

## Madrassa, Militancy and Politics in Pakistan

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### Abstract

*Madrassa* is a community funded indigenous institution traditionally meant for catering to the needs of religious socialization. However, for the last thirty years, it has expanded its social role and political clout. Though it is performing a useful job by providing free food and education to poor students, yet it is accused of indoctrinating narrow religious world-view and ignoring practically relevant scientific education. Hence, *Madrassa* 1) promotes culture of religious intolerance and 2) impairs the capacity of its students by restricting their exposure to outdated theological education. Resultantly, students cannot compete for mainstream jobs and are easily lured by militant and sectarian organizations. The basic assumption is that *Madrassas* were promoted by the dictatorial regimes for gaining political legitimacy and to achieve specific strategic interests. Hence, both dictators and fundamentalists have been harboring each other to prolong their survival and thereby putting the democratic institutions at stake. At the same time, some regional developments like *Jihad* against Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Iranian revolution and the rise of Taliban to power provided them transnational

support and networks. This paper intends to focus on the functional dynamics of Madrassa: how this resource was exploited and 'overused' by dictators and power elites. There is a need of introducing sustainable reforms to modernize this institution and make it a catalyst for human resource development.

## **Background**

Mosque and *Madrassa*<sup>1</sup> (Religious school) have always existed and worked to impart religious education to people in Pakistan. Historically, these institutions functioned smoothly without disturbing the existing social and political systems (Metcalf 1982). However, for the last thirty years, Madrassa has been accused of promoting militancy and sectarian violence in Pakistan (Aziz 2001; Malik 1996; Nayyer 1998).

After the independence in 1947, the secular rulers of Pakistan started exploiting Madrassa for different political and strategic purposes (Nashabe 1989; Ejaz 2001). From Ayub (1958-1969) onward, political leaders frequently tried to contain and co-opt the clergy. Ayub wanted to reform and secularize Madrassa by controlling it through the establishment of *Auqaf* Department though he failed because of stiff resistance from clergy (Jalal 1990; Feldman 1972).

Bhutto (1972-77) attempted to create a national ethos on anti-Indian and pan-Islamic slogans. He systematically highlighted Pakistan's Islamic and supposed Middle

Eastern identity (Dedebant 2002). This stance indirectly gave the clergy additional social power and political significance (Burki, 1980). Bhutto nationalized the education sector but Madrassa was exempted and remained autonomous (Waseem 1994). He also attempted to co-opt the Madrassas by offering to grant them the equivalence of public sector certificates and diplomas (Aziz 2001). Bhutto government also entered into agreements with Arab countries for promotion of Arabic language (Ziring 2001). These linkages, in particular Saudi Arabia's patronage of Pakistani Madrassas, especially of the more radical Ahle-Haith/Salafi branch, thrive even today (Waseem 1994; ICG 2002).

*During Bhutto years, Afghan dissents, mostly religious teachers, took sanctuary in Pakistan after Sardar Daud's 1973 coup. As a result of Bhutto policies, the early prototype of the militant Madrassa emerged in Pakistan. It is observed that the nexus between the Madrassa, militancy and army originated during Bhutto years (ICG 2002). Despite all this, the clergy did not support Bhutto when he was accused of massive rigging of 1977 elections. Rather, Madrassa provided considerable street power to fuel the unrest and thereby facilitated Gen Zia to overthrow Bhutto administration.*

Being an un-elected ruler, Zia (1977-1988) promoted and funded Madrassa for getting legitimacy and political support (Rashid 2000). In the late 70s and early 80s, some regional developments like Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, Islamic revolution in Iran (1979), and Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) opened new avenues for the political use of Madrassa. Saudi Arabia and Iran supported Sunni and Shia Madrassas respectively for enhancing their influence in the region.

The transnational connections of Madrassa radicalized its dormant but deep sectarian and doctrinal differences (Stern 2000; Ziring 2001). In Madrassa system, promoting a particular sect inevitably implied the rejection of the others. When domestic or international forces tried to promote a particular type of Madrassa, the others strived to maintain their existence. This competition sometimes converted into violent sectarian clashes. Mutually hostile sects wanted to enhance their strength, connections and resources: Hence number of Madrassas increased sharply. It is reported that in 1995 there were 10,000 registered Madrassas functioning in Pakistan (Ministry of Education 1995). However, the number of unregistered Madrassas is much more and is estimated around 40,000 to 50,000 (Stern 2000).

