

RE-EMERGENCE AND RISE OF BENGALI NATIONALISM IN EAST PAKISTAN, 1954-58: AN APPRAISAL

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The year 1954, was a turning point for the consolidation of Bengali¹ nationalist forces and elimination of Muslim League from its stronghold where it was established half a century ago. The approach adopted by the leadership of Muslim League both at the Centre as well as in East Pakistan, facilitated politically proactive and socially integrated Bengali nationalist forces to go all out for their well-designed goals. The re-emergence and rise of Bengali nationalist forces in East Pakistan could not be digested by the ruling elite² of Pakistan which opted for confrontational way to snub them. This confrontation is clearly reflected in Constituent Assembly debates, decision making at higher echelons and dealing with the political, economic and governing issues. This tug of war had enduring repercussion and perpetuated to an ignominious stage when after the first decade of the creation of Pakistan, so-called parliamentary democracy was wrapped up in October 1958.

Key Words: Nationalist, Bengali, Muslim League, East Pakistan, Confrontation, Parliamentary Democracy, Elite.

Introduction

Unfortunately, from the very beginning a highly ‘centralized’ approach adopted by the ruling elite of Pakistan to tackle the regional and diverse ethno-linguistic issues (particularly in East Bengal) had sown the seeds of regionalism, provincialism, hatred and confrontation. Therefore, soon after the creation of Pakistan, Muslim League started rapidly declining in credibility and as a cementing factor among the public, particularly in

East Pakistan. For mobilising public opinion, Bengali nationalist political forces united themselves against ML and portrayed it as a tool to dominate East Pakistan by West Pakistan. This was achieved through the Jugto Front. Until 1954, Muslim League as a symbol of West Pakistan was so demonised by the Bengali political elite that it had become unacceptable for Bengalis. That is how in the provincial elections, public sentiments were ignited and then cashed in, eliminating Muslim League from East Pakistan. The Jugto Front (United Front) won the elections hands down. However, it was unbearable for the ruling elite to give free hand to United Front for running the affair of the province in accordance with their own aspirations. This set the path of rivalry and confrontation which had become order of the day both at the Centre and in East Pakistan. It was the outcome of this exclusive monolithic approach adopted by the Centre and equally responded by the Bengali nationalist political forces that hindered political stability and became the permanent trait of Pakistani politics which ultimately led to the abrogation of the constitution in 1958. The present research is an inquiry about phenomenal growth of Bengali separatist nationalism vis-à-vis West Pakistan/Centre. This research aims to present the critical role of Bengali opposition and its impact on the relations between the two wings. It commences with the examination of unification and rise of Bengali nationalist political forces and the response of the ruling elite of Pakistan. An attempt is made to discuss United Front and its politics, constitutional matters and provincial autonomy along with their effects on national integration. From historical perspective the present study is conducted with descriptive/analytical approach. It is a library and archival research based on both primary and secondary sources. Kate L. Turabian's *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations* is followed in this research.

Unification of Bengali Political Forces: The United Front

In 1953, due to differences with the provincial government, A. K. Fazlul Haq as Advocate General of East Pakistan resigned and resumed his politics by reorganizing Krishak Sramik (Peasants and Workers) Party (KSP). Since the exclusion of Bengali nationalist elements (Suhrawardy group), Bengali political elite started considering East Pakistan Muslim League as a symbol of oppression and a mouthpiece of West Pakistan. As the provincial elections came closer, in spite of deep ideological and political differences among themselves (nationalist, leftist and Islamist) most of the political parties in East Pakistan made an alliance popularly

known as United Front (UF) against the Muslim League. UF was based on a twenty-one point manifesto which was parochial and significantly regionalist in nature. The main objective of UF can be comprehended quite clearly by point nineteen which stated:

“In accordance with the historic Lahore Resolution, to secure full and complete autonomy and bring all subjects under the jurisdiction of East Bengal, leaving only defence, foreign affairs and currency under the jurisdiction of the Centre. Even in the matter of defence, arrangements shall be such as to have the Headquarters of the Army in West Pakistan and the Headquarter of the Navy in East Bengal and to establish Ordinance Factories in East Bengal with a view to make East Bengal self-sufficient in the matter defence and convert the present *Ansars* into full-fledged militia”.³

