

Pakistan-India Relations: Post Nuclear Scenario

Farhat Nasreen

Govt. College for Women, Faisalabad, Pakistan.

ABSTRACT

The relations between India and Pakistan have been arctic since freedom from British colonial rule. India did not acknowledge Pakistan as a separate sovereign state. The flattening of Babri Masjid, Gujarat aggression and operation polo are the indications of overt Indian bias. A key determinant is Indo-Pakistan relations that are critical to peace in South Asia in the embryonic political and strategic order in the region. India remained busy in nuclearization program and Pakistan's defence policies have always been 'India centric'. The one of the major motives behind Pakistan acquisition of nuclear program is the debacle of East Pakistan. Pakistan deems military parity with India essential for her security. India outdoes Pakistan by her policies, outsized economy, power, huge population and scientific and technological knack. Despite, their collapsing economies, the rifts between India and Pakistan have changed the region into a nuclear flashpoint. It is supposed that Pakistan in possession of weapons of mass destruction have proved to be a 'failed state' but due to their mutual threat perception, if India has nuclear arms and missiles technology then Pakistan ought to have them.

Key Words: **India, Pakistan, South Asia, Nuclear Flashpoint, Missile Program.**

Conventional Arms Race in South Asia

The two countries of the region, India and Pakistan shortly after the liberation struggle have been occupied in acquiring their nuclear weapons but the perception of the 'arms race' is employed from historical armed competitions between the two superpowers; Russia and US throughout cold war. These superpowers involved the South Asia in weaponization and the region entered in to the 'second nuclear age'. Pakistan, in 1954 joined Baghdad Pact and then SEATO, which opened the spillover of weapons from the US. The USSR on the other side began to boost India's military potentials. There was a rising global consciousness that the region was among the main muddle-spots of the world. The existing war like circumstances between India and Pakistan provoked the global attention. As an upshot of various international and domestic reasons, the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan were prompted. India's agitation about militarily strong and nuclear armed China and her aspiration to obtain the standing of a great power had impelled her to begin a nuclear programme (Khan, 2010).

India began an arms race in South Asia and did her nuclear explosions in 1974 but Pakistan is criticized of having 'Islamic Bomb'. Pakistan's nuclear explosion was for peaceful motives. However, it was labeled internationally as a 'rogue state',

an irresponsible nuclear power and later the only proliferate. While the fact is that the U.S. and the Britishers were the early broker of technology and equipment that was later followed by Israeli and Indian nuclear programmes (Akhtar, 2007). India and Pakistan, neither country is the party of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). “Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that, it would do so only after India would join the Treaty. Consequently not all of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities were under IAEA safeguards” (Khan, 2010).

China did her first atomic explosion in 1964 and events did not stop here. China shook India severely and gave her an ultimatum in 1965 India-Pakistan war (Khalid, 2010). Sino-Indian rivalry was also one of the major reasons for India to ensue her nuclear programme. The incident again gave air to the discussion going on nuclear weaponization in India. Pakistan’s distressed relationship and strong sense of insecurity with a huge neighbouring country India had provoked her to establish nuclear weapons programme. The conventional battles, arms race, rising insecurity and eventually the nuclearization of India and Pakistan is the outcome of the recurrent hostility and enmity.

Kashmir Dispute

Kashmir is the major irritant in Indo-Pak relations. Kashmir has been a longest unfinished agenda between India and Pakistan. They both have always been in discomfort and confrontational mode due to Kashmir issue. Pakistan views Kashmir as a core issue and conflicts kept on taking serious position and the two have fought two wars; in 1948, and 1965 and a military clash in 1999 over Kashmir. Insurgency in Indian held Kashmir is the origin of heightened tension between India and Pakistan and a cause of bitterness in the region. India and Pakistan are failed to resolve Kashmir problem because of their failure to have normalization of relations. The obtaining of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan has worsened the security further in Kashmir and has escalated the disputed area into a nuclear flashpoint. The competition for weapons balance intensifies the possibility of a new conflict over Kashmir. Applying the credible minimum deterrence will not resolve the bottleneck issue of Kashmir between India and Pakistan but strengthening relations will lessen the risk of another war in future.