Apart from patronization, the Pakistan's domestic political and economic conditions also acted as precipitating factor to the growth of Madrassa. Over the years, Government of Pakistan has failed lamentably to improve the living conditions of its people. As a result, the public infrastructure especially health and education remained under developed (Lieven 2002). The incidence of poverty increased and substantial number of people could not afford to send their kids to public schools. As an alternative Madrassa offered free education, food, and clothing for children (Ghazi 2002) and psychological solace for the poverty ridden parents (Harder 1993; Malik 1996). Hence, for poor children, Madrassa could be one viable option among others, e.g. child labor, begging etc. (Zakar 2000).

The mix of domestic and regional factors made the situation extremely volatile and clearly detrimental for Pakistan's internal stability and regional security (Rashid 2000; Bulliet 2002). Government of Pakistan admits that 10

to 15 percent of Madrassas have links with sectarian militancy or international terrorism (Ghazi 2002). These Madrassas were established to meet some crisis. And their sustainability is linked with the existence of a crisis situation; be it real or perceived. Their recruits have developed a capacity to fight a crisis.

### **Theoretical Framework**

The institution of Madrassa has been a contentious political issue for the last thirty years in Pakistan. It has expanded its role with immense social and political implications. Madrassa has been accused of promoting sectarian violence, religious militancy and bigotry. In some cases it has been challenging the writ of the state and creating problems of law and order.

The basic assumption of this project is that the Madrassa, from time to time, was used and exploited by the domestic rulers and foreign powers for achieving specific political and strategic objectives. The domestic dictators used it for getting political legitimacy and to undermine the already fragile democratic system. The foreign powers exploited Madrassa for various purposes: 1) enhancement of their influence in the region, 2) promotion of their particular sect, and, 3) getting recruits for Jihad.

Domestic rulers patronized Madrassa by giving it various kinds of favors. Madrassa received financial support from official Zakat fund. Clergy was given free-hand to establish new Madrassas and teach whatever suited their objectives. They were never asked seriously to disclose the sources of their funding or transnational connections. Nor were they asked to teach practically relevant secular subjects. Its degrees were recognized and Madrassa graduates were

recruited as Arabic/Islamic studies teachers in the public schools. Heads of some Madrassas were given high slots in various statutory and constitutional bodies. On their demand, Government enacted some controversial laws including blasphemy law and never dared to repeal or even amend them. In short, there are countless laws, regulations and ordinances which directly or indirectly promoted or appeased clergy.


Apart from Government patronization, Pakistan's domestic environment has also been conducive for the growth of Madrassa. Massive poverty worked as precipitating factor for the provision of recruits to Madrassa. Years of bad governance, military rule, political instability, and massive corruption ruined the economy. Consequently, the incidence of poverty increased and living standard declined. A huge chunk of public money went to defense, debt serving and white collar criminals; and little was left for the development of public infrastructure especially for education and health. Poor people could not afford to send their children to public schools. Though these schools charge nominal fee, but the parents have to arrange for the books, food and transportation which they might not afford. Interestingly, Madrassa provided every thing to its students free. Hence a viable choice for the poor.

Madrassa gets recruits from the poor, money from the rich and patronage from the domestic and foreign powers. Sending a kid to Madrassa may be doubly beneficial for the parents: Firstly their child gets free education and, secondly they get psychological solace in believing that they have pleased Allah by devoting their son for learning and spreading His religion. Hence the existence of Madrassa in a way becomes part of their belief system.

What a student learns in Madrassa? Madrassa does not provide military training nor does it preach violence. Nevertheless, the students are indoctrinated to a narrow and sectarian version of Islam. They are usually not exposed to mass media nor they are trained in practically relevant secular subjects. Hence the trainees usually become close-minded and highly ethnocentric. They are indoctrinated to promote and defend their own sect and reject the others. Hence Madrassa curriculum and sub-culture tend to develop a peculiar worldview of its students. Religious tolerance, pluralism and culture of dialogue do not exist there.

