

Behind the Veil of Language: From the Philosophy of Language to Rūmi's Mystical Poetry

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Abstract

The poetic legacy of Jalal-ud-din Rumi, as reflected in his magnum opus *Mathnavi*, is a literary monument to Sūfism's enduring power which allows it to transcend cultural and historical boundaries. Engaging with the past and anticipating future challenges, Rumi enters into conversation with all possible strands of thought through poetic and metaphoric language. His coverage of the relationship between language and meaning predates, and in some instances, corresponds with all linguistic themes that would form the core of European philosophy in twentieth century, subsequently labeled as the "linguistic turn" in Social Sciences. Saussere's relational theory of language, Wittgenstein's 'language games,' Gadamerian hermeneutics, French postmodernism, all these themes have been raised in one way or another within the overall scope of Mathnavi. Rūmi's ruminations on language are scattered throughout and interspersed with terse but deep poetic expressions within the manifold stories of Mathnavi. In the current paper, I intend to critically compare Rūmi and major representatives of European linguistic philosophy and highlight the commonalities and differences between them. This comparison is undertaken not to formulate Rūmi's notion of language per se in relation to European philosophy of language. References to language in Rūmi's poetry cannot be understood separately from his overall worldview defined by sūfism's main idea of the unity of being (vah dat al-vujud). Language is viewed through this idea as a powerful tool for tracing transcendental presence in a phenomenal world of 'color and scent'. The paper demonstrates Rumi's employment of the limitless capacity of language to 'track' invisible traces of transcendental unity of being including the unity of religions.

Keywords: Rūmi, *sūfism*, poetry, language, meaning, transcendence

Introduction

"The limits of my language means the limits of my world."¹ This phrase of Wittgenstein is the most succinct yet all-embracing description of the essence of language. It points to the constitutive 'entanglement' of language with the nature of being and existence. The expression also tacitly suggests language's inherent 'desire' to break through its limitations by constan-tly pushing the boundaries of our limited world. The conceptualization of language as something that 'brings forth a world' rather than being a neutral medium of representation of outside reality forms the core thinking of the contemporary philosophy of language.

JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND CIVILIZATION

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¹Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Routledge: London and New-York, 1961), 115.

Ever since the publication of Saussure's "General Course of Linguistics" in 1915, twentieth century European philosophy has been defined by extensive preoccupation with language and linguistics to the extent that the overarching reach of language currently permeates the whole fabric of social sciences. To an extent, Saussure's concern that language, due to its omnipresence in human life, should be the preoccupation of not only linguists but every discipline has been steadily gaining ground in academic circles. From structuralism to poststructuralism, hermeneutics to pragmatism, language has come to embody a new role as a boundary-setting criterion of possible enquiry and understanding which extends as far as language can cast its shadow. It is with this image of language in mind that Gamader resoundingly asserts that "being that can be understood is language."² Furthermore, poststructuralist readings of society and ideology that take their inspiration from Saussure's relational theory of language have resulted in steering social and political sciences into a blind alley of relativism, where social order is deprived of any ultimate foundation and remains caught in a permanent cycle of discursive constructions and reconstructions.

The idea that we are bounded by and dwell inside linguistic confines has become so entrenched that it has inherently come to deny any possibility of extra-linguistic experience of being. The spoken and written word has acquired the status of something immanent, noumenal (a thing-in-itself), a point of ultimate reference, the only available measuring tool. Transcendence, earlier a concern of metaphysics, now manifests itself in the new garb of linguistic existence transcending individual existence.

In comparison, I attempt to provide an alternative yet complementary reading of language that was presented in a poetic form by Jalal ad-Din Rūmi more than eight centuries ago. Ideational underpinnings of Rūmi's poetry derive from Islamic mysticism and turning to his poetry in contradistinction to modern philosophy of language presents the topic in an entirely new light and from an entirely new perspective. First of all, poetry as the highest form of linguistic expression defies formal rules of syntax and grammar, rearranges words in an infinite number of possibilities with an infinite flow of meanings, and yet orchestrates this ever-sprawling multiplicity under the oneness of rhythmic unity. Based on the *sūfi* traditions of mysticism, Rūmi's poetry is narrated in the suggestive language of story-telling. Firstly, it tries to eschew philosophy's vocabulary as 'qīl-o-qāl' (meaningless verbal noise) and embraces metaphoric language of everyday life and popular folk stories to make a point without resorting to rigid concepts. Secondly, hidden under layers within layers of manifold stories of Rūmi's Mathnavi can be found his own ruminations on language (zabān), utterances (sukhan) and meaning (ma'ni). Taken in isolation from Rūmi's overall worldview, he could very well fit into the category of the philosophy of language, as his poetry in a simple figurative narration reflects all the major views and concerns of the contemporary philosophy of language. Thirdly, Rūmi's poetry reveals language's phenomenological essence ('araz), yet employs its limitless and originative capacity to "track" the transcendental presence in a phenomenal world of color and scent (rang-o bo). With a particular emphasis on Rūmi's references to the nature of language, the article demonstrates how he employs suggestive stories of Mathnavi to disclose Islamic sūfism's main idea of the unity-of-being.

²Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans., Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (Continuum: London/New-York, 2004), 478.

Behind the Veil of Language

2. Debates on the Nature of Language

In every culture, language has been conceived in a mediating role on the border between the human and the divine.³ The origin of the Plato's notion hermeneia refers to the god Hermes as an inventor of writing who brought divine truth to humans. In the ancient Greek culture, oracles took on the mantle of Hermes to fulfill this mediating role and their oracular pronouncements, covered in the fog of human language, neither wholly spoke out nor totally concealed the divine truth. Indeed, similar to poetic language, they rather indicated the traces of a higher meaning.⁴ Similar implications of the sacredness of language and beliefs about its religious origins abound in all cultures and traditions.

