

International and Regional Political Competitions in Syria "Geo-political dimensions"

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Abstract

Since the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011, where fighters from 70 countries meets on its territory, who turned it to international terrorism territory, which came on the infrastructure of the country, led to massive violations of human rights from all parties of the conflict, and changed the Syrian geopolitical, because of excessive interventions for regional players, wishing to transform the international balances in their favor, at the expense of the Syrian people.

The Russian intervention in the Syrian crisis comes at an international level, as long as the Western pressure on the Syrian regime strengthens the countries of the Middle East hostile to it. This began with President Obama's speech that Assad should step down, which in turn led to the adherence of countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and others to an extremist rhetoric to resolve the conflict.

Apart from the Russian goals that the writers and researchers disagreed on, there is no doubt that Russian entry of this magnitude will bring serious changes to the Syrian crisis

From this perspective, the countries of the Middle East, including Iran, are following up and trying to understand the impact of the new reality on its policy towards Syria and its implications for it. As one of the stakeholders in the Syrian case, Russia's strategic raids did not worry. In this paper we will attempt to assess the impact of this development on Iran's Syrian policy and its consequences. Where Iran considers Russia's military entry against the Dai'sh and other armed organizations likely to sway its Syrian ally in the military dimension.

This complex map makes it very difficult for any American administration to build an effective policy in Syria. All those conflicting interests have to agree on what they want to achieve in Syria. At the same time, they must agree on their understanding of the different terms .When we say "cease-fire" or "truce" or "zones of escalation", otherwise these ideas or concepts will become "theoretical" terms, meaningless on the ground, and the various parties will continue to fight the ill intentions of the parties in their policies towards Syria.

Keywords: Human Rights, International and regional Competitions, Syrian Crisis

Introduction

The internationalization of the Syrian crisis has given the way to foreign interference in the internal Syrian affairs as well as the loss of the status of the power of the Authority and its territorial fragmentation in the form of political papers with the

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regimes of the neighboring countries and the dominant regional powers until the Russian, Iranian and Turkish role became the agent of the Syrian opposition and the government. It is not possible to return to the pre-revolutionary era. The weakness and loss of the Syrian state, as a result of the crisis of ending the Syrian role in Lebanon and the problem of eliminating Hezbollah, seems to be facing a very large crisis, which has led to a variety of chaos. As a result of the failure of the state, which showed the problem of terrorism, the problem of displacement, illegal migration, refugees and the problem of relief, the problem was then turned to the Syrian humanitarian disaster and of Arab, regional and international real problem.

Syria has become a global theater of military and political conflict between regional and international powers, even Syria has become an expropriated land by the countries of the world, while a large part of its people are still leaving it.

We would like to point out the rapid change in the course of the Syrian crisis, wondering ... How did Russian policies of President Vladimir Putin with the new Eurasian orientations of Russian thinker Alexander Yugin make Moscow a regional hegemony over the Middle East and a major contributor to the Syrian geopolitical. The Syrian regime has tried to talk to a dominant mediator in its regional conflicts. This is what was mentioned by former Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk al-Sharaa. The late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad met with former US President Bill Clinton in 2000 about an arrangement for the military peace and the truce with the Zionist entity in the region. Today, the Syrian geopolitics, which have become most of the keys, have changed hands in Moscow, Tehran, Ankara and other Arab countries with economic influence, especially after the elimination of the terrorist gangs in mid-2017. Syria 14 centuries ago "center of the world order during the Umayyad rule.

In fact, it is necessary to recognize that Syria has been subjected to a major sovereign crisis that has destroyed the "prestige of the state," leading to the dispersal of internal power centers of the Syrian parties, due to the serious levels of internationalization of the Syrian case to achieve different balances between regional and international powers.