It is very easy to harness such mindsets in the name of religion and preparing them for a specific mission. They can be easily lured by militant organizations which use violence to achieve their political objectives. In this context, Madrassa seems to be a huge reservoir of vulnerable human resource which has been, time to time, exploited and used by domestic rulers and foreign powers. This idea has been schematically presented in the figure No. 1.

**Figure 1 Madrassa: A Reservoir of Poverty, Politics, and Militancy in Pakistan**



Once they are trained, motivated and used for a specific mission, they get used to it. They develop their capacity and it has a spin off effect. When they finish a job, they need another. Their job emerges out of a crisis situation,



either it is out there or just created. This threat, real or imaginary, could be in the form of domestic economic system (un-Islamic interest based banking system), political system (secular democracy), and social system (poverty, injustice, Westernization etc.). Threat could also exist in the neighboring countries (e.g. Godless communists) or oppressors of Muslims anywhere in the world. The threat is presented in a religiously obligatory duty fight. Their functionality and sustainability is linked with the vision of some crisis situation.

### **Role of Militants in Pakistani Politics**

Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has a persistent problem with democracy and constitutionalism. The country remained under military rule for more than half of its total existence. However, for the last twenty years, religious fundamentalism has expanded its role in Pakistani society and polity.

Fundamentalists have not yet overwhelmed the state power. However, their involvement in power politics has manifestly increased. They seem to have the prowess to force the political governments to accept to their demands/agenda and thereby political governments want to appease them to seek their support. They have been successful in inserting many presumably Islamic punishments into law books, establishing *Shahria* courts, declaring *Almudis* as non Muslims, death penalty for blasphemy and restrictive statutes for women and so on. Fundamentalists are equally active in implementing these laws through judicial discourse. If normal legal procedures fail to deliver, they, some times, invoke extra-judicial means to get the things done (e.g., threatening and even

assassinating the presiding judge or police officer who acts contrary to their 'wishes').

Politically they have been consequential as well. Though their electoral gains have been marginal, yet they effectively negotiate with Governments and get due share in the decision making process at all levels. However they attained the highest water mark when they collaborated with Pakistan army to fight a Jihad in Afghanistan against Soviet Union in the early 80s. Henceforth, they developed high stakes in the foreign policy, domestic issues and key strategic decisions.

In the domestic politics, they provided legitimacy to the various military rulers (notable example is Zia-ul Haq's regime 1977-1988) by invoking Islamic symbols and rhetoric. They also tamed the liberal regime of Bhuttos by mobilizing public opinion against their "secular" policies. Sometimes, they opposed and supported the same regime. For example, when Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Lahore to have peace talks with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1998, they organized violent demonstrations against Mr. Sharif. However, in 1999 they supported the same Prime Minister when he attempted to pass Sharia bill to accumulate more power. In short, fundamentalists have been playing role "in making and breaking political governments", negotiating for political power, extracting favors in lieu of their "services" – mostly out of parliament and through "under the table deals". Over the years, Pakistani Governments, from time to time, both wooed the mullahs and ridiculed them<sup>ii</sup>. Whenever authoritarian rule suffered from legitimacy crisis, Islam was used to provide a cover<sup>iii</sup> and fundamentalists en-cashing the opportunity.

During the last 20 years, there appears to be a qualitative change in their approach and activities. Some of the fundamentalist organizations are no more just 'pressure groups'; they have grown to the size and strength uncontrollable by the state. For example, *Lashkar-e-Tayyba*, a militant Jihadi organization, possesses considerable organizational prowess and weaponry resources and has the capacity to defy the writ of the state. Similarly *Sepah-e-Selaha-Pakistan* (SSP) and *Tehrika Jafaria Pakistan* (TJP) have been involved in bloody sectarian clashes, killing hundreds<sup>iv</sup> of innocent people and the Government seems unable to bring them to justice. Anti American and pro-Taliban rhetoric of Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman of Jammat-ul-Ulma-Pakistan continuously embarrasses Government of Pakistan. Quite recently Government decided to ban Jihadi organizations for fund raising<sup>v</sup>, which was openly defied by these organizations as well as prominent political parties<sup>vi</sup>. They argue "We did not start Jihad with the permission of Government nor would we stop it on Government appeals<sup>vii</sup>. By seeing their aggressive mood, the Government has turned defensive and apologetic<sup>viii</sup>.