However, the sacred qualities of language come in tandem with its domineering ones. The employment of the originative power of language "to produce existence by producing the collectively recognized, and thus realized, representation of existence" inherently implies its association with absolute power as a tool of linguistic hegemony over minds and ways of thinking.⁵ In simple words, it is the only available tool for identity construction. History is fraught with examples of the sanctity of 'word' standing at the service of power, whether it be Genghiz Khan ordering to substitute Chinese characters with a created Mongolian script to institutionalize the vast Mongolian Empire, or Korean King Sejong embarking on a similar intervention to spread Hangul script in order to escape China's cultural reach, or most recently Kemal Ataturk's adoption of Latin-based alphabet instead of Arabic to cut loose of Turkey's Islamic past and embrace Western modernity.⁶ Different social and political modes of organization derive their sustainability from classifying the diversity of worldviews under the single conceptual hierarchy of commonly shared language.

Nineteenth and twentieth centuries were centuries of nationalisms and ideological battlegrounds which firmly established language as a tool of ideological control.⁷ Previously, the sanctity of language meant its restriction to a unique inner circle of language-bearers that guarded it against spreading into the common populace. Sanskrit remained an obscure language and a privilege of the elites belonging to Brahmin or other higher castes of Indian society up until the modern period.⁸ Medium of communication among Egyptian priests was so restricted that when ancient Greeks discovered its written form there was no priest left to explain their mystical writings. Hence, the Greek word for naming these Egyptian word-scripts is hieroglyphs, that is, 'sacred carvings.'⁹ In contemporary times, we can notice a reverse trend. No longer language remains a sacred and mystical repository of knowledge for the privileged few but has become a center of struggle for making its own vision of the world, reality and existence as widespread as





³Julie T. Andresen and Phillip M. Carter, *Languages in the World: How History, Culture,* and Politics Shape Language (Wiley Blackwell: West Sussex, 2016), 95-97.

⁴Jussy Backman, "Hermeneutics and the Ancient Philosophical Legacy: Hermeneia and Phronesis," in The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics, ed., Niall Keane, and Chris Lawn (Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 24.

Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Polity Press, 1984), 42.

⁶Julie T. Andersen and Phillip M. Carter, *Languages in the World*, 109.

Ibid., 66-75.

Ibid., 57.

⁹Julie T. Andresen and Phillip M. Carter, *Languages in the World: How History, Culture,* and Politics Shape Language (Wiley Blackwell: West Sussex, 2016), 96.

possible. Each and every novel political authority fosters its own social and political vocabulary, its own specific representation of the social world, for which it needs its own metaphors, euphemisms, idioms, and sayings to nourish proud nationalists or exemplary believers. Thus, language is conceived as an 'ideologically saturated' worldview that ensures 'a maximum of mutual understanding in all spheres of ideological life.'10

That language can be molded and remolded to produce a variety of meanings has to do with the specific properties of language. There are long-standing debates in the philosophy of language over the relationship between a word and its underlying meaning which, although in some ways contradictory to each other, still reveal various manifestations of language. To be sure, language is a form and not a substance, although this distinction is sometimes blurred in the writings of contemporary philosophers. Saussure contends that meaning does not derive from a word itself but rather emerges from other words that surround it.¹¹ If words had intrinsic meanings, so goes the logic of Saussure, they would all have exactly the same meaning when compared in parallel from language to language, from culture to culture.¹² A word can be modified without affecting its sound simply by surrounding it with other words, thereby its meaning changes depending on other terms come along with it.¹³ In this regard, words are defined by their differences and juxtaposition against each other. And from words, interwoven into a web-like mosaic of differences, a linguistic structure comes into shape in which words mutually constitute each other's meaning. In such a relational concept of language, units and grammar are nothing more than reflections of the same basic linguistic principles, that is, functioning of linguistic oppositions for production of meaning.

Saussure's views on language came to be known as the relational theory of language and its adherents are referred to as structuralists. Giving the name of structuralism to this theoretical movement seems to be a misnomer since its adherents stress arbitrariness of linguistic sign (word).¹⁴ Yet it is exactly its arbitrariness that prevents language from arbitrary modification. Language is a medium which is shared by everyone and in order to guarantee mutual comprehensibility, linguistic structure remains the most stable of all social institutions endowed with 'collective inertia toward innovation^{,15}

Structuralism tends to see order in contingency and apply the same linguistic principle to the analysis of social order and structures. On the contrary, the linguistic school generally known as pragmatism highlights a totally different property of language,

¹⁰Mikhael Bakhtin, "Polyphonic Discourse in the Novel," in *Discourse Studies Reader:* Main Currents in Theory and Analysis, ed., Johannes Angermuller, Dominique Maingueneau, and Ruth Wodak (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2014), 32.

¹¹Ferdinand de Saussure, "The Value of the Sign," in *Discourse Studies Reader: Main* Currents in Theory and Analysis, ed., Johannes Angermuller, Dominique Maingueneau, and Ruth Wodak (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2014), 25.

¹²Ibid., 24. ¹³Ibid., 25.

¹⁴The core of Saussure teachings on language exactly stress arbitrariness of linguistic sign, see "The Nature of the Linguistic Sign," in The Routledge Language and Cultural Theory Reader, ed., Lucy Burke, Tony Crowley, and Alan Girvin (Rutledge: London and New-York, 2001), 26-27.

¹⁵Ibid., 29.

that is, its creative ability to bring forth reality. Following Wittgenstein, pragmatists stress that "a meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it."¹⁶ Saying is a condition of doing and vice versa. Language is not a description of outside world, for we cannot ascertain the existence of non-linguistic reality outside our linguistic practices.¹⁷ Utterance is, therefore, at the same time a linguistic practice constituting reality. Promising, declaring war by supreme commanders and heads of state, pledging marriage allegiance through the utterance of specific expressions in various cultures, are all obvious examples of producing action through words. Meaning of a word therefore springs from involvement in action through the use of language or the so called 'language game.¹⁸ Contrary to structuralism, pragmatism tends to see contingency in order. Pragmatic school deprives philosophy of its monopoly over the source of meaning by bringing it back to the field of everyday ordinary speech.