Another target of the UF was to secure autonomous status for the educational institutions and to introduce Bengali language as a medium of instruction in the province.⁴ During electioneering, an organised propaganda was run to malign West Pakistan and to inculcate hatred in Bengali voters’ mind. For instance, it was propagated that “Muslim League government had imposed three taxes on a tree one on the roots, a second on the trunk, and a third on leaves”.⁵ It is argued that the elections of 1954, would be held between the “political haves (the ML) and the Political have-nots (the UF)” which greatly helped the propaganda of UF against the ML.⁶ UF also joined hands with the Congress and Communists. Nonetheless, it was an inflexible approach adopted by the ML government both at the Centre and the province, which led the Bengali “vernacular elite” to endorse linguistic nationalism.⁷ In addition, the UF leadership not only evoked class consciousness but also the differences between Bengalis and non-Bengalis were projected across East Pakistan.⁸ This approach of propagating hatred and animosity created the atmosphere for open clashes at mills, factories and other working places.⁹ It is opined that the formation of UF was “more against the ML than for any positive policy. Having consisted of various antagonistic forces, factionalism was rife from the start”.¹⁰

Being loosely organized, initially the UF’s candidates were hesitating to contest elections from its platform. For receiving maximum applications, UF leadership published an exaggerated account of applications it received for tickets.¹¹ As a result of this type of projection, government officials,

like district magistrates came out in the support of UF against ML.¹² In a nutshell the Elections held in March 1954, resulted into crushing defeat of ML and landslide victory for UF. The overwhelming victory of UF was seen as a “revolt of the East Bengalis through the ballot-box”.¹³ It is argued that ML’s inflexible stance over language issue caused its sweeping defeat in the elections.¹⁴

The ML’s defeat was remarkably portrayed in the editorial of *The Pakistan Times*. According to Mazhar Ali Khan, the editor: “never before, in the history of parliamentary strife, has the party in power suffered such an ignominious and decisive defeat: and never was such a nemesis so richly deserved”.¹⁵ Ayesha Jalal aptly summarized the defeat of ML as political dice “turned decisively against the West Pakistani– dominated establishment, weakening Bogra’s already shaky grip on power”.¹⁶ The victory of UF was considered main “step in the direction of complete independence”. Pro-separatist Bengali press referred to the victory as a peaceful revolution. For its victory, UF’s manifesto was a key factor which was “highly regionalist in nature”.¹⁷

Once UF got sweeping victory in the provincial elections held in 1954, and wiped out ML from East Pakistan, serious political and ideological differences appeared within its lines. Radical and conservative factions in UF stood up against each other. The allocations of portfolios added to existing differences between Awami League (AL) and Krishak Sramik Party (KSP). Being a dominant personality, Haq characterized AL members as “young inexperienced and extremist”.¹⁸ Despite facing harsh criticism, the leadership of AL continued to support Haq in establishing the government.¹⁹ Later on when rivalry and conflict between AL and KSP reached the point of no return, the former was expelled by the UF parliamentary party.²⁰ Furthermore, UF cabinet members were accused of extending their support for provoking the riots in the province in order to achieve their political goals.²¹ During these riots instead of protecting the “lives of masses they protected party interest” which further exacerbated political discontent in the province.²²