At social level, these organizations have developed a well entrenched network of Madrassas (religious schools) where free food, shelter and religious education is provided<sup>ix</sup>. Poverty ridden people, un-served by the Government institutions, readily send their kids to these Madrassas where students are systematically indoctrinated to adhere to a narrow version of religion<sup>x</sup>. Usually, the graduates of these Madrassas, being unable to get some job, are subsequently recruited by the fundamentalist organizations. There are more than 50000 Madrassas functioning in Pakistan<sup>xi</sup>. Recently Government has promulgated an ordinance to modernize their curriculum

and to put some check on their activities<sup>xii</sup>. Again, Government is condemned for conspiring against Islam "to appease the West<sup>xiii</sup>". Again, Government turned defensive.

Government seems reluctant to have conflict with these organizations<sup>xiv</sup>. But at the same time, Government cannot coexist with them because of their unacceptable demands and international pressure<sup>xv</sup>. For example SSP's core demand is to "declare Pakistan a Sunni state and Shias be declared as non-Muslim<sup>xvi</sup>". Hence, 'the once unifying factor of Islam has become a lethal weapon in the hands of fundamentalists and a force of division and fragmentation'<sup>xvii</sup>. Further, they have been issuing open threat to 'secular' Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) for promoting Western values and lifestyle<sup>xviii</sup>. Recently, in the North West Frontier Province, some girl schools run by NGOs were smashed to save the 'future mothers' from secularism. Maulana Akram Awan's organization even threatened to "invade" Islamabad, if Government failed to implement Islamization<sup>xix</sup>. Government of Pakistan failed to take proper legal action to check this lawlessness. By seeing the strength of fundamentalists and fragility of the Government, some analysts have concluded that Pakistan is drifting towards talbanization<sup>xx</sup> and predict a bleak future of democracy in Pakistan<sup>xxi</sup>.

Government of Pakistan is under tremendous pressure from international community to constrict the activities of these organizations<sup>xxii</sup>. Domestically, they ward off foreign investment and undermine the rule of law and defy writ of the state. The question is: to what extent Government of Pakistan has the capacity to handle this power? And what

are the Government's limitations to cut them to size. Currently Government of Pakistan is in a serious dilemma. "Pakistan now faces a typical "principal-agent" problem: the interests of state (principal) and those of militant groups (the agent) are not fully aligned<sup>xxiii</sup>. They may serve Pakistan's strategic interest, as they did in Afghan Jihad and elsewhere, but they also kill civilians and perform terrorism in violation of international norms and law<sup>xxiv</sup>. These elements seriously damage Pakistan's international reputation. Already, they have caused considerable damage to Pakistan's civil society and polity.

During the past two decades or so, there has been an ever greater increase in the power of Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan and thereby communal violence and intolerance. Several factors appear to have contributed to this trend: 1) the coming into power of a highly conservative military ruler, General Zia in the late 1970s; the Islamic revolution in the neighboring Iran in 1979; and the emergence of Islamic *mujahideen* in Afghanistan. The cumulative effect of these developments has provided the fundamentalists a transnational clout. During the Afghan war a pool of well trained and motivated Mujahideen has been created. And the Taliban government in Afghanistan provided these fighters sanctuary and training grounds. These training camps have become virtual universities for promoting pan-Islamic radicalism in Algeria, Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, Jordan, the Philippines and Bangladesh. They operate under the belief that with the Jihad in Afghanistan, they have defeated one superpower—the Soviet Union—and now, they would defeat the second<sup>xxv</sup>. The narrowly educated Madrassa students in Pakistan may readily subscribe to such theories. With the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan, some fundamentalist parties in Pakistan have

already openly declared that they would stage Taliban-like revolution in Pakistan<sup>xxvi</sup>. And the millions of graduates from Madrassas would be a large enough human resource to work for such a revolution.<sup>xxvii</sup>