Siachen Issue

India in 1984 initiated ‘Operation Meghdoot’ seizing most of Siachen Glacier. More spars erupted in Siachen Glacier in 1985, 1987 and 1995. More than 2000 people have died in this inhospitable terrain, mostly due to climate extremes and the ordinary dangers of mountainous warfare. Pakistan strived intensely but without success, to reclaim Siachen glacier from her stranglehold.

Kargil Operation

The Kargil move once again made the valley of Kashmir the flashpoint between India and Pakistan. Kargil heights are the point where Indian held Kashmir and Pakistan administered Kashmir separated. The dubious state of Jammu and Kashmir later in fact escort to a Kargil fiasco in 1999 after blatant nuclearization. It was an armed fracas also called 'Operation Koh-e-Paima'. As Pakistan evacuated her position in Kargil, she deemed that India would also abandon her position. However, India maintained her military outpost on the glacier.

Sir Creek Issue

The history of dispute over Sir Creek opens up in to the Arabian Sea can be traced back to pre-independence era. The row lies in the agreement of the maritime frontier between Kutch and Sindh. After getting freedom from colonial rule, Sindh was given to Pakistan and Kutch remained the part of India. The row between India and Pakistan is that Pakistan rested her claim on entire creek, as per the Bombay Government Resolution of 1914 signed between the Government of Sindh and Rao Maharaj of Kutch.

Water Clash between India and Pakistan

According to the Indus Water Treaty signed in 1960 between the Indian Premier Nehru, Pakistani President Ayub Khan and Mr. W.A.B Illif of the World Bank. India has right over the water of Ravi, Sutlej and Beas Rivers while Pakistan has the right to use the water of Jhelum, the Chenab and the Indus rivers. India in order to disrupt the flow of water into Pakistan, has initiated the Wular Lake barrage into Jhelum River. The barrage's capacity of water is 3.0MAF (million acre feet). The apprehension for Pakistan is that it affectedly damages the three canal system; Upper Jhelum Canal, Upper Chenab Canal and Lower Bari Doab Canal. On the other hand, India argues that Tulbul Project would regulate the water supply to Mangla Dam which would improve Pakistan's capacity to generate electricity and regulate the irrigation through the canal systems. India in the form of Baglihar dam, stores the water in reservoir behind the gated spillways.

Another declaration of India is of Kishanganga Hydro Electricity Project. This project enters in Neelam River into Pakistani Kashmir. Neelam River is essential tributary to river Jhelum and construction of this project will obviously divert the route of water of Neelam River.

Mumbai Massacre

In 2008, a faction of gunmen inaugurated a murderous rampage in India. The attacks killed hundreds of people in India's commercial capital and dozens of militants were involved in the attack (The Telegraph 2008 Nov 27). Pakistani militant network Lashkar-e-Taiba was allegedly declared to initiate the attack.

India authorities alleged Ajmal Kasab and Afzal Guru as convicts and later they were hanged in Indian prison.

Nuclearization of India

Nehru envisioned India's status of a great power on the region and at international level. In the middle of 1950's, India started her nuclear program meet the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Trombay. Indian Atomic Energy Act was created in 1962. The nuclear programme of India was based on country's abundant natural thorium reserves. The US supplied India with heavy water for the project CIRUS 40 MWt and many Indian scientist participated (Creasman, 2008). "Its foundation was laid by the U.S. 'Atoms for Peace Program', which aimed to encourage civil use of nuclear expertise in exchange for assurances that would not be used for military purposes" (Weiss, 2003). India's first reactor, the Aspara Research Reactor was built with the assistance of British in 1955. The U.S. assisted India in developing and fueling Tarapur reactors. On May 18, 1974 India conducted a nuclear test at Pokhran in Rajasthan desert. The government of India stated it a "peaceful nuclear explosion experiment" and declared it that she has "no intention of producing nuclear explosion" (Perkovich, 1999).