Until now the language bandwagon let loose unrest, riots and agitation in the province in which ethnic conflicts and Bengali and non-Bengali hostility reached an alarming level. As UF promised in its election campaign therefore, soon after assuming power, the UF government got passed a resolution from Provincial Assembly in which Bengali language was recognized as one of the state languages. According to the UF, Constituent Assembly members from East Pakistan were not true representatives of Bengali public, thereby started demanding the replacement

of these members with those to be nominated by UF.²³ This non-cooperative exclusive approach of UF by drawing own lines of functioning revealed its antagonism with the Centre.²⁴ In 1954, during his visit to West Bengal, Haq issued some highly provocative and controversial statements in Calcutta that added to the existing trust-deficit between the UF and the central government. He was reported to have said that the border that divides Bengal was “the artificial barrier between East and West Bengal” therefore, “he did not believe in the political division of the country”. He further aggravated the situation by demanding the independence of East Bengal.²⁵ *The Statesman* from Calcutta quoted him as saying “I do not believe in the political division of the country. I am in fact not familiar with two new words- Pakistan and Hindustan-when I speak of India I mean both the countries”.²⁶ Haq’s provocative statements “provided great momentum to the secessionist forces” by opening a new political discourse in Pakistan.²⁷ Henceforth, the UF was considered by the ruling elite as a serious and potential threat to national unity and integrity.²⁸ The statements were strongly condemned by the members of CA and the central government sharply reacted to control the situation.²⁹

When Haq realized the gravity of the situation created by his statements, he claimed he was wrongly reported. However, PM Chaudhry Muhammad Ali called on the reporters and confirmed the statements. He characterized Haq as a “self-confessed traitor” who had been striving “to disrupt and divide” Pakistan. According to him the objective of Haq’s ministry was to create “pseudo- Bengali nationalism as opposed to Pakistani nationalism” by promoting “provincialism and parochialism” in East Pakistan.³⁰ Haq’s statements provided an excuse to the central government for taking a “most reluctant decision”. It was perceived that the continuity of the UF ministry “would lead to disruption and disintegration of Pakistan”.³¹ Therefore, the dismissal of UF government was considered utmost necessary.

The dissolution of UF government indicated that the central government (which was of ML) did not want “to allow any other party to take office in East Bengal”.³² It is evident that the way federal government handled the political situation in East Pakistan, it added to the existing crisis and further alienated the Bengali political forces. The situation could have been handled in a different and better way had political dexterity and sobriety prevailed. In the opinion of a political scientist, the dismissal of UF ministry was a turning point towards the disintegration of Pakistan.³³ After the dismissal of UF ministry, Iskander

Mirza was appointed as Governor of East Bengal. He banned the Communist Party, censored some Bengali newspapers and ordered large-scale arrests.³⁴ He was reported to have said: “if necessary, the army will not hesitate to kill even ten thousand people for the sake of national solidarity”.³⁵

In initial eight years, the demographic, cultural, geographic and ecological differences were not overlooked, but further highlighted by multiplying the miscalculations committed by West-Pakistan-dominated ruling elite. Bengali members of CA time and again indicated that East Bengal had been deprived and this policy of deprivation will definitely “cause harm to the integrity of Pakistan”.³⁶ Bengali leaders were much dissatisfied over “indispensable” imposition of governor rule, which, they considered, as deprivation of the right of self-governance.³⁷ Their speeches and statements often depicted their distrust and antipathy towards West Pakistan. For instance, Ataur Rahman admitted that:

...It may be a great weakness with me that I feel a peculiar sensation when I came from Dacca to Karachi. I feel physically, apart from mental feeling that I am living here in a foreign country. I did not feel as much when I went to Zurich, to Geneva or Switzerland, or London as much as I feel here in my own country that I am in a foreign land.³⁸ That was how with the passage of time Bengali political elite developed an impression that they were being considered by West Pakistanis as “a subject race” and being “neglected and crippled” by the “scorched-earth” policy of the Centre to keep East Bengal backward and wholly dependent on West Pakistan.³⁹ They had serious complains that the ruling elite had “sucked the entire blood” of Bengalis and if anybody cries, “we are told that you have no right to cry: you are a Communist”.⁴⁰