Critique, or better called a modification of structuralism, also came from another corner of linguistic offshoots under the rubric of poststructuralism. It is a diverse strand of theoretical positions united by their adoption of Saussure's relational theory of language as the foundation of society's discursively constructed system of differential relations. However, for poststructuralists, social orders are never fully structured but are always open to political struggles that result in a relative fixation of the meaning of terms.²⁰ As such, they treat language as a tool of action and power to delineate the boundary between what can be said and written in a particular period of time and what is actually said and written.²¹ Limits of 'sayability' bracket the extent of human creativity within a restricted area of possibilities and produce subjects that take the existing order as natural and legitimate. Discursive practices permeate every possible habitat of human activities and affect subject constructions, such as ideological subject, aesthetic subject, scientific subject, etc. that are confined to see, think, speak and write in the delineated contours of expressability.²²

Although poststructuralism claims to have freed itself from searching for foundationalist grounds in social orders, power or power relations is still the one discernible foundational 'brick' in poststructuralism on which the structuration and direction of discursive practices are based. Discursive practices do not seek, so to speak,

²²Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, trans. G. M. Goshgarian (London: Versobooks, 2014), 262-269.



¹⁶Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed., G. E. M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wight, trans., D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), 662.

⁷Daniel Whiting, ed., *The Later Wittgenstein on Language* (Palgrave McMillan: London,

^{2010), 8.} ¹⁸Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophic Investigations* (Blackwell: Oxford, 1958), paragraph

¹⁹Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Communication as a Language Game," in *Discourse Studies* Reader: Main Currents in Theory and Analysis, ed., Johannes Angermuller, Dominique Maingueneau, and Ruth Wodak (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2014), 48. ²⁰Francisco Panizza and Romina Miorelli, "Taking Discourse Seriously: Discursive

Institutionalism and Post-structuralist Discourse Theory," Political Studies 61 (2013): 302.

²¹Michel Foucault, "An Archaeology of Discourse," in Discourse Studies Reader: Main Currents in Theory and Analysis, ed., Johannes Angermuller, Dominique Maingueneau, and Ruth Wodak (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2014), 109.

to get to the heart of the matter, to 'scratch out' the meaning behind the walls of words.²³ Words, utterances, and language by themselves do not possess an inherent quality to generate meaning. Meaning emerges from the use of language in specific social contexts. Meaning, so presented is of secondary value, subordinate to a power play of practices and rules employed in negotiating meaning within discourse communities.²⁴

Contrary to this reading, hermeneutics takes on a wholly cultural perspective on meaning, which it prefers to call understanding. Gadamer, the most well-known representative of the hermeneutic school, views culturally situated perspective of individuals, something he defines as prejudices or pre-judgments, as a necessary precondition for understanding.²⁵ Our cultural environment, shaped by tradition, authority and prejudices is an inescapable foundational stone on the basis of which we develop our own culturally distinct horizons of understanding. It is also our distinct perspectival 'angle' which allows us to have a possibility to engage with other, different horizons of understanding.²⁶ How language fits into this description has some implied link with Wittgenstein's connection between saying and doing. Although Gadamer is talking about words and images, rather than saying and doing, yet images in a hermeneutic conception are a result of words continuously "bringing forth a new reality." Words, especially novel explorations of word usage, such as novel metaphors, idioms or expressions continuously recreate new understandings of reality and, as such, establish a link between language and phenomenological presentation. Words have presentational qualities, they present the world as if through 'lingual shadowing.'27

Hermeneutics, in line with a general trend of modern philosophy, abandons an ultimate, supra-contextual point of reference. Thus, it limits meaning and understanding from within the confines of cultural and linguistic lifeworld of the subjects. Discussing the concept of hermeneutic circle, Heidegger talks about the impossibility of breaking out of the 'brackets' of personal pre-understanding (Gadamerian prejudices) that orient our engagement with and interpretation of other subjective lifeworlds, cultures, traditions, and historical backgrounds.²⁸ There is no way to escape embedded-ness in cultural traditions, since there is no other foundation except our own cultural framework to build our understanding and engage in interpretation. Yet our lifeworld always remains open to the possibilities of transformation through constant encounters with others, different lifeworlds and contexts. These encounters although do not allow us to transcend our historicity and language, nonetheless, they elevate our initial understanding by fusing our own horizons with the horizons of others.²⁹ In this not completely identical fusion of horizons, we come to grasp perspectives of others through expanding and deepening our

²³Johannes Angermuller, Dominique Maingueneau, and Ruth Wodak, eds., *Discourse* Studies Reader: Main Currents in Theory and Analysis (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2014), 3.

²⁴Ibid., 3. ²⁵Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 270.

²⁶Ibid., 299 - 306.

²⁷Ibid., 444 - 445.

²⁸Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 268-278.

²⁹Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and "Politics of Recognition" (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 72-73.

own. The infinitely recurring fusion of horizons is a source of generation of new meanings and understandings that expand our phenomenological lifeworld.³⁰

Hermeneutics is a philosophy, which, arguably out of all contemporary philosophical traditions, turns to literature and poetry for instruction. In Gadamer's own words "conceptual explication is never able to exhaust the content of a poetic image."³¹ Conceptual language naturally tends to disassociate itself from concrete life situations that give rise to it by gravitating towards universalization and general applicability. While literature, on the other hand, depicts in an original form the "singularities that define life as an idiom."³² Poetic form is a form of language that dissolves all rules and conventions that otherwise govern the construction of meaning in other areas of language application. While poetry is an unrestricted, free play of words that sends meaning off into new unexplored directions; conceptual language, on the contrary, is a complete whole, rigid and inflexible, that rather tries to bend new encounters, experiences, and perspectives into its limited confines.