One of the most important differences between all the countries that entered the triangle of the Syrian crisis is called the balance between the US and Russian forces, the two agents of the Syrian opposition forces on the one hand and the Syrian Arab army on the other, as well as the balance between the Iranian and Turkish forces loyal to the Sunni and Shiite communities inside Syria, Consider the roles of the rest of the neighboring countries, and what other possible roles can play from time to time, such as the European Union, Egypt and Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the Kurds and Hezbollah, the state organization and others. The conflict is no longer about the crisis of democracy, says Samuel Huntington, but the consequences of the use of excessive "military power" for regional hegemony and gains at the geostrategic level under the title of defending democratic freedoms. The Syrian Baath Party will not be able to return to the crisis until before 2011, when it was required internally, a little openness to the opposition, because the latter insisted on ending of the Syrian Baath Party and the departure of Bashar al-Assad out of the authority. Since the outbreak of

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the Syrian crisis in 2011, where fighters from 70 countries meet on its territory, who turned it to international terrorism territory, which came on the infrastructure of the country, led to massive violations of human rights from all parties of the conflict, and changed the Syrian geopolitical, because of excessive interventions for regional players, wishing to transform the international balances in their favor, at the expense of the Syrian people.

All these had transformed Syria from a self-sufficient country to a country in need of international support to meet the basic needs of its citizens, including but not limited to the crisis of the Syrian opposition forces to take the force in the Barada valley, and stopped the capital Damascus from drinking water. This crisis presents a simple picture of what is going on in Idlib, Daraa, Eastern Ghouta, Homs, Hama, Aleppo, South Damascus, Deir Al-Zour, and others.

The Syrian revolution, after the Russian intervention and the Iranian-Russian alliance, is undergoing a period of dangerous transformations, but it preserves military potential, human potentials, popular legitimacy and deep-rooted morals, making it an almost impossible task to complete. But the weakness of the pro-revolutionary alliance in the face of the challenges of Iranian-Russian influence increases human and historical costs for this war.

Russian and Iranian role in support of the Syrian regime

Here we must return to the historical roots of Russian relations with the Syrian regime. Russia has been a military and political ally of Syria since 1956 during the time of the former Soviet Union. This historical support continues for over half a century to become a direct intervention during the Syrian civil war that followed the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011.

Since the outbreak of the revolution, Russia has supported Bashar al-Assad's regime by sending weapons, military and technical experts to train the Syrian regime's army to use Russian weapons and repair Syrian military equipment.

The Economist newspaper noted in a report that Russia is helping to maintain the Syrian regime by transferring hundreds of tons of banknotes through planes. In December 2012, Russian military advisers were reported to have protected some of the anti-aircraft defenses sent by Russia to Syria.

In January 2014, Russia supplied Bashar al-Assad with new vehicles, armored vehicles, surveillance systems, radars and electronic warfare systems, as well as spare parts for helicopters, bombs and rockets.

In September 2015, Russia made direct military intervention in Syria by launching air strikes against Syrian opposition sites and the Islamic state organization. Although Russia has announced that the strikes will be directed against Dai'sh, however, the strikes were directed to the forces that are against to the Syrian regime, especially the Front of Nusra and Ahrar Sham.

This coincided with the announcement of the Orthodox Church in Russia that the Russian intervention in Syria is a holy war against terrorism.

In this context, we will shed light on the Russian-Iranian role in Syria, the most complex and intractable crisis on the peace and security situation in the region, with its regional and international multiplicity, which constitute a regional and international actor with the capacity to seek the maximum possible Syrian equation. It is even a figure that cannot be exceeded, or to preserve the balance of power in the troubled and volatile region. A crisis that is witnessing a regional and international siege of the Iranian role and its geo-political armed militias in Syria to achieve demographic change in practice to create a new demographic reality in Syria, which is the cornerstone of the Iranian geopolitical project in the region. We will also shed light on the motives of this role and its determinants in the light of assumptions of the theory of role in international relations to determine the scope of the Russian and Iranian role in Syria, and the extent of compatibility of this role with the capabilities and the future of this role in light of the comparison of capacity and regional and international attitudes in Syria in the near future by the beginning of 2018.

From here, contrary to what the Kremlin authorities said, Russia's military presence in Syria was an official request by Iran to save Bashar al-Assad personally and in an orderly manner, according to the Iranian newspaper (Kayhan), run by Khomeini's advisor Hussein Shariatmadari.

"Russia sent its troops to Syria two days after the visit of the Iranian military delegation to Moscow. The delegation asked for an air and missile force to be sent to the war in Syria," said Saadullah Zarai, head of the Revolutionary Guards' Institute of Thought Studies.