Divergence in Constituent Assembly

The Constituent Assembly (CA) was composed of members having contradictory ideological and political affiliations. It was the only platform for convergence of contradictory approaches from both the wings. But it proved the other way round. It is argued that after the creation of Pakistan, the relationship between the two political contradicting mind-set (East Pakistan and West Pakistan) was based on mere a “marriage of

convenience than any real alliance based on the understanding of each other's problems and ideas".⁴¹ In the very first session of CA, language question was raised which unfolded inherent diversity between the political class of the two wings. In 1950, Basic Principle Committee (BPC) of Constituent Assembly presented its report in which Urdu was recognized as the only national language of Pakistan. The Bengali political leadership felt aggrieved and perceived the report as "there will be a unitary central government and they will be made a colony of Pakistan".⁴² A wave of demonstrations started and even the leadership of Provincial Muslim League condemned and criticized the report.⁴³ Bengali newspapers strongly criticized the report. As the *Azad* wrote "a conspiracy was being hatched to impose a fascist rule on East Bengal". The *Naobelal* denounced the report and demanded the withdrawal of the BPC recommendations.⁴⁴ In addition the leadership of AL went so far that they presented a more radical demand: confederation between the two wings.⁴⁵ It is argued that growing discontent and isolation from West Pakistan boosted the national and ethnic consciousness among politically active and socially integrated Bengalis.⁴⁶ In the opinion of Bhuiyan, the BPC report by far the most serious mistake committed by ML.⁴⁷ As discontent started escalating in East Bengal indicating a "full scale national movement" forced the government to postpone the constitutional discourse on BPC.⁴⁸

In 1953, Nazimuddin's ministry was dismissed and replaced by Muhammad Ali Bogra, to promote the Governor General's agenda. The Constituent Assembly was also dissolved in 1954. The exercise of power in arbitrary and delusional manner by the Governor General Ghulam Mohammad badly damaged the ongoing constitutional frame work. Now PM Bogra had to tackle multiple challenges, including the constitutional impasse. Consent and support of CA members from East Pakistan was utmost necessary to sort the constitutional and political matter out. Nonetheless, the second CA expedited the constitution making process. Bogra presented a federal formula in CA based on parity, thereby treating the provinces of West Pakistan as a single Unit. When the bills of formation of One Unit and renaming of East Bengal were presented in CA, Bengali members came up with a sharp reaction. They viewed the formation of One Unit as undemocratic, unconstitutional and a conspiracy planned in West Pakistan against East Pakistan. They repudiated and characterized the formula as "a move to consolidate the rest of the country against them".⁴⁹ Bengali leadership conceived One Unit scheme as an attempt to grab the interests of the Bengali people.⁵⁰ They were of the view that One Unit would lead to "the utter disintegration of

Pakistan” and considered it against the very idea of Pakistan.⁵¹ Once at the floor of the House, Shaikh Mujib-ur-Rahman sarcastically stated that the Indian, Arab and Iranian Muslims should also be brought into One Unit.⁵² While rejecting the formula of One Unit, he warned against combating the public sentiments; it would lead to dire consequences.⁵³ He stated that “the ruling elite sometimes considered themselves more powerful than God”.⁵⁴ With regard to their peculiar distinctiveness, a Bengali politician Aatur Rahman went so far that he presented East Bengal as a separate nation:

East Bengal is a part of Pakistan at all when there is no linguistic, no cultural affinity, affinity of any kind whatsoever excepting cementing bonds of Islam; we are Muslims and you are Muslims beyond that we have no similarity whatsoever with you. Our language is completely different from you; culture, customs, tradition, music and dances, everything completely different from yours. Then why East Bengal should be a part of Pakistan at all. They cannot be brought into one nation-hood.⁵⁵

The questions over the name ‘East Bengal’ (When its bill was being discussed, the Bengali members of the Constituent Assembly frequently questioned the renaming of East Bengal as ‘East Pakistan’), separate electorates, language and provincial autonomy were frequently raised. On many occasions while discussing the various issues in CA, Bengali members warned that if the government superseded the democratic and constitutional way, they “would be opted for unconstitutional way”.⁵⁶ A Bengali member termed the political situation of East Bengal as “a volcano” and warned the central government that “don’t dance over the volcano and don’t play with fire”.⁵⁷ It is thought that the One Unit was no more than an artificial unity of West Pakistan “by forcible merger of the provinces” having overwhelming ethnic, racial and linguistic differences.⁵⁸ According to a Bengali member, One Unit scheme was materialized due to the “fear of east Bengal domination” by “creating a rift in Bengali members” of the CA to satisfy the desire of the ruling coterie.⁵⁹ Bengali leaders strongly believed that the idea of One Unit originated as a preventive measure to escape from East Bengal domination.⁶⁰ Bengali nationalist members even started threatening that in case of failure to ensure parity and equality between the two wings the “central government should not expect any cooperation from the