The link between fundamentalist elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan has grown stronger and clearly problematic for Pakistan's internal security, economic stability and international image. 'Jihad International Inc.<sup>xxviii</sup>' continues to attract foreign investors, most notably *Wahabi* Arabs in the Persian Gulf regions and wealthy Pakistanis<sup>xxix</sup>. Initially, Islamabad could not fully realize the long term implications of allowing 'international Jihad' on Pakistani soil. It took years for Government to realize the gravity of the situation<sup>xxx</sup>. Recently, Government of Pakistan has imposed ban on fund raising for Jihad. Government's ability and commitment to implement the ban is yet to be seen<sup>xxxi</sup>.

### ***Regional Stability and Militancy***

Last year, the U.S. State Department reported that South Asia has replaced the Middle East as the locus of terrorism in the world<sup>xxxii</sup>. Two major countries of South Asia—India and Pakistan---have poisonous mixture of historical animosity, history of conventional wars and quite recently nuclear weapons and violent religious fundamentalism. Neither Indian's secular democracy nor Pakistan's liberal civil-military dictatorship seem capable of circumventing the fundamentalists' violent activities. The hawks on both sides stick to their guns. And in this standoff, Pakistan is particularly vulnerable due to its geographical proximity with Taliban's Afghanistan. Day by day, 'political fragmentation, economic meltdown, ethnic and sectarian warfare and Islamic fundamentalism tighten their grip on

Pakistan.<sup>xxxiii</sup> The threat emanating from transnational fundamentalism is no longer a local affair.

The locus of their activities is North West Frontier of Pakistan and the whole of Afghanistan. There are about 50,000 Madrassas in Pakistan where millions of students are getting religious education. Though all of the Madrassas are not producing *Mujahedeens* but some, in the garb of Islam, are busy fanning sectarian violence, and poisoning people's minds. Now the question is: 'How did the institution of Madrassa thrive'? One may assert that breakdown of socio-economic institutions have played a pivotal role in the emergence of Madrassa. "More importantly, the state's willingness to realign the constitution according to the religious dictates provided a conducive environment for the Madrassa culture to flourish<sup>xxxiv</sup>. Hence, a deeper analysis of the situation may reveal that fundamentalism is not by chance, it is by design<sup>xxxv</sup>—carefully designed by the ruling elites who needed legitimacy and support for their dubious regimes. They rarely bothered to think about its long term disastrous implications.

Presently fundamentalists are disturbing Pakistan's domestic tranquility, posing threat to regional stability and international security. Given their transnational expansionist agenda, plus covert support and patronage from neighboring states like Afghanistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, they have enough resources and organizational prowess to implement their agenda. If they continue to expand their networks and operations, historical animosity between India and Pakistan may aggravate to the point of nuclear conflict. Use of fundamentalists to defeat

communism was a dangerous proposition which is now producing results. Killing of thousands of innocent people in World Trade Center on September 11, may be a bitter harvest of the revival of Jihad policy<sup>xxxvi</sup>. "The new burst of activism has reached such a proportion that, with the demise of communism, Islam is increasingly--and erroneously--being perceived as one of the future ideological rival of the West<sup>xxxvii</sup>. Unfortunately there is no comprehensive policy response to this highly volatile situation.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington and its allies (Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) have never developed a new strategic framework for the area. The United States dealt with issues as they come up in the haphazard, piecemeal fashion, pursuing constantly changing single issue agenda that were driven more by domestic American politics than the global ending of civil war<sup>xxxviii</sup>. Policy makers in Pakistan, too, never tried to weigh the long term implications of their 'short-sighted' and opportunist decisions. Now keeping in view the ground realities, the following policy issues need to be addressed

- How to constrict fundamentalists' expansionist and transnational operations?
- How to include them in the main stream political process so as to make them answerable/accountable to the public?
- How to restrict dictators and rulers in Pakistan not to 'use' them for political and strategic purposes?