Pakistan's Nuclear Phenomenon

In the decade of 80's India persisted on threatening Pakistan of conventional defensive strikes. India was conscious about her military dominance over Pakistan. Pakistani defence planners deem that India remains an intimidation for Pakistan. "We may be wrong but that is what we think. To meet that threat we must have a minimum force, which would be a deterrent" (The Pakistan Times 1974, June 8). In Soviet Afghan war, Pakistan fought as a frontline ally toward US side. In this situation, US thought it necessary to provide Pakistan military with advanced F-16 aircrafts. In reaction to Indian intimidation, Gen. Zia ul Haq gave an indication that in case of any preventive strike Pakistan will use all available means also Pakistan was aware of the fact that nuclear weaponization is the single way to thwart the recurrent threats and national survival. It became clear to Indian think tank that any attack could aggravate retaliatory action in Pakistan and it could turn in to full fledged war with Pakistan. Bhutto described India's nuclear tests as "fateful development, a threat to Pakistan's security" (The Pakistan Times 1974, June 8). In order to establish strong deterrence against India, Pakistan acquired to have a nuclear power. Pakistan initially stuck with the point of view that is 'Atom for Peace' but hostile acts from Indian side changed the perception of Pakistan. Pakistan came out of the closet and established her nuclear programme in 1972 under the leadership of Z. A Bhutto, he was Minister for fuel, power and natural resources at that time. Bhutto deemed "India's nuclear programme as a vehicle for intimidating Pakistan and establishing hegemony in the subcontinent". He also stated, "We will eat grass but we will make a nuclear bomb" (Akhtar, 2007). In the

Pakistan-India Relations: Post Nuclear Scenario

decade of 60s Dr. I. H. Usmani became the chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and trained a lot of students in nuclear field. Pakistan in late 1970s acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise to maintain balance with India and to protect the Pakistan's integrity against outside aggression. With the arrival of German trained metallurgist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1975, the efforts advanced. Under Khan's regulation Pakistan employed an extensive covert network to obtain essential materials and expertise for developing uranium enrichment capabilities. On January 28, 1984 interview for the London Times, Dr. Khan, who headed the Kahuta facility, threatened, "Nobody can undo Pakistan or take us for granted. . . . [L]et it be clear that we shall use the bomb if our existence is threatened." (London Times, 28th January 1984) The Finance Minister and Secretary of Pakistan had gone to Washington D.C for annual conference with I.M.F. and World Bank. They were optimistic to convince these affluent institutions to let Pakistan have some balance of payments support. Under the influence of U.S. they both refused any support. Hathaway enunciates that "As a result, in 1990 US economic and military aid was cut off and sanctions were endorsed to deter the country from developing nuclear weapons" (2000).

"In 1979, alarmed by Pakistan's nuclear ambiguity and quick technological progress, the United States stopped its military and economic aid to Pakistan... However as Pakistan remained US staunchest ally against communism in the region. In 1985, in a second attempt to slow down Pakistan's nuclear development, the US Congress passed the Pressler Amendment, prohibiting all US aid until the state proved that it possessed no nuclear explosive devices" (Pakistan profile, 2010).

Almost after seven years, Bhutto lost power and five years after he lost life, his plan for making Pakistan a nuclear power to thwart Indian hegemonic designs and save Pakistan's national integrity and independence was accomplished (Akhtar, 2007). The American management was happy with depose of Bhutto's government, but despite strident opposition of West, fiscal and political instability, the nuclear project went ahead. In spite of the U.S. sanctions on Pakistan, she finally decided to conduct five nuclear tests on May 1998 in Baluchistan.

Acquisition of Missile Technology of India and Pakistan

Missiles are the essentiality to carry weapons, their production, control and use. Abdul Kalam was the father of Indian missile programme. After India test-fired the first Prithvi missile in 1988, Prime Minister Vajpayee allowed the tests on Agni missile range on 8 April 1998. Even though, the Missile Technology Control Regime (then an informal grouping established in 1987 by Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) decided to

restrict access to any technology that would help India in developing her missile program. To counter the MTCR, the IGMDP team formed a consortium of DRDO laboratories, industries and academic institutions to build these sub-systems, components and materials. Though this slowed down the progress of the program, India successfully developed indigenously all the restricted components denied to her by the MTCR. Recently, India has tested her first long-range ballistic missile, the Agni-V, with a range of 3,100 miles and she is determined to add Russian made submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Pakistan also tested a short range ballistic missile Hatf IX.