Heidegger, regarded as the founder of hermeneutic thinking, subsequently came to the realization of the futility of hermeneutic philosophy and dedicated himself to developing a more poetic concept of being.³³ His understanding of the poetic, expounded in his views on Holderlin's poetry, makes him the closest of all European philosophers to the teachings of $s\bar{u}fism$. For here, Heidegger made a marked distinction about the essence of thinking (read philosophy) and poetry which we can also find in *sufi* teachings. "The thinker says being, the poet names the holy."³⁴ The holy of the poet refers to a different level of being in the world, a condition of being which goes beyond the realm of useful. It is an attitude and engagement with the world free from the shackles of self-interest. It is a way of looking at the world without wearing glasses of utility. This kind of attitude lies at the foundation of Rūmi's mystical poetry and it also has a close association with the nature of language.

3. Language as a Medium for Describing Ontological Oneness through Epistemological Manyness

When one is reading *Mathnavi* with a background knowledge of the philosophy of language, one would be able to find that the core messages of all major linguistically informed schools of contemporary philosophy are reflected in Rūmi's major poetic work, expressed in multiple forms of metaphoric expressions within the depths of his suggestive stories. It might seem contradictory to our usual way of thinking that such a diversity of opinions about the nature of language could logically fit into one organically connected whole. Yet, for Rūmi, who comes from a tradition of Islamic mysticism that perceives the



³⁰Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 305.

³¹Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Gadamer Reader*, ed. Richard E. Palmer (Evanston, North-Western University, 2007), 37.

³²Dennis J. Schmidt, "Hermeneutics and Ethical Life. On the Return to Factical," in *The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics*, ed. Niall Keane, and Chris Lawn (Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 67,

^{2016), 67.} ³³Jean Grondin, *The Philosophy of Gadamer*, trans. Kathryn Plant and Chesham Acumen (McGill-Queen University Press, 2003), 71.

³⁴Martin Heidegger, "Post Script to What is Metaphysics," in *Pathmarks*, ed. and trans., William McNeill (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1998), 237.

Behind the Veil of Language

world through the prism of the unity-of-being, complementarities and contradictions are incorporated simultaneously in a natural order of things. Although there are different ways of understanding the unity-of-being, the central tenet in all schools of mysticism, which the current author believes is reflected in Rūmi's poetry, is a perception of the unity-of-being through a dichotomy of oneness of being (Allah) and manyness of knowledge (ways of knowing the 'being').³⁵ Stated differently, while there could be numerous ways of knowing Allah (being), they are all, in the final instance, a description of the ontological oneness. The core of Rūmi's views on language exactly comes from language's mediating role in describing ontological oneness in the garb of epistemological manyness. This is also the prism through which we can compare and contrast Rūmi with modern philosophers of language which may reveal to us their commonalities as well as their fundamental differences.

First of all, the idea of ontological oneness and epistemological manyness guides Rūmi to view all doctrines and arguments expressed through language as a kind of aporetic³⁶ nodes of contradictory statements containing the seeds of truth.

Just so everyone in matters of doctrine *Gives a different description of the hidden subject* A philosopher expounds in one way And a critic at one refutes his propositions This truth and that truth cannot be all true And yet not all of them entirely astray in error There is no fancy in the universe without some truth...³⁷

The double-pronged nature of every argumentative 'fancy' as simultaneously containing 'truth' and 'error' has to do with two essential gualities of language. The first quality pertains to language as essentially holding the same attributes as other phenomena, and therefore, subject to the same cycle of death and resurrection. In one of its many allegorical descriptions, Rumi compares language to a camel eating a thorn after it has already withered and lost its original 'greenness.' The same thorn, when consumed when it was still a green plant, brings nothing but "pleasure and nutriment" (naf'va la Z Z Similar transformation happens to any spoken utterance and written word when at they separate from their 'substance' and descend into an earthly 'form.' Observed in a similar way by Bourdieu, any novel word or expression, theory or argument, once popularized and used repetitively, loses its originality and novelty and becomes worn out.³⁹ Word covers 'substance' in dust (*khākalod mīiayad sokhan*).⁴⁰ In similar terms, Gadamer refers to a 'living language' in continuous renewal, unconstrained by rigidity of

³⁵This idea was explicitly the focus in writings of a celebrated Sufi mystic Farghani. On this idea see for example W. C. Chittick, "Spectrums of Islamic Thought: Sa'id al-Din Farghani on the Implications of Oneness and Manyness," in *The Legacy of Persian Medieval Sūfism*, ed., Leonard Lewisohn (Khaniqahi Nimatullahi Publications, 1992), 203-218.

⁶Derived from the word aporia – a difficulty encountered in establishing the theoretical truth of the proposion, created by the presence of evidence both for and against it.

¹Jalal-ud-Din Rūmi, "All False Doctrines Contain an Element of Truth," in *The Masnavi* of Rūmi, trans. E. H. Whinfield (Evinity Publishing Inc., 2009), 144-145.

³⁸Jalal-ud-Din Rūmi, *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rūmi, First Daftar*, trans., Reynolds Nicholson (Gibb Memorial Trust, 2017), couplet 3994. ³⁹Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power* (Polity Press, 1984), 63-64.

⁴⁰Rūmi, *The Mathnavi of Jalaluddin Rūmi, First Daftar*, couplet 4001.

dictionary definitions, having properties of a poetic essence that can be neither exhausted nor restrained by conceptual explication.⁴¹ Pragmatists point out open-ended nature of words and terms, oriented towards use in infinite number of future contexts, without the possibility of their meaning being finitely specified.⁴²