These issues are connected with one basic question: How democracy be restored in Pakistan? Dictators in Pakistan have been arguing that 'fundamentalists would come into power through elections and democracy'. So Pakistan is better off under liberal dictators'. In this way they argued that dictatorship was in the "national interests" of Pakistan. However, Political history of Pakistan suggests that fundamentalism itself may not pose any danger for democracy. Rather, fundamentalism thrived under dictatorship; both supported each other to prolong their survival. Both are afraid from democracy. Many erroneously argue that Pakistan is 'not fit for democracy'. But "a country does not have to be deemed fit for democracy, rather it has to become fit through democracy"<sup>xxxix</sup>.

By and large, people of Pakistan never approved fundamentalist's narrow interpretation of Islam and violent style of politics. People have always adhered to the ideals like freedom of expression, religious tolerance, rule of law, independent judiciary, free elections and political parties. Time and again, they have struggled to restore these values in the society. People of Pakistan may dislike Western hegemony but not principles of democracy.

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### End Notes

<sup>1</sup> One judge of High Court, several judges of subordinate courts, senior police officers, magistrates, prosecuting officials and even jail wardens have been assassinated by the militants. Now sometimes judges/police officers are reluctant to try/investigate the sectarian criminals because of insecurity.

<sup>2</sup> Freeland Abbott. 1968. *Islam and Pakistan*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

<sup>3</sup> Leon T Hadar. 1993. "What Green Peril". *Foreign Affairs* 72 (2): 27-42

<sup>4</sup> In Pakistan, especially in Karachi, Shia-Sunni clashes are very common and situation gets aggravated during the

month of *Muharram* when entire Government machinery focuses on maintaining law and order situation. For detailed treatment of the subject see Shaukat Ali's book *Pakistan: A Religio-Political Study*. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research.

<sup>5</sup> In August 2001, Government decided to impose ban on fund raising for Jihad. However, it was a half-hearted effort and Government seemed not committed to implement the ban. For example, Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider and others issued conciliatory statements that Government had no intention to curtail their activities, but only wanted them not to collect donations publicly (see press statement in *The Nation*, September 3, 2001.).

<sup>6</sup> Almost all the Jihadi organizations condemned the government action. Some prominent politicians like Nawabzada Nasrulla Khan and Chaudhary Shujait Hussain also disapproved the Government's move (see various press statements published in the last week of August 2001)

<sup>7</sup> Press statement of Mr. Umar Farooq, (leader of *Lashkar-e-Tayyba*, a prominent Jihadi organization operating in Indian Kashmir) published in the *Daily Jang* (an Urdu daily dated 15-8-2001) published from Lahore.

<sup>8</sup> Even after promulgating the Madrassas ordinance, various Cabinet Ministers and Governors of Punjab and Baluchistan issued states that they "never wanted to interfere into Madrassa affairs"---a clear negation of the policy of their own Government. It reflects that Government itself is not clear and determined to bring the Madrassas under state control.

<sup>9</sup> Muhammad Zakria Zakar. 2001. "Dual System of Education and Poverty Persistence in Pakistan". *Al-Sysia* 1 (2): 25-48.

- <sup>10</sup> Pervez Hoodbhoy. 2000. "What are They Teaching in Pakistani Schools". *The News* (English daily dated June 11). Lahore: Jang Publications.
- <sup>11</sup> Press statement of Mr. Moain Haider, Federal Interior Minister, Government of Pakistan, published in the daily Jang dated 15-8-2001. Recent survey conducted by *The News* and some private NGOs (e.g. *Sudhar*) have reported that the actual number of Madrassas is much higher than officially reported.
- <sup>12</sup> Nadeem Shahid. 2001. "An Enigmatic Crackdown". *The Nation* (an English daily) dated September, 03 2001.
- <sup>13</sup> Religious parties in Pakistan usually criticize the policies of the Government by alleging that "Government wants to appease the West". In Pakistan, no Government can afford such allegation.
- <sup>14</sup> Afzal Mahmood. 2001. "What Price Jihad Culture"? *Dawn* (English daily dated January 15) Karachi: Pakistan Herald Publications.
- <sup>15</sup> Nadeem Shahid. 2001. "An Enigmatic Crackdown". *The Nation* (English daily September 03,). Lahore: Nawia-Waqat Publications.
- <sup>16</sup> Resolution passed by Sipahi-Sahaba Pakistan in a public meeting held in Karachi dated 20-10-2000.
- <sup>17</sup> Ahmad Rashid. "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism". *Foreign Affairs* 78 (6): 22-52.
- <sup>18</sup> "Assuming the State Function". Editorial note of *The Nation*, an English daily published from Lahore dated 24-10-2000.
- <sup>19</sup> Last year, thousands of followers of Maulana Akram Awan camped near Islamabad and served a warning to Government of Pakistan to Islamize Pakistan's polity and economy within three months; otherwise they would invade Islamabad and implement Islamic system with the power of gun. High ranking Government officials rushed