Pakistan is known of the fact that the military parity with India can only be achieved by acquiring the missile defence. Pakistan is considered to transmit nuclear weapon technology to North Korea and she in return provided Pakistan with the acquisition of missile technology. Pakistan in 1971 pleaded for providing armaments, various rocket launchers, ammos and diverse spare parts. The 1980s Iran-Iraq war generated a prospect to North Korea and Pakistan to work in collaboration in the field of missiles. China too has played a vital role in Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. China is also the main source of support to North Korea's weaponisation.

Dr. Samar Mubarik, Head of Pakistan's National Development Complex concentrated on China's assistance in advancing the solid-fueled Shaheen missiles series and Dr. Khan, organizer of Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in Kahuta was interested in improving liquid-fueled Ghauri missile series and therefore he had close ties with North Korea. Both Shaheen II and Ghauri II interestingly were of the parallel range 2000 to 2300 km (Nanda, 2001).

According to Washington Times, Pakistan was delivered required apparatus for Ghauri missile in 1998 in several installments by North Korea. The KRL received consignments though in the intervening time U.S imposed sanctions in 1993 for its role in acquiring China M-11 missile equipment. Pakistan successfully tested the missile Ghauri-I in 1998 under the plea that they have sullied U.S export law associated to the Missile Technology Control Regime (Nanda, 2001).

Nuclear Doctrine of India

The DND of India describes that "Nuclear weapons shall be tightly controlled and released for the use of highest political level. The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s)". Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in a public statement to Parliament illustrates the country's "rightful place in the comity of nations," while downplaying any unreceptive intentions toward Pakistan. However, Prime Minister Vajpayee's stressed on India's invented "restraint" is rather unsettling. (In fact, the word "restraint" is used five times to describe India's nuclear stance in the course of the relatively short document). By actively advancing her nuclear program, India is hardly applying any "restraint" (<http://jessicanapper.com/india-and-pakistan%E2%80%99S-nuclear-flashpoint->

Pakistan-India Relations: Post Nuclear Scenario

considering-credible-minimum-deterrence-in-the-kashmir-conflict/). Thus, the Pakistanis have little spur to hamper their own nuclear development.

1. "India shall peruse a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence based on a triad of nuclear forces i-e mobile-land based missiles; aircrafts and sea-based asserts.
2. The basic purpose of Indian nuclear weapon is to deter the use and any threat of use of nuclear weapons against India and its forces by any state of entity.
 - a. India shall respond with punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor. India shall exercise its nuclear option, if its territory or its forces are attacked with biological and chemical weapon.
3. India will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weaponry state.
4. The highest political leadership through the NCA only can authorize retaliatory attacks.
5. No-first use of nuclear weapons is India's basic pledge.
6. The doctrine also delineates the requirements credible deterrence. They are; (a) sufficient survivable and operationally deployable nuclear forces, (b) a strong command and control system, (c) affective intelligence and early warning capabilities. (d), comprehensive planning and training for operations in line with strategy, and (e) the will to utilize nuclear forces and artillery.
7. It continues strict control over the export of sensitive technologies and materials,
8. It would keep on the moratorium on further nuclear testing.
9. The doctrine stresses that worldwide, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament is a national security objective. It seems New Delhi would contribute in talks of the fissile material control treaty. In plain words, India would support nuclear arms control/ disarmament arrangement provided China be party in such arrangements" (Jaspal, 2004).

Nuclear Doctrine of Pakistan

As President Musharraf stated that "Pakistan believe in maintaining a 'credible minimum deterrence' and does not want to direct its available resources towards the race of weapon of mass destruction" (Dawn, 1999 Nov. 25).

1. "Pakistan's nuclear weapons are India particular. They would put off Indian aggression, whether conventional or nuclear.
2. Nuclear deterrence forms an integral part of Pakistan's security calculus. Minimum nuclear deterrence would remain the guiding law of Pakistan's nuclear policy.
3. Pakistan sustains a first use option and establishes a reliable C41 network.