people of East Bengal".⁶¹ It is beyond doubt that the One Unit scheme was the brainchild of dominant Punjabi political leadership at the centre to politically unite West Pakistan against East Bengal.⁶²

To pass the Constitution from the assembly, cooperation of Bengali political forces was utmost necessary. Therefore, in 1955, PM Chaudhry Muhammad Ali and Bengali political leadership signed a pact at Muree, in which major Bengali reservations were accommodated. The Muree Pact was composed of One Unit, autonomy for East Pakistan, parity of both the wings, joint electorates and Bengali language to be accepted as one of the state languages of Pakistan.⁶³ For the time being, this truce cooled down the ongoing controversies and healed the political environment in East Bengal.⁶⁴ Subsequently, a long awaited constitution was promulgated on 23rd of March 1956. Now AL turned towards economic disparity and provincial autonomy. The renaming of Eastern Wing i.e. East Pakistan was objected to and various propagandas were driven to achieve the desired political goals.⁶⁵ Bengali political forces even called for the independence of East Bengal through a secessionist movement if their legitimate demands were not accepted.⁶⁶ Even a month before the military *coup*, an East Pakistani minister issued a highly outrageous statement against the Centre. He is reported to have said: "I am sure there can be nothing more preposterous, outrageous and in-human than the treatment which has been meted out to the people of East Pakistan by the Central Government. I fail to understand what they want. Do they want complete frustration, and chaos and confusion in the country? I do not believe they do. But then why do they not respond to the just and legitimate demands of East Pakistan?".⁶⁷

Power Politics and Ignominious end of so-called Parliamentary Phase

Although the constitution was promulgated in March 1956, yet the political crisis remained intact in East Pakistan as well as at the Centre. The bandwagon of autonomy and joint electorate was being pushed by the Bengali opposition forces.⁶⁸ The Provincial Assembly became the hub of conflicts, rivalries and intrigues. Between 23 March 1956, and October 1958, the power politics in East Pakistan presented its worst shape. Rivalries and confrontations had been penetrated within the parties. According to President Iskander Mirza, the constitution passed in 1956, was formed by "dangerous compromises" on the national integration and unity of Pakistan.⁶⁹

In September 1956, AL resumed power both at the Centre and in East Bengal and Suhrawardy became the PM. Regardless of his its earlier criticism of the pro-West foreign policy of Pakistan, AL continued the same policy. Suhrawardy even stated that “he could not become PM without US”.⁷⁰ On 10th October 1956, addressing the National Assembly, he out-rightly rejected the validity of the Two-Nation Theory. He stated that “the two-nation theory was advanced by the Muslims as a justification for the partition of India and the creation of a State made up of geographically contiguous units where the Muslims were numerically in a majority; once that state was created, the two nation theory lost its force even for the Muslims”.⁷¹ Suhrawardy took some solid steps in order to minimize the economic gap between the two wings. He even declared that 98% autonomy had been conceded to East Pakistan.⁷² It is argued that under short span of AL governments, the autonomy question acquired new dimensions. As Suhrawardy resigned, Bengali nationalist elements started blaming West Pakistan that his resignation was an outcome of “a conspiracy” framed and executed for the protection “of vested interest of West Pakistan”.⁷³

In 1957, Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani organized a conference in East Bengal in which Pandit Nehru, B.C. Roy, CM of West Bengal and Bengali writers, intellectuals and poets were invited.⁷⁴ While addressing the conference, Bhashani warned that the growing grievances of East Bengal must be addressed otherwise he would say “Asalamualikum to West Pakistan”.⁷⁵ On the other hand due to growing differences between Bhashani and Suhrawardy group, AL was split and National Awami Party (NAP) emerged in 1957.