to Maulana and assured to consider his demands seriously. With timely intervention of Government, a gory civil war was narrowly averted.

<sup>20</sup> Shahid Rafique. 2001. *The Future of Pakistan*. Karachi: Millat Publishers

<sup>21</sup> Ahsan Farooq. 2000. *Fate of Democracy in Pakistan*. Lahore: Wahid Publishers

<sup>22</sup> Time and again, neighboring states including India, China and Iran have expressed their concern over the activities of fundamentalists organizations in Pakistan and have urged to check them.

<sup>23</sup> Jessica Stern. 2000. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture". *Foreign Affairs* 79 (6): 12-25.

<sup>24</sup> "Islam in Asia" A report (April 16, 1999) authored by Dr. Satu Limaye, Chief Research Division, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. Honolulu, Hawaii. Also see Rasul Bakhgh Rais's article titled "Pakistan's Defining Movements" published in *The News* dated September 24, 2001. Also see Afzal Mehood,s article "What Price Jihad Culture" published in *Dawn* dated January 15, 2001.

<sup>25</sup> Ahmad Rashid. 2000. *Taliban Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*. London: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

<sup>26</sup> According to most of the Jihadi organizations, they are not only committed to fight with infidels in other countries but also within Pakistan to make it a "true Islamic State".

<sup>27</sup> Assuming the State function" Editorial of *The Nation*" October 24, 2000.

<sup>28</sup> The term was coined by the late Pakistani scholar Iqbal Ahmad, see *Dawn* dated 25-08-1998.

<sup>29</sup> Jessica Stern. 2000. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture". *Foreign Affairs* 79 (6):115-26.

<sup>30</sup> Recently, Government of Pakistan has started disassociating itself from Jihadi organizations. Government's

decision to impose ban on their funds raising in August 2001 may be one symbolic gesture.

<sup>31</sup> Almost all the major newspapers of the country through their editorial notes questioned the Government capability to implement the ban (see editorials/analysis of *Dawn*, *The News*, *The Nations* and *Jang* in the last week of August 2001)

<sup>32</sup> Jessica Stern. 2000. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture". *Foreign affairs* 79 (6):12-25.

<sup>33</sup> Ahmad Rashid. 1999. "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism". *Foreign Affairs* 78 (6)

<sup>34</sup> Dr. Manzur Ejaz. 2000. "A Simplistic Approach to Madrassas Problem". *The News* (an English daily April 30, . Lahore: *Jang* Publications.

<sup>35</sup> Mahir Ali. 2001. "Here Come the Avenger". *Dawn* (dated September 19). Also see "Problems of Law and Order" by Dr. Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti published in *Dawn* (dated September 17, 2001).

<sup>36</sup> "Afghanistan: a bitter harvest". See *The Economist* dated September 15, 2001 page 19.

<sup>37</sup> Robin Wright. 1992. "Islam Democracy and the West". *Foreign Affairs* 71 (3):132-45

<sup>38</sup> Ahmad Rashid. 1999. "The Taliban: Exporting Extremism". *Foreign Affairs* 78(6):22-52

<sup>39</sup> Amartya Sen. 1999. 'Democracy as a Universal value". *Journal of Democracy* 10 (3): 2-17.

