend to satisfy the President. Resistance started by the majority of opposition politicians by anti-One Unit platform, which labeled the constitution unworkable and designed to perpetuate the powers of the civil-military establishment.

With the implementation of One Unit, it was a responsibility of civil-military establishment to bring 1956 constitution into force but they had little success in filling the political vacuum resultantly Chaudhri Muhammad Ali was forced to step-aside and allowed Surawardy to assume the office of the Prime Minister. The rift between two wings over distribution of development funds continued even after One Unit. Since long time, President Mirza and Ayub Khan were determined to maneuver the politicians toward their common goals or nullify their actions altogether. Regarding Objective resolution, Mirza believed that 'there was no question that sovereignty was man-made phenomenon and that reference to God's sovereignty was only served to confuse as well as to divide the nation'.<sup>30</sup> During Ayub martial law, maximum powers were granted to the bureaucracy at division and district level under the device of a council of the administration of West Pakistan.<sup>31</sup>

## Conclusion

This article has attempted to explain how civil-military bureaucracy operationalized the early perceived idea of Rowlands of December 1947, which was purely suggested for economic and political growth of Pakistan but the idea was more favorably connected with the interests of oligarchy and imperialist objectives. The strategy of One Unit was gradually preceded by pushing instability in politics and institutional structuralism. Political instability established with dissolving elected provincial assemblies at different junctures and replaced with installing Governors rule in the provinces like Sindh in 1951 and East Bengal in 1954 and first military coup in Punjab in 1953. On the other hand, institutional structuralism was promoted first by rapidly nationalizing army and later induction of civil-military bureaucracy in the decision-making process. This maneuvering is not getting popular support with constitutional design in terms of the One Unit. The idea of One Unit, articulated by civil-military nexus further perpetuated extensive control over political and administrative mechanism of the country and culminated military coup of Ayub Khan. His iron-fist command over country's resources and administration aggravated the situation and grilled provinces under his dispirited policy of One Unit and controlled democracy, which resultantly ushered separatist demand of Bengali nationalist.

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<sup>29</sup> Talbot, *Pakistan: A New History*, 57.

<sup>30</sup> Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crossroads of History*, 71.

<sup>31</sup> Wayne Ayres Wilcox, *The Consolidation of a Nation* (London: Columbia University Press, 1963), 189.