In March 1958, due to mounting intrigues in parliamentary politics Haq as governor dismissed the AL’s ministry. This triggered the process of alliances in which NAP played a key role of supporting and then opposing one ministry after another. This highly ignominious parliamentary politics had become a hot-bed of manoeuvrings. To end this political turmoil Governor Rule was imposed from June to August 1958. However, Governor Rule failed to change the nature of politics. Even it turned in its worst phase when a free fight ensued in the House resulting into the death of the Deputy Speaker⁷⁶ Shahid Ali; a similar type of political manoeuvrings were going on at the Centre. Out of this worst form of parliamentary politics on 7th October, 1958, Martial Law was imposed. The president described the power politics in these words: “ruthless struggle of power, corruption and shameful exploitation of the masses and prostitution of Islam for political ends” had become norm of the

day.⁷⁷ He added that the occurrence in the Assembly “did not raise the prestige of the country by killing deputy speaker and desecrating the National Flag” thereby brought the country “on the verge of ruination”.⁷⁸ While justifying Martial Law he termed the politicians as “traitor and unpatriotic elements”, therefore, a “peaceful revolution” was considered utmost necessary.⁷⁹ After imposing Martial Law, President Iskander Mirza tried to linger on, through military as an alternative to parliamentary politics.⁸⁰ But top military leadership had already made up their mind and were looking for a suitable opportunity to get rid of Iskander Mirza.⁸¹ Therefore, Iskander Mirza failed to realize his ambitious design, subsequently, Ayub Khan expelled him from the country and took rein of the government in his tight grip.

Conclusion

At the national level, whenever the lust of power and human conceit prevails, the dignity of national characteristics would effect and certainly produce drastic consequences for a diverse state as it warrants recognition and accommodation of existing diversity in a plausible manner. Immediately after the creation of Pakistan, the leadership of Muslim League had forgotten its own struggle in British India. When Bengalis failed to get recognition and accommodation of their legitimate demands, political and economic interests, social and cultural aspirations, Bengali nationalism which had deep historical and cultural roots robustly reappeared. Thus, the re-emergence of Bengali nationalism as a potential threat to nation-building and national-integration was the product of unaccommodating conflicting and divergent ideas connected with the internal political approach adopted by the ruling elite. Furthermore, Bengali nationalist forces highlighted the existing differences between Bengali and non-Bengali and raised the nationalist feelings for political gains in East Pakistan. In this regard Bengali nationalism served as a cementing factor for ideologically and politically divergent factions against West Pakistan. That is how Bengali political elite successfully mobilized the masses against ML (after Islam the only uniting factor between the two wings of Pakistan) and rooted it out from East Pakistan. Basically the election held in 1954, was the test case of the strength of Bengali separatist-cum-nationalist forces in which they succeeded.

In the absence of a workable coherent political system, the period from 1954-58, of parliamentary politics marked as tug of war for power and mutual antagonism and confrontation between the ruling elite of

Pakistan and Bengali nationalist forces. ML the binding force between the two wings badly failed to tailor its agendas. The arrogant ruling elite ruled the country in such a way that it was their inherent right beyond any criticism and opposition from any part of the country. This mind-set greatly harmed and impeded the process of national cohesion and integration to be evolved. The emergence of Bengali nationalist forces and their unification in a dominant position in East Pakistan could not be digested by the ruling elite who opted for confrontational approach to settle the score. This confrontation unleashed an unending process of making and breaking the governments in East Pakistan, thereby exacerbating the political crisis and prevailing uncertainty that set the worse precedents in the history of Pakistan. The dismissal of UF government was an ill-conceived notion and not inevitable. The imposition of governor rule actually strengthened the propaganda of Bengali nationalist forces. They considered it as an assault on the right of Bengalis' self-rule and accused West Pakistan/Centre as responsible and impediment in the way of ameliorating their problems. Once the language issue was resolved, economic disparity and provincial autonomy became the main tools of Bengali separatist cum-nationalist forces for mobilizing the public against West Pakistan. In a nutshell, the autocratic way of tackling the reactionary Bengalis further added to the existing misunderstanding and trust deficit between the two wings of Pakistan. Religious ideology and Pakistani nationalism was overemphasized when its came to national cohesion, integration and identity creation. Out of this exclusive rigid approach the ruling elite, never treated Bengalis as equal potential citizens and their culture and language as suitable and adjustable in Pakistani context. Therefore, this mutual antagonism continued till the so-called parliamentary politics was ignominiously halted in 1958, generating far-reaching repercussions for the upcoming relations between the two wings of Pakistan.