The second quality of language mentioned above is akin to, and at the same time, reversely related to Saussure's concept of meaning is negative oppositional differences. While Saussure asserts that "in language there are only differences without positive terms"; Rūmi, on the contrary, attempts to demonstrate that it is exactly through their opposites that words come to reveal in each other their hidden meanings. Thus, during the daylight we see the world in various colors and assign it to the nature of things themselves to radiate their specific colors. But when the veil of *darkness* covers the world, we then understand through this difference - darkness - that the source of all colors we erroneously assigned to things themselves is *light* and things themselves become colorful only through the benevolence of light. Light is thus disclosed to us through its opposite 'darkness' (pas bah zidd nūr paydā shod tūrā).⁴³ If opposites reveal each other's meaning, then anyone of the opposite words does not imply negative meanings, which is usually assigned to the other side of the equation. If a bird has only one wing either left or right, how it will be possible for it to take off and fly (*morgh-i* yakparah az parīdan $\bar{a}jiz$ ast).⁴⁴ Both left and right wings are necessary to have an effect. Therefore, Rūmi calls life a reconciliation of opposites (zindagānī āshti-___idd-hāst).⁴⁵

But Rūmi goes further in exposing that not only opposite words mutually reveal each other's meanings but also that every meaning of a word is a unity of opposites as well. To the extent allowed by the flexibility of Persian language, Rūmi sometimes employs homonyms to demonstrate that each and every word not only has several layers of meaning but also has perfectly opposite meanings. Several couplets of Mathnawi refer to people's blindness that do not see the higher meaning behind the names, such as the example of people wrongly calling a desert 'mafāzah' which means a desert without water and vegetation, a place where one can find death and extinction.⁴⁶ Yet 'mafāzah' also has a completely opposite meaning of a place of salvation and emancipation. These completely contradictory meanings impart the word "mafāzah" with wholeness in the unity of its opposite aspects. World is "mafāzah" that has a potential to be both a place of extinction and salvation, death of the self, emancipation from the self, and resurrection in a selfless mode.

4. Language as Interpretation, Action and Discourse: Themes of Philosophy of Language in Rūmi's Poetry

Rūmi's occasional allusions to language are not of primary order, but rather come in the discussion of language's inherent relation to the problem of meaning. It is no coincidence that in the Arabic language and in all other languages that have been subject to the influence of Arabic, which includes Persian as well, the meaning of the word

⁴³Rūmi, *The Mathnavi of Jalaluddin Rūmi, First Daftar*, couplet 1128.

JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND CIVILIZATION





⁴¹Gadamer, *The Gadamer Reader*, 37.

⁴²Whiting, *The Later Wittgenstein on Language*, 121-22.

⁴⁴Rūmi, *The Mathnavi of Jalaluddin Rūmi, Second Daftar*, couplet 1554. ⁴⁵Ibid., *First Daftar*, couplet 1293.

⁴⁶Rūmi, The Mathnavi of Jalaluddin Rūmi, Second Daftar, couplet 1473.

' $\bar{a}lam$ ' – the world, universe, cosmos – has a root connection with the word $\bar{a}l\bar{a}ma$ ' – sign or mark. In Rūmi's poetry, all the words serve as invisible signs or traces of something beyond this universe. To disclose this inherent connection between language (*zabān*) and meaning (*ma*'*ni*), he draws parallels with the relation of soul and body.

What connexion have the meaning (soul) with the body? What connexion has the apprehension of things with (their) names?⁴⁷

Meaning-language relationsh-ip thus harks back to the same unity-of-being worldview in which meaning could be seen as ontologically one and language/words/names as epistemologically many. No word at any time can signify and embrace within itself boundless possibilities of meaning. Meaning is the source of language's constant flux of renewal and rejuvenation. Keeping up with and not falling behind the spiritual source (ma'ni) can endow language with a constant power of reincarnation in a new form. A word does not remain stagnant as water in the pond, rather flows in tandem with its spiritual substance like a roaring mountain river. It incessantly enters into a continuous cycle of birth and death in the phenomenological world of 'color and scent.' For the world of color (phenomenological world), in all its different and diverse shades and hues, comes into existence through the *spell* of a word. The double meaning of English word spell here exactly conveys its mystical effect that to spell words is to bring out their magical powers. Still words and utterances come out from a sea of silence and die going back to where they originally came from.⁴⁸ Their next resurrection brings them back from the dead, brings them back 'repainted,' that is, narrated in a different coat of paint. Their next resurrection has a different mode of being. Rumi in one of his most insightful stories "King and his Two Servants," told through the mouth of the King's first servant, exposes the interpenetrating relationship of meaning-word-actionphenomena which represents one of the core parts of Rūmi's overall Islamic sūfi teaching.

The slave said, "O King, the mind cannot but despair if you say that accidents (phenomena) are not carried over. O King, there is nothing but despair for the servant (of God), if the accident (phenomenon) that has gone is not coming back If there were no carrying over and resurrection of accidents, action would be vain and words (mere) babble. These accidents are carried over in another guise: the resurrection of everything mortal is another (mode of) existence Look on houses and edifices: they were as tales in the (mind of) the architect. ('Twas) the accident (design) and ideas (proceeding) from the architect (that) brought the tools and pillars (into existence) from (their respective) crafts (professions) What but some fancy and accident and idea is the origin and source of every (handi)craft? The beginning, which is thought (mind), comes to an end in action This world is one thought (emanating) from the Universal Intellect (Mind): the Intellect (Mind) is like a king, and the ideas (are his) envoys;⁴⁹

⁴⁷Ibid., *Second Daftar*, couplet 3291.

⁴⁸Rūmi, *The Mathnavi of Jalaluddin Rūmi, First Daftar*, couplet 1140.