4. Pakistan would rely on its land and air capability for the delivery of nuclear weapons. This appears that aircraft and missile would convey bombs/warheads. The nuclear weapons are not part of Pakistani nuclear programmes.
5. Pakistan supports nuclear weapon free zone agreements in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Africa. This disallows Pakistan from deploying, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons in these regions. In addition it supports the idea of nuclear weapon free South Asia.
6. Pakistan supports a regional-restraints regime based on credible nuclear deterrence at minimum possible level, including non-induction of anti-ballistic missiles and submarines-launched ballistic missiles in the region.
7. Pakistan renounces from the operationalization of its nuclear forces.
8. Pakistan has agreed to a cessation on nuclear testing, but not signed CTBT.
9. There should be a regional solution of non-proliferation issue” (Jaspal, 2004).

Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, Director Gen. of Strategic Plans Division (SDP) in an interview to a team of Italian researches in 2002 illustrates some scenarios for Pakistan’s use of nuclear arsenals.

- a) “India harasses Pakistan and surmounts a large part of its land.
- b) India ruins an outsized part any of its earth and air forces.
- c) India carries on to the monetary asphyxiating of Pakistan.
- d) India presses on Pakistan into political deterioration or generates extensive inner subversion” (Jaspal, 2004).

India and Pakistan’s Defence Budgets

Quaid-e- Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah observant of the Indian military supremacy in October 1947 sent an envoy to Washington to ask for a loan of 2 billion dollar of which 550 million dollar was to be utilizing for the defence of Pakistan but US refused to allocate saying that the region’s issues were the responsibility of the United Kingdom (Matinuddin, 2004). Then Pakistan’s alliance with US after the Soviet incursion in Afghanistan resulted in the extensive spillover of US weapons in to Pakistan. Defence outlays of India and Pakistan have persisted to boost. Indira Gandhi in August 1971 signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Moscow. USSR provided India with military weapons which further skewed the subsisting military discrepancy as compared to Pakistan. India’s defence budget has up-graded from 3 billion dollar to over 15 billion dollar in twenty years. Indian army in four years has ascended to 3,000 crores. India was the second chief importer of military artillery in 2000. Defence expenditure of Pakistan had also been increasing but in last few years it has been declined. From 6.3 percent of its GDP in 1990 it has dropped to 4.5 percent of GDP in 2002. It has also reduced the army by 50,000 (Matinuddin, 2004).

Pakistan-India Relations: Post Nuclear Scenario

Pakistan because of the conventional unease with her arch rival India increases every year its military expenses by 15%. The military disbursement in 2013-14 was Rs627 billion;the air force was allocated Rs 131.18 billion while the navy got Rs 62.80 billion (The News Tribe, 2013, June 13). While presenting the Union Budget 2013-14 to Parliament on 28 February, the Finance Minister hiked the defence allocation by 5.3 per cent to Rs. 2,03,672.1 crore (US\$ 37.4 billion).

Conclusion

The nuclearization of India and Pakistan has increased the regional instability. Both India and Pakistan are engaged in a dangerous form of brinkmanship. Both countries followed up their nuclear jingoism with 'tit-for-tat' missile testing. They have just profited from their nuclear arsenals but instead they both undergo political and fiscal sanctions. With the presence of nuclear arsenal and arms race increased the threat and risk have in the region and the whole world. India and Pakistan have depleted a lot of money on nuclear arsenal. India is running behind MiG-29s and Pakistan is chasing F16s. They both are buying more and more military tanks. The arm race should be culminated and the two opponents should resolve their clashes on Kashmir issue, water and other disputes. Joint pacts for reducing the arms race and nuclear risk should be signed between India and Pakistan. There should be elimination of short range ballistic missiles; HATF range and Prithvi range. Mutual downsizing of their nuclear arsenals should be signed. Despite India and Pakistan's tumultuous history they should ameliorate their issues bilaterally; most importantly the military crisis without the intervention of West. There should be trust and confidence in both nations. Discussions and conferences are the only solutions.