The Russian version says Russian military intervention in Syrian territory began on September 30, 2015, after Syrian President Bashar al-Assad asked for a military presence from Moscow and the Russian Federation Council agreed to authorize President Vladimir Putin to use Russian armed forces outside the country.

Zarai said that Iran's request came because of the need for forces loyal to the Assad regime and its military allies in Syria to "shock", following the victories achieved by the opposition in areas such as Idlib and Sheikh Mesken and Sukhneh.

The Iranian analyst of the Revolutionary Guard said that the forces of his country control the battles in the center, north and south of Syria directly, contrary to the statement by the Iranian authorities that the participation of its forces limited to "advisory work" only.

The head of the Institute of "Thought Studies" said that Iran has long provided "strategic weapons" to the forces of Bashar Assad and his followers from Hezbollah and others in order to continue the battles in Syria.

"Iran will not find a reliable partner like Russia in the world," Ali Akbar Welayati, Khomeini's supreme adviser, said in support of Zarai's remarks on Russian-Iranian coordination, after praising Russia's support for Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

Most of the neighborhoods of Damascus, Tartous and Lathakia, the southern province of Suweida, the city of Hama and parts of its western countryside, and the cities of Aleppo, Homs and Daraa Medina, large parts of the northern Lathaqia countryside, and the cities of Western Ghouta, from the eastern Ghouta.

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Iran is helping to build up militias such as the Zainabion group, the Pakistani Shiites living in Iran, the Fatimiyan group, the Afghan Shiites living in Iran, and allowing the Lebanese Hezbollah to actively and effectively participate alongside the Assad forces in all areas of tension and conflict with the Syrian opposition or regions the dominance of this city represented a great strategic interest for Iran because it links Damascus, Homs and the Syrian coast to Hezbollah's areas of influence in Lebanon. Mobilized Iran «Hezbollah» Iraqi and «League of the Righteous» Corps militias «Abu Fadl al Abbas» and «Zulfikar» militias and brigades «the master of martyrs» Saraya «Khorasani movement» nujaba », and were formed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.

It is estimated that the number of members of these militias trained by Iran in three camps: Imam Ali, north of Tehran, and the "Amir of the Believers" west of Tehran, and "Mursad" Shiraz, one of the most important training centers for foreign fighters, about 40 thousand non-military fighters , While others estimate that their numbers are 60,000. In August 2016, it also announced the formation of a cross-border Shiite military force under the name of the "Free Shiite Army" led by Qasim Suleimani, based in Syria [consisting of Fatimiyoun, Zeinabion, , And includes the Shiites of Iraq, and there is the banner of «Hezbollah» to complete the implementation of its plans.

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First: the international budget

The Russian intervention in the Syrian crisis comes at an international level, as long as the Western pressure on the Syrian regime strengthens the countries of the Middle East hostile to it. This began with President Obama's speech that Assad should step down, which in turn led to the adherence of countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and others to an extremist rhetoric to resolve the conflict.

As Russia became more active in Syria, it became clear to everyone that there was a parallel to the anti-Assad and anti-Assad western role in his rhetoric to step down, despite the fact that this rhetoric was only reinforced by arming groups that proved

ineffective. In this sense, the entry of Russia into an international budget at the rhetorical and operational levels.

The new international budget is expected to have a regional impact as well. Regional countries, which rely on the Western role as an ideal option, realize today that the West will not confront the Russians to achieve a goal that is still clearly fluctuating. As a result, Tehran is counting on Middle East countries supporting the opposition to opt for exclusionary options as a prelude to resolving the conflict. Today's budget does not tolerate the preconditions for a solution.

The field budget: Re-balancing the field of the Syrian arena is the second result of Russia's air strikes against armed organizations. Since the change in the Syrian equation after providing the armed opposition with quality weapons and unification of its ranks on the Saudi initiative and the acceptance of Turkish-Qatari cooperation, the possibility of resorting to political solutions has declined. Russia realized at the same time the need to hold effective pressure if it succeeds in finding political solutions to the Syrian crisis.