⁴⁹There are very few authoritative translations of the *Mathnawi*, but even those which are considered the best, like *Mathnawi* of Reynolds A. Nicholson or Whinfield, still either suffer from

These couplets show that Rūmi is so close yet farther apart from modern linguistic philosophies. They contain the gist of three schools of philosophy, including hermeneutics, linguistic pragmatism, and postructuralism, expressed in several lines of rhymed phrases. Firstly, in close association with Gadamer's understanding of 'word and image', Rūmi talks about the continuous resurrection of phenomena, yet each resurrected phenomenon comes in a different guise as each of them is repainted in a different 'color.' For each color that is carried over and returns is never empty but 'filled with verbal babel' (rang kay khālī bod az qīl-o-qhāl) that brings it back in a different mode of existence.⁵⁰ If we recount that Gadamer's 'fusion of horizons' refers to different horizons of understanding fused into something new and different from previous horizons, we can clearly see the affinity of hermeneutics and Rūmi's sūfism. Yet their underlying assumptions and conclusions are fundamentally different. Gadamer's hermeneutics does not see anything beyond a dialogue, an open conversation. Fusion with the language of the other, through which understanding occurs, is by itself a happening of truth.⁵¹ The world is the 'shadow' of the language and its phenomenological transformations come from the lingual blending of colors that result in new historical understandings. For Rūmi, the source of transformations is extra-linguistic and such a one-sided reliance on language would resemble a 'one-wing bird' allegory. Rumi's main theme in Mathnavi starts with separation from the "one," so a return to its original essence lies in removing layer within layers of lingual sedimentation. This bears some resemblance to Heidegger's understanding of hermeneutics as destruction through which a philosopher scratches away layers of interpretation to arrive at the experience of things in themselves and the pure phenomena.⁵² Heidegger further polished his position on language afterwards by describing it as "the house of being," with neither of the two - Being and language being identical to nor independent from each other.⁵³

The second point from the story of 'King and His Two Servants' also manifests the understanding of action as connected to words and reappearance of 'colorful' phenomena. Rūmi makes this connection clearer and forceful in other sections of Mathnawi.

A single word lays waste a (whole) world, turns dead foxes into lions.⁵⁴ Or.

Know that a word which suddenly shot from the tongue is like an arrow shot from the bow. O son, that arrow does not turn back on its way: you must dam a torrent at the source.³

⁷Rūmi, The Mathnavi of Jalaluddin Rūmi, First Daftar, couplet 2469.

⁵¹Inga Romer, "Method," in *The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics*, ed., Niall Keane, and Chris Lawn (Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 91.

⁵²Ibid., 89. ⁵³Ibid., 90.

⁵⁴Rūmi, The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rūmi, First Daftar, couplet 1597.

JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND CIVILIZATION



difficulties in transferring meaning from Persian to English, or remain incomplete. The author made use of whatever is available but unfortunately it does not impart the same depth of meaning as in the original. For example, the word 'araz' is translated as accident or design in Nicholson's edition, although it could be more akin to the philosophic notion of phenomenon or "image" in Gadamer's hermeneutics. In very few places the author takes a freedom to insert its own words in brackets so that to render meaning more complete.; Rūmi, The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rūmi, Second Daftar, 958-978.

Here, we can clearly see that Rūmi is speaking in a metaphoric language about the speech acts of late Wittgenstein followers. For when we talk about the destruction of the world by a word, we talk about words turning into actions. Rūmi inserts these verses as interludes of reflections about connection between words and actions inside the story of the 'Merchant and his Parrot.' The story narrates the merchant's promise to his parrot that he will relay his grief of separation to other parrots during his trade mission to India. But once the merchant relays his grief to other parrots, one of them upon hearing the travails of the merchant's parrot's life inside a cage suddenly falls from a tree and dies from sorrow. The merchant comes back from the trip and tells his parrot what has happened to the fellow parrot. The merchant does not realize, however, that the news will produce the same effect on his parrot also leading to the parrot's sudden and unexpected death. The merchant then repents his sayings as they bring forth effects into actions. The parrot's death in this story relates an allegory of spiritual death of one's own self which is brought about by the illocutionary effect⁵⁶ of the merchant's words.

The third point that the previously mentioned couplets in the story of 'King and his Two Servants' highlight relates to the discursive nature of all human undertakings. Although the English translation of the Persian word '*peesheh*' usually refers to crafts and occupations but Rūmi employs its different, much broader meaning, that is, any human pursuit. Quoting an example from the field of architecture, he makes readers look at this discipline differently, as an exposure of human fancy and ideas from mind to words - or tales of the mind of the architect - to beautiful and magnificent buildings. For a human being is nothing more and nothing beyond than his fancies and ideas (*ai barādar*, $t\bar{u} ham\bar{a}n and\bar{i}sha'i$)⁵⁷ that constitute the subject through discursive practices. In a short parable about the judge, it is demonstrated how absurd and even sometimes ridiculous it might seem to look at the world through the narrow confines of one's discursively constructed disciplines.

He (the player) at chess said, "This is the house of the rook." "By what way," said he, "did the house come into its hands? Did it buy the house, or inherit it?"

A grammarian said, "Zayd has struck 'Amr." Said, "How did he chastise him without any offence (on his part)? 58

Chess players and grammarians speak in the language specific to their environment but the judge interprets it in his own legal language. The house of the rook in chess, for the judge, is a matter of its acquisition either through inheritance or purchase. While a grammarian is trying to explain the rules of Arabic grammar, the judge, on the other hand, still comprehends it as a legal issue. Such is also the result of all ideological effects on the constitution of particular types of subjects. Wars and peace is nothing more than the result of a play of fanciful ideas.

⁵⁵Ibid., couplets 1658-1659.

 $^{^{56}}$ Perlocutionary effect is a type of speech-act that produces an effect upon the listener in causing the listener to act in a certain way.

⁵⁷ Rūmi, *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rūmi, Second Daftar*, couplet 277. ⁵⁸ Ibid., couplets 3627-3629.

Their peace and their war (turn) on a phantasy,

and their pride and their shame spring from a phantasy;⁵⁹

5. Tracing Oneness in Manyness: 'That One, From which a Hundred thousand Manifestations Arise'

The cord binding the four philosophies of language covered in this article is their relativistic anti-foundationalism. Hermeneutics, poststructuralism and pragmatism all in one way or another project a linguistic construction of reality, which is, by definition, arbitrary and subject to reconstruction. Poetic allegories on language that Rūmi sporadically inserts in different places of *Mathnavi* also suggest that he is largely in agreement with these philosophies. It is exactly due to the speculative capacity of language that Rūmi sees words creating worlds. A comparison with Saussarean structuralism, on the other hand, gives us a perspective to connect seemingly arbitrary relativism of language with the foundationalist and universalizing tone of Rūmi's overall message. Rumi does this by applying the same principles of linguistic philosophy to depict the idea of the unity-of-being.