References

- Akhtar, H. N. (2007). "If The Truth Be Told (An Alternate History of Pakistan)". Sang-e-Meel Publications. Pakistan: Lahore.
- Bhutto, Z. A. (1969). "The Myth of Independence". London: Oxford University Press.
- Cheema, P. I. & Bokhari, I. H (Eds.).(2004). "Arms Race and Nuclear Developments in South Asia".Hanns Seidel Foundation, Islamabad Policy Research Institute. Asia Printers 12 D SNC Centres Printers. Blue Area: Islamabad.
- Creasman, D. J. (2008). "The Evolution of India's Nuclear Program: Implication for the United States. Monograph.School of Advanced Military Studies. Dawn (1999 Nov. 25).
- Hathaway, R. M. (2000). "Confrontation and Retreat: The US Congress and the South Asian Nuclear Tests. Arms Control Association.<http://www.armscontrol.org/act2000-01-02/rhchart>.
- Jaspal, Z. N. (2004). "Assessment of Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Doctrines".In a book "Arms Race and Nuclear Developments in South Asia".Cheema,

Farhat Nasreen

- Pervaiz Iqbal & Bokhari, Imtiaz H (Eds.). Hanns Seidel Foundation, Islamabad Policy Research Institute. Asia Printers 12 D SNC Centres Printers. Blue Area: Islamabad.
- Khalid, I. (2012). "Nuclear Doctrine: Ramifications for South Asia". A Research Journal of South Asian Studies. Vol. 27. No. 2. pp. 313-334.
- Khan, R. M. & Shabir, G. (2012). "Nuclearization of South Asia: A Discourse Analysis of The Hindustan Times and Dawn". A Research Journal of South Asian Studies. Vol. 27. No. 2. pp. 421-438.
- Kumar, V. Budget 2013-14 http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/IndiasDefenceBudget2013-14_1kbehera_040313 location by 5.3 per cent to Rs. 2, 03,672.1 crore (US\$ 37.4 billion).
- Matinuddin, K. (2004). "Conventional Arms Race in South Asia: A Pakistani Perspective". Arms Race and Nuclear Developments in South Asia. Cheema, Iqbal Pervaiz & Bokhari Imtiaz H (Eds.). Islamabad Research Policy : Hanns Seidel Foundation.
- Nanda, P. (2001). "Nuclearisation of Divided Nations Pakistan-India-Korea". Manas Publication. New Delhi: India.
- Pakistan Profile. (2010, June). The Nuclear Threat Initiative. <http://www.nti.org/eresearch/profile/Pakistan/Nuclear/index.html>
- Perkovich, G. (1999). "India Explodes A 'Peaceful' Nuclear Device. India's Nuclear Bomb: The Pakistan Times 1974, June 8. The Impact on Global Proliferation". Berkeley, CA: The University of California Press.
- Sethna, H. (2003). Opening the Door to Nuclear Development. In Weiss, Leonard. Atom for Peace. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 59(6), pp. 34-44:44. <http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclearweapons/issues/proliferation/india/charnysh-india-analysis.pdf>.
- Bajpai et al., Brasstacks and Beyond, p. 39. The interview was with journalist Kuldip Nayyar of the London Times 1984 January 28.
- Topychkanov, P. "Nuclear Juxtaposition in South Asia". http://www.isodarco.it/courses/andalo11/paper/ISO11_Topychkanov_Nuclear-Juxtaposition-in-South-Asia.pdf.
- Weiss, L. (2003). Atom for Peace. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 59(6), pp. 34-44. <http://nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclearweapons/issues/proliferation/india/charnysh-india-analysis.pdf>. (<http://pakistaneeconomy.wordpress.com/tag/water-dispute-between-india-and-pakistan/>). (<http://jessicanapper.com/india-and-pakistan%E2%80%99S-nuclear-flashpoint-considering-credible-minimum-deterrence-in-the-kashmir-conflict/>).

Biographical Note

Dr. Farhat Nasreen is Assistant Professor at History Department, Govt. College for Women, Gulistan Colony, Faisalabad, Pakistan.