Notes and References

1. In this paper the word "Bengali" refers with relation to East Bengal.
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6. Mushtaq Ahmed, *Politics without Social Change* (Karachi: Space Publishers, 1971), 5.
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18. Rafique Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958, Vol. I*, (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1978), 202.
19. Umar, *The Emergence of Bangladesh*, 268-69.
20. Umar, *The Emergence of Bangladesh*, 265.
21. Prime Minister Mohammad Ali's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 28 June 1954, in *Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debate*, 1361. See also. Rahman, *The Unfinished Memoirs*, 269-270.
22. Ahmad. E. H. Jafar's speech on 17 July 1954, in *Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debate*, Vol. I, NO. 26, 2054.
23. K. K. Aziz, *Party Politics in Pakistan 1947-1958* (Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research, 1976), 23.
24. PM Mohammad Ali's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 28 June 1954, in which he severely criticized the no-cooperative attitude of the UF ministry, in *Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debate*, 1363
25. PM Mohammad Ali's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 28 June 1954, in *Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debate*, 1364-65,
26. Cited from Inamur Rehman, *Public Opinion and Political Developments in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 212.
27. Mehmood, *Pakistan Divided*, 22. It is argued that Haq was operating on "the ultimate long-term objective of complete independence" for East Pakistan. Cited in Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958*, Vol. I, 206-207.

28. Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958*, Vol. I, 242.
29. Ahmed E.H. Jafar strongly condemned Haq in the Constituent Assembly on 17 July 1954. He supported the imposition of governor rule and suggested that Haq should be made a precedent and put to jail on his treacherous activities so that in future nobody could dare to commit such a treachery against the state. *Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debate*, 2055.
30. Mohammad Ali's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 28 June 1954, in *Constituent Assembly (Legislature) of Pakistan Debate*, 1366-67. See also, Dil and Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh*, 93.
31. Mohammad Ali's speech in the *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debate* 28 June 1954., 1362.
32. Memon, ed., *The Altaf Gauhar Papers*, 354.
33. Mehmood, *Pakistan Divided*, 22.
34. Mehmood, *The Deliberate Debacle*, 22.
35. Dil and Dil, *Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh*, 93
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39. Ataur Rahman Khan's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 7 September 1955, in *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debate*, Vol. I, 529-530,
40. Ataur Rahman Khan's speech in the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 19 March, 1956, In *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates*, Vol. I, No. 4, 214.
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44. Umar, *The Emergence of Bangladesh*, 163.
45. Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan*, 32.
46. Lawrence Ziring, *Bangladesh from Mujib to Ershad: an Interpretive Study* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992), 4.
47. Bhuiyan, *Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League*, 25.
48. Umar, *The Emergence of Bangladesh*, 173.
49. Basically the One Unit scheme was the brainchild of dominant Punjabi leadership at the centre to politically unite the West Pakistan against East Bengal. Afzal, *Political Parties in Pakistan 1947-1958*, Vol. I, 242. See also, Inamur Rehman, *Public Opinion and Political Developments in Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 64.
50. Umar, *The Emergence of Bangladesh*, 312.
51. Zahiruddin's speech: 7 September 1955, in *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debate*, Vol. I, 556.
52. Shaikh Mujibur Rahman's speech, 25 August 1955, in *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debate*, 507-509.

53. Shaikh Mujibur Rahman's speech, 25 August 1955, in *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debate*, 511.
54. Shaikh Mujibur Rahman's 25 August 1955, in *Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debate*, 513.
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