As mentioned above, following $s\bar{u}fism$'s main teaching of the unity of being, life has been perceived as a reconciliation of opposites. According to the pragmatic understanding of language, action is inherently constituted by the use of language; then the same principle can be applied to every word as a reconciliation or a unity of oppositions. In the previous section it was shown that not only opposite words reveal each other's meaning but also that every word conceals within itself its potential opposite. Each word springs out from the unity of the meta-word, moving in the direction of generating an infinite multiplicity of words.

At the same time, every word is a reflection of the oneness of the meta-word, which potentially endows it with an inner power to generate an endless number of meanings. All languages have words with a very broad range of applicability and having diverse meanings in different contexts. As we continue to expand the boundaries of our world, words will continue to morph into new meanings, new images and new realities. Yet with this multiplication ad infinitum, words are also transcendentally united as one thread all attached to their original source. Rūmi's poetry is not only doing worlds with words. He is also doing the reverse, that is, to bring back words to their true original essence, to show that through vastness of their multiplied meanings they all point towards one direction.

The story of the "Tree of Life" in *Mathnawi* is making the same point in a more vivid way. A certain king hears from veritable sources that there exists the tree of life in Hindūstan and whoever eats its fruit will live forever. The king is anxious to find it and sends his most trusted envoy in search of this tree. The envoy spends years traversing every part and corner of Hindustan, roaming from city to city, from mountain to valley but fails to find the right path to it. In every place he hears different reports about its whereabouts and manifestations. Frustrated and hopeless he decides to visit the local *shaykh* who dwells in the vicinity. After hearing his travails, the *shaykh* gives response as to why he could not find this tree,

⁵⁹Rūmi, *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rūmi, First Daftar*, couplet 71.

JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND CIVILIZATION



Behind the Veil of Language

Thou hast gone after the form, thou hast gone astray... Sometimes it is named 'tree,' sometimes 'sun'; sometimes it is named 'sea,' sometimes 'cloud.' (It is) that one (thing) from which a hundred thousand effects (manifestations) arise: its least effects are everlasting life. The names that befit that one are countless...He has thousands of names, yet is One... Pass on from the name and look at the attributes, in order that the attributes may show thee the way to the essence." The disagreement of mankind is caused by names: peace ensues when they advance to the essence (denoted by the name).⁶⁰

The way to essence is through a name, a language, which gives us a clue, a trace of the desirable track to follow. Rūmi thus urges us to pass on beyond names and see oneness in thousands of manifestations of language. The reason that the king's envoy could not find the tree of life is because he has been after the name/word not the attributes that each name/word shares and which makes them all united despite their diversity.

Elsewhere in his lyrical poetry, Rūmi hints vaguely at the rise of diverse cultures in different corners of the world as a result of the broken path-seekers getting shipwrecked in the sea of quest for unification with the One.⁶¹ As every path-seeker's tortuous road is different, they have left diverse paths as a legacy for their would-be followers to emulate. With a passage of time, these unique paths have turned into traditions and have become mere imitations. From here follow thousands of manifestations of the One mentioned in the 'Tree of Life' story in the form of different names of 'tree,' 'sun,' 'sea' or 'cloud,' all pointing to the same essence. Paths might be different in different cultures and religions, but they all have the potential to lead to the same destination.

Language conceals what lies behind the veil of language. In contrast to Gadamer, Rūmi believes that removing the language barrier will emancipate us from our initial cultural 'prejudices' and pre-judgments. Directly shared empathy is more important than indirectly shared language (*hamdilī az hamzabānī bihtar ast*).⁶² Even though discourses of language are illuminating yet they can never reach the level of speechless spiritual comprehension. This is what Rūmi means when he says that sometimes you can meet a Hindu and a Turk who can share the same 'language' of spirit despite their differences in language, culture and traditions as opposed to two Turks, who despite sharing one language of communication, religion and culture, remain strangers to each other. It is also in this light we can comprehend Rūmi's ecstatic revelations that he is neither "from the East, nor from the West, neither Christian, nor Jew, nor Gabr (Zoroastrian), nor Moslem." Only those who are able to peep beyond the veil of language have the power to relate to each other despite their cultural and religious differences.

In the story of 'Prophet Moses and the Shepherd,' Rūmi dwells on the distinction between the 'language of ecstasy' ($zab\bar{a}ni h\bar{a}l$) and language of communication. As the story goes, Prophet Moses rejects a shepherd's pleadings to serve him and become his

76

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⁶⁰Rūmi, *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rūmi, Second Daftar*, couplets 3670-3674, 3680.

⁶¹Mavlana Jalal-ud-Dīn Muhammadi Balkhi, *Divāni Shams* (Intishaaraati Sokhan: Tehran, 1387), Ghazal no. 22.

⁶²Rūmi, *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rūmi*, *Second Daftar*, couplet 1207.

Behind the Veil of Language

disciple due to his inappropriate language and use of foolish words in addressing him. Immediately a rebuke comes from the heaven chastising the Prophets Moses' harsh treatment of the shepherd and ordering that he should serve as a channel of unity not separation. Even though the shepherd used inappropriate language, however, the tongue and speech are of no value, rather the inward state of feeling is valuable. Moses, regretful of his deed, follows the shepherd and apologizes to him confessing that:

Do not seek any rules or method (of worship); say whatsoever your distressful heart desires. Your blasphemy is (the true) religion, and your religion is the light of the spirit... O you who are made secure by God doeth whatso He willeth, go, loose your tongue without regard (for what you say)."⁶³

True religion is thus not defined by either rules or methods of worship, or by the language one uses to describe his inner state. Prophet Moses, in the last instance, calls the shepherd's blasphemy a true religion. So, what might appear blasphemy to us through language is in actuality a mode of worship.