The Russians discussed the accumulation of their strategic capital in the dialogue with the West through the Syrian Middle East portal. The opposition's progress and the possibility of Assad's fall in Moscow led to the conclusion that the Russian papers are falling rapidly. If the situation is not remedied, it will lose its last base in the Middle East to influence regional equations.

Apart from the Russian goals, the result remains the same: the rebalancing of the field after the imbalance caused by the introduction of large amounts of arms and money to Syria after the recent change in power in Saudi Arabia. Observers may differ from the Syrian situation on the feasibility of Russian raids and the changes that will be made on the ground in favor of the survival of Assad or the defeat of his enemies, but the field rebalancing of the expected results if not achieved so far.

Reducing strategic burdens: Reducing the strategic burdens of Iran and its allies is the third outcome of the entry of the Russian variable into the Syrian conflict. Iran has emerged as the main supporter of the Syrian regime. It is clear that this reality has generated considerable pressure at all levels. The regional and international political confrontations stemming from the Syrian crisis led to increased support of Saudi Arabia and Turkey and their allies to the armed opposition in order to strike at the Iranian side on the one hand and increased the support - at least rhetorical - for Western countries to opt out by force

All of this has increased the strategic burden on the Iranian strategy, which was heavily loaded with the nuclear file. Its break-up has reduced the nuclear deal from international burdens, but increased support for the armed forces and the establishment of the Fatah army has upset the balance of power in the Syrian north and increased pressure on the Syrian regime and its allies. This has led to the hardening of the position of the opposition - both armed and unarmed - and its supporters alike.

It is clear that Iran and after its nuclear agreement with the West, I would like to say that at the international level, it is not looking for escalation at the regional level for

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two reasons. The first is to keep the nuclear agreement from being influenced by the regional files and secondly to gradually remove the burdens of regional policy and its relations with its Arab neighbors. In favor of the two objectives"

This, in turn, has increased the pressure on the supporters of the Syrian regime on the one hand and Russia's resentment - the incubator of the dialogue between the government and the moderate opposition - on the other. The Russian intervention was therefore a response to the change in the balance of power and restored some balance to the equation. Syria after the entry of Russians is different than before and the countries that support the military option against Assad know that the situation has changed. In this sense, the strategic burden on Iran has decreased and pressure has increased at the same time on the countries of the military solution.

The Russians talk about the possibility of expanding operations to include Iraq, Jordan and Egypt, but a clear indication of Moscow's intention to penetrate the larger standards in the files of the Middle East. The Russians are therefore coming to play a larger and wider role than the Syrian coast. In general, so far, Iran does not consider the Russian intervention except with satisfaction and gratitude for the return of international, regional and field budgets and to alleviate the heavy strategic burden of the Syrian crisis. Apart from the aforementioned results, the growing role of Russia in Syria and the region can be framed by another perspective, the role of regional politics and regional player on international accounts and players after the Arab Spring. Westerners became more volatile after Qaddafi's fall. Thus, the regional player, without others, moves freely towards the regional files, supports, finances, salutes and tries to draw the new reality.

The nature of the United States' remote position on the developments of the Arab Spring, its allies fought to fill the void by supporting the Syrian armed opposition, and the role of the Syrian regime's allies in supporting them and standing before the choice of its enemies. The Russian military action is therefore an entry into the international character of the Syrian crisis - and other regional crises in the future - of its regional character. This is the role of the regional player. According to a popular statement by geopolitics, international solutions to crises of a geostrategic nature need to be developed. For each scale crisis, the scope of solving geostrategic crises cannot be national or even regional. A glimmer of hope can be seen for a political solution in Syria after the role of international players has increased. This comes as a result of weak regional cooperation and zero-sum solutions that eventually came to the role of regional players

In addition, and in view of the rising role of Russia and the international in general at the expense of regional roles, it is expected that deals on the Syrian issue. For regional states to play a pivotal role, the regional player will not have the necessary pressure tools for international resistance. This is true of Iran's competitors more than Tehran itself. Moscow is expected to care more about Tehran's priorities than Western ones or the interests of Riyadh or Ankara, for example.

It should be noted that all the propaganda for the Syrian crisis depends on the security and strategic situation of the Arab countries, what goes on in the war on Yemen, the

Gulf-Qatari crisis combined, gave the Russians and Iranians in the occupation of Syria.

Therefore, despite what is raised in the media, is no longer the issue of survival or change Assad as central issue today, what is important to Tehran was to thwart the scheme to overthrow Syria Assad by its enemies and replace it with the system of its allies, but now and with the budget provided by Russia on the equation, Tehran will promise any political solution across Negotiating, even if limited to the strength of its allies. It is a strategic asset that builds a more active and more active Iranian role with the Arab states.

Apart from this general reality, the question remains about whether Iran accepts the scenarios put forward after the Russian military intervention. Tehran understands that the Syrian situation has changed over the years of crisis and the priorities of the players have evolved in line with these changes. It is clear that a spiritual Iran that insists on a nuclear agreement at the international level is not looking for escalation at the regional level for two reasons: first, keeping the nuclear agreement away from regional files and the second gradually removing the burdens of regional politics. The Russian intervention is in favor of both objectives.

"The issue of the survival or change of Assad is no longer the central issue today. What is important for Tehran was to thwart the plan to topple Syria Assad by its enemies and to replace it with its regime and its allies, and with the budget that Russia put on the equation, Tehran would consider any political solution even if it limited its allies'

In other words, Iran's pivotal goal today is to stop the Syrian war without Syria handing over its enemies. The Iranian discourse, which calls for Syrians to decide their own destiny, is an expression of this vision. In general, Iran's goals in the post-Russian military entry phase can be summarized as follows:

- Building on the field budget to push for greater realism in the use of the armed opposition with the Syrian regime to reach a political solution.
- Build on the international budget to reduce regional extremism against Iran and its allies and the targets focused against it in order to strike its influence.
- Focus on the need to find opportunities for a political solution that will be prepared by a spiritual government, a strategic asset that supports the nuclear agreement.
- Try not to stand in front of international solutions and not to impose sanctions on Iran and its allies.

In general, Tehran's position on its regional rivals is flexible towards the Russians, Iran's friends, and Western countries, Iran's partner in the nuclear deal. On this reality, Tehran is counting on reaching its final Syrian objectives.

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Although it is expected that Tehran, like others, will have a part of the international imposed on the region in the Syrian file after it began to weaken the role of regional players in favor of international players, but the doors seem more open to them to continue to influence the final solution. This is how the situation at least looks, despite the difficulty of predicting the future.

The objectives of Moscow and Damascus have been divided since their military alliance of Syria hosting the Tartous military base, one of the most important military bases overlooking the Mediterranean Sea. So Moscow sought to protect the Syrian regime as part of its strategic political agenda to regain its dominant role in the Middle East. It succeeded in a decisive military intervention led to the fall of Aleppo, and the collapse of the forces of the Free Army of the Syrian opposition and its decline in the beginning of 2017.

The Russian role is characterized by the possession of leading papers internationally, making Moscow oversees the Syrian role, beginning in having a permanent seat in the Security Council, and its ability to integrate the Syrian file in the bilateral talks, the US - Russian raced to global domination. It also oversees most of the negotiations between the Syrian parties as a neutral member and seeks regional stability that will support its convenient military presence at the Tartous base for more decades to come. On the ground, the fight against the state organization has been the catalyst for the Syrian intervention in Syria, which the opposition accuses of defeating the battle for the Syrian army.

Iran has rejected the Syrian revolution and sought to sustain the Syrian regime, the pre-Saddam regime in Iraq. The Baathist regime was a common enemy of Hafiz al-Asad. Cooperation between Tehran and Damascus continued until after the fall of Saddam Hussein. What is illustrated in the policies of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his successor, Haider al-Abadi, complemented the Lebanese Hezbollah intervention to sway the Syrian regime. Iran continues to support the fighting in favor of the Syrian army and against the Free Army, as it exercises regional hegemony on a sectarian basis in the region. Its policy has succeeded in supporting a balance of forces favoring the regime at the expense of the armed opposition. The role of Iran remains active whenever the Russian role is honorable and leading, but if the American role enters the line, Turkey plays a balanced role no more and no less, so as not to overwhelm the Shiite role and cause the fueling of another sectarian war instead of the existing civil war.

International attitudes towards the Syrian crisis

Turkish position and rapprochement with Russia

Despite the success of Iran and Turkey over the past six years to neutralize their differences on the conflict in Syria, but it appeared that there is an international trend and regional support for a political settlement of the Syrian crisis. These differences go back to the forefront again .This was evident during the Turkish tripartite talks

Iranian-Russian relations on 20 December 2016, and during the bilateral Turkish-Russian negotiations that ended with the declaration of a cease-fire. Here, it is possible to say that these differences reached maturity, in a way that no longer with the policy of containment or neutralization is gaining importance and special relevance in the vision of both Tehran and Ankara. But this does not mean that the Iranian escalation against Turkey will reach an unprecedented stage, especially with Tehran - despite its displeasure with Turkish politics – which cannot risk entering into open conflict with Turkey, at least at the current stage.

While senior Iranian officials welcomed Russia's efforts in cooperation with Turkey to bolster the chances of success in the Astana negotiations aimed at strengthening the Russian-Turkish ceasefire agreement on December 30, 2016, this does not negate the many concerns Iran is imposed by the high level of understandings ongoing Russian-Turkish, and undoubtedly the cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the fight against a duel in the city of the Al Bab heightened the fears of Iran, as this could expand the scope of the role and influence of Turkey in Syria, especially with reports that Suggest that Turkey seeks to ensure the maintenance of a military presence in the city of the Al Bab even after the end of military operations launched by the forces of the Euphrates Shield, which received the support of Russia represented in the air strikes launched by Russia against the sites of the call.

In an interview with Al-Jazeera satellite channel on 19/4/2017, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan expressed his position on Iran's expansionist role, criticizing Iran's policy in Syria: "Tehran pursues a policy of Persian expansion and adopts expansionist policy based on Persian nationalism, "Iran wants to penetrate the Arab countries to form a Persian force," asserting that his country "will not allow the deduction of land from Syria for the benefit of other countries," which led to a negative Iranian reaction strongly towards the Turkish position.

Iran's eagerness to adopt a "wait policy" in dealing with those Russian-Turkish understandings or the US-Gulf understandings is that its fears of the repercussions it can impose do not deny - at the same time - its strong need to maintain strong relations With Russia and Turkey, especially that the coming period may witness an American escalation against it, which began to emerge with the waving of some US Congressmen to the possibility of introducing a bill obligating the US State Department to include the Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization threatens the security of the world, and Trump's statements about Iranian expansion in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

The Israeli factor

Washington's strategic ally in the region has defined foreseeable and tactical, four red lines, without which it will not move to intervene in the Syrian-multilateral conflict:

- a) Prevent the Assad forces from approaching the cease-fire lines in the occupied Golan Heights.

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- b) Preventing Hezbollah and Iran from exploiting the war in Syria to smuggle sophisticated weapons, especially rockets inside southern Lebanon, to support Hezbollah's arsenal.
- c) To prevent the concentration of armed groups fighting the Assad forces and their allies near the Golan Heights.
- d) Not allowing Russian intervention in the Syrian war to impede the movement of the Israeli army in achieving the previous three goals.

Over the past years, Israel succeeded in forcing its opponents or competitors not to skip the four lines mentioned above in the Syrian conflict by taking the position of the observer who does not intervene in the events only with a measure of action required by the red lines set for them. More importantly, Israel extracted recognition from Russia of its interests in Syria in a statement made by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his address to the United Nations in September 2016 saying that «Russia recognizes Israel's right to defend its interests in Syria, and when Israel realized an Iranian transgression of the permissible "Iran will not allow the construction of an Iranian base in Syria. The construction of an Iranian naval base and the arrival of Tehran at a port in Syria are not in the interest of Russia or Israel," Iran's ambassador to Russia Ghazi Kuin warned. In March 2017, a day before his visit to Moscow to meet with Putin to pressure Iran and prevent it from establishing a naval base in Syria in anticipation of the danger that this would strengthen the strength of Hezbollah and shortening the range of Iranian rocket fire against it, said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu: The United States decided to carry out a process to deter Iran's influence in Syria », and then stands the Israeli refusal next to the Turkish American blocking any Iranian military ambitions to build a naval base in Syria.

The American factor

Since coming to power on January 20, 2017, US President Donald Trump has adopted a new strategy that is different from that of his predecessor, Barack Obama, who adopted the principle of "leadership from the back", which is based on two axes: In order to pass Obama's ideas that the power of America stems from its cohesion and development at home and not from its international relations and foreign currency, the second one concerns countries that were rogue states such as Iran and Russia, which allowed freedom of movement for those countries in the region.

Trump's strategy is based on the principle of "leadership from the front," i.e. dealing directly with crises in the Middle East and conflict areas around the world to achieve American goals from the point of view of the new American administration. In this context, the American position, which rejects unilateral moves in the Middle East? Hence, we find the American position strongly opposed to the Iranian project in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, and therefore since his arrival as president, the Middle East issues in general and Iran in particular are on Trump's statements whether to describe the nuclear agreement as disgraceful, or threatened to attack the Iran and threatened to

impose sanctions on Iran and to freeze its financial assets in order to rein in and control it. His statements have come to confront Iran militarily, citing its threats to the US Navy in Iraq and the Gulf Water.

Although Iran was not invited to attend the Islamic Summit held in Riyadh on 21/5/2017, it was present and absent in Trump's speech, saying: «The Iranian regime is the main financier of international terrorism», adding that it feeds hatred in the entire Middle East, Especially in Syria, in a way that makes and brings terrorism and the Iranian authorities' responsibility for the crisis in the region. He said: "Iran trains and arms the militias in the region, and for decades, it has been raising slogans of death for the United States and Israel and intervening in Syria." It is training, arming and funding militias and other extremist groups that spread destruction and chaos, especially in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.

In this context, the movements of the new US administration come against Iran in Syria, including:

- Targeting Syrian Shuerat Bases: Three days after a chemical attack killed dozens of civilians in Khan Sheikhan, in April 2017, the United States dropped 59 cruise missiles on the base of the al-Assad and Iranian forces.
- Targeting the military base: The US-led coalition aircraft launched a raid on a military convoy of the Iranian militia on May 17, 2017. It was advancing towards the Al-Tanf military base on the Iraqi-Jordanian-Syrian border.

The Russian Factor

There is no permanent friendship or perpetual hostility in politics, but there are permanent interests. Where the interests of two or more countries have converged, the relationship has been strengthened and when the interests have been strained, the relationship has become strained. More than anything else, four centuries of historical hostility and decades of ideological difference cannot create a strategic partnership between any two parties, but a unique partnership of necessity in international relations, which seems more permanent here, because it's main cause will not disappear. In the near-term, namely the leadership of the United States is unilateralism of the international system, which changed the compass after the Cold War and the collapse of the equation of the conflict between the eastern and western camps. The following are the Russian - Iranian disagreements with Syria:

1. Controversy in the starting points, objectives and means: Brzezinski [one of the oldest influential foreign policy students in Washington is still in the age of the 84, one of the voices of American policy is a famous theory in international relations is the theory of alliances and intersections, and that the result is always in the strongest mill, and that

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alliances are always in favor of the stronger and do not benefit from the least powerful in anything. This theory today is working with all force within the structure of the Russian-Iranian-Syrian alliance. The Russian standpoints and means are intersecting with its Iranian counterpart day by day. Russia is a political strategy to protect its influence on the Mediterranean coast represented by the Tartous naval base, which is of great strategic importance as a result of its location on the Mediterranean coast. It is also a major starting point for the countries of the region, both allies and opponents of the region. Around the world, it is a gateway to the region and a permanent footprint for Russia on average, which allows it to restore its glory in that region, as the Russians hope to obtain US concessions in international issues such as Ukraine and the missile shield on its borders and lift imposed economic sanctions.

Russia is aware that the concession of Syria will bring heavy economic losses. Russia's current investment in Syria amount reaches to \$ 19.4 billion. It has opportunities to export goods to Syria with an annual average of \$ 1.1 billion. It also has arms contracts estimated at \$ 4 billion in 2011. It is ranked as seventh among international buyers of Russian weapons, and Russia will lose an anti-Moscow regime hostile to Syria in the loss of those contracts. .

Russian policymakers believe that Syria is the last card in the region, after the loss of several papers, most recently the Libyan paper. Its presence in Syria makes it a player and influential figure in the new equation in Syria. The entire region rearranged the political map of the entire region to maximize its strategic advantages, and then continue to implement its old dream and project to restore the glory of Russia in the warm waters of the region, and thus realize that the demise of that paper will eliminate it from the region In the framework of the new balance of power prepared European and American in the framework of the distribution of roles and the division of spoils.

Iran is starting from doctrinal ideological bases to extend Shiite influence, as we have said. Naturally, if the objectives differ, the means will vary. Russia, while preserving the regime by strengthening its military capabilities and enabling it to regain its lost land as an entry point to re-balance the conflict, and its close circle of government. Iran, meanwhile, has been adamant to maintain order by making a decisive victory over the Syrian revolution, by strengthening the role of irregular forces, cloning the experience of Hezbollah and Iraqi militias, and marginalizing the regular military establishment.

2. Differences over the priorities of the military fronts: While Russia focuses on the countryside of northern Aleppo is linked to Turkey, Iran was focusing on the countryside of southern Aleppo and eastern accounts of the opposition and the organization of the call and demographic change in Kfria and Fu'a in Idlib, and then emerged

public controversy after the control of eastern Aleppo especially with the evacuation of civilians and militants. Iran has tried to block the evacuation and kill all suspected militants and civilians, prompting Russia to threaten to strike at all those who fired, in reference to its allies, the regime and Iran.

3. The dispute over the future of Iranian militias in Syria: Iran seeks to consolidate its influence by spawning dozens of Hezbollah-like militias to ensure its sectarian project, which collided with the Russian position to fight sectarian battles or the presence of unorganized sectarian militias on Israel's borders. Targeting the leaders of Hezbollah through a security agreement between Moscow and Tel Aviv, and what has tried to get out of the Russian orders, the Russian aircraft targeting Iranian fighters on the ground at the Mellouk checkpoint near Homs, and the way of Khanazir and another north of Aleppo, and increased the pace of Russian bombing of the headquarters ,The Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah in the villages of Nabal and Zahra, and targeted the Iraqi Shiite movement stationed in Jabal Azan south of Aleppo.
4. Differences over how the political solution is to be: The Russian policy in Syria is based on the rule that the political dialogue between the regime and the opposition is the solution, away from any attempt to overthrow the regime by military force, and therefore the Russian military intervention is nothing but a new design of reality to respond and serve the stage of political solution. As for Iran, the vision of the Syrian regime is complete. There is no objection to Tehran making minor changes in the form of the regime that does not change its content, especially President Bashar al-Assad, which is the only guarantee for the continuation of the regime in its current form.
5. Differences over the nature of the relationship with the Gulf States: The objectives of Russia and Iran are also different in terms of the nature of relations with the Gulf States, and Russia looks forward to good political and economic relations with the Gulf countries. Iran is feeding the hostility with the Arab environment more interference and harassment as well as the problems that stand in the region always on the edge of tension and confrontation. It is known that part of the papers to resolve the Syrian crisis are owned by Gulf States, and the role of these countries is necessary to reach understandings and agreements between the regime and major factions and influential in the Syrian opposition, and Russia can be a mediator has a degree of

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acceptance, while the presence of Iran can complicate any efforts on this road.

The differences between Russia and Iran in Syria in the agreement between Russia and Turkey on 27/12/2016, which led to the displacement of civilians and revolutionary factions from the liberated section of the city of Aleppo without the knowledge of Iran and its ally Assad, the fact that Russia is the political decision in Syria and the task of its implementing allies, Blocking the evacuation of those trapped in Aleppo. The Russians threatened to fire during the evacuation. The threat included the militias belonging to Iran and the Assad regime. The Russian warplanes targeted the Iranian militias in the Rashidin area in a letter to Iran to implement the decision of Russia. Iran has therefore listened to what Moscow wants, revealing the extent of Russian pressure on Iran, which it has shown as a minor player in the political and military decision in Syria, but not to the leaders of Iran who feel their influence in Syria is diminishing in favor of an alliance between Russia and Turkey. The Iranians