In the Hindoos the idiom of Hind (India) is praiseworthy; in the Sindians the idiom of Sind is praiseworthy...⁶⁴

Every word has a meaning within the cultural context of where it is being used. Things that might sound to us as blasphemy are actually a mode of worship for the other side of the divide. The question might be asked as to whether there is no contradiction in putting one's faith in words and names even if they are 'praiseworthy' in different cultural contexts; for the goal is to pass on beyond names and words. Rumi answers that even though we may pursue names in the beginning of our 'journey,' however, ultimately all of them will lead to the same destination. Every first step in our search gets entangled in names and words but false beginnings will eventually end up in true ends. From this perspective, whatever starting point we might begin our worship with, whether it is our infatuation with 'tree of life' or 'sun,' we will be nonetheless drawn to one and the same essence behind every name. Terms of 'kufr' (denial) and 'īmān' (belief) thus all become relative and interchangeable terms. In the story of 'How an enemy spat on the face of the Prince of the Faithful, 'Ali," we read that an infidel was vanquished on the battlefield by 'Ali's and in a fit of indignation spat on his face. But 'Ali did not draw out his sword and instead spared his life astounding the infidel. The act of sin committed by the infidel had an effect of changing his heart. It is of this effect of 'sin' that Rumi talks about the sin as a manifestation of worship "Thou hast committed a sin better than any act of piety."⁶⁵

The distinction between 'language of ecstasy' and 'language of communication' in the story of 'Prophet Musa and the Shepherd' is the distinction between those who overcome the shackles of 'names' and those who still remain imprisoned by them. No distinction is made between religions, cultures, languages etc. As Rūmi says that when we go beyond 'names,' confusion and uncertainty of letters will succumb to oneness from head to toe.⁶⁶



⁶³Ibid., couplets 1784-1786.

⁶⁴Ibid., couplets 1757.

 ⁶⁵Rūmi, *The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rūmi*, *First Daftar*, couplet 3830.
⁶⁶Ibid., couplet 2915.

But what does it actually mean 'to go beyond names'? In *sūfism*, this essentially means emancipation of one's own self. Complete emancipation from the self is the core of all *sufi* teachings and is also the final step of the *sufi* journey. Rumi makes a direct connection between emancipation from the self and going beyond language, "If thou wouldst pass beyond name and letter, oh, make thyself wholly purged of self."⁶⁷ From the perspective of the modern philosophers of language, this is where they would part roads with Rūmi as possibility of extra-linguistic experience would nullify their whole philosophical edifice. From the poststructulist perspective, stepping beyond the boundaries of language means purging all our accumulated knowledge acquired by language constituting us as discursive subjects. Such a condition is untenable as the denial of every discursive circle necessarily presupposes another discursive circle necessary to deny the previous one. Pragmatism could also point to the inherent contradictions of such a possibility as the relationship of human action with language is inherently constitutive. The possibility of extra-linguistic experience basically means the denial of human action, a view that Rumi shares with pragmatism as well. The idea of the unity-of-being on the basis of which Rūmi derives his ideas about the nature of language might also seem to be drifting towards 'absolute knowing,' a condition of absolute awareness transcending the linguistic confines of our understanding. This is precisely what postmodern studies in language have been doubtful of all along as manifestations of 'Platonic idealism' that tries to root human condition in unshakeable absolute and universal foundations. Instead, hermeneutic readings of human condition offer only a possibility of understanding the 'here and now' of our life experiences, through the prism of which we interpret our past and in constant to other understandings we set off new understandings of our vet unknown future. In Rumi's universe, there is no philosophically credible way to leap out from the circle of language except through a leap of faith.

6. Conclusion

Current debates in academic circles on the issue of language are dominated by the philosophical approach. Although $s\bar{u}fism$ as well as other gnostic traditions are less adaptable to the academic environment, we still can try to enrich our discussions by bringing in a perspective that can potentially overturn our usual understandings of language, society and universe. The current paper was an attempt to show that beyond the usual understandings of $s\bar{u}fism$ as something esoteric; it can shed light on the most immediate of our individual and social problems but can also open up new understandings of familiar philosophical subjects. Rūmi does this in a very simple, easyto-comprehend manner through simple stories about events encountered everyday, stories without complicated plots. Through his poetry he teaches us to see the unusual in the usual.

In this article, I tried to demonstrate Rūmi's unique and comprehensive grasp of language's essence. Where poststructuralists see power play in constructing coherent and meaningful discourses, Rūmi observes a word's unity of meaning with all other words. Where structuralism sees negative differences of oppositions, Rūmi observes mutual revelation and wholeness. Where hermeneutics sees the cultural context of the subject, Rūmi believes that the subject creates and so can step over the culture. As mentioned

⁶⁷The Mathnawi of Jalaluddin Rūmi, Second Daftar, couplet 3458.

JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND CIVILIZATION

earlier, Heidegger was the closest of philosophers to $s\bar{u}fism$ as he moved from hermeneutics towards more poetic form of being with selflessness at the core. In his writings about Holderlin's poetry, Heidegger in the same manner as Rumi, talks about the possibility of entering into another experience of being, a true 'being-in-the-world' is only realizable through "dwelling poetically."⁶⁸ This drift towards poetic form of being becomes more pronounced in the last years of Heidegger's life wherein he, showing nearly the same attitude as Rumi, talks of multifold beings – "worlds and things, earth and sky, divinities and mortals" – un-concealing themselves "into the simple onefold of their intimate belonging."⁶⁹ This alternative experience of being is only possible when we extricate ourselves from self-interest by going beyond the confines of the useful. Purging oneself from the 'self' is also at the heart of Rūmi's belief for entering into a new realm of being. But this step can only be achieved through immediate experience and not endless words, discussions, and arguments. Academic discussions go as far, so is the extent of the coverage of this issue in this article.

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⁶⁸Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. A. Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), xiv.

⁶⁹Ibid., x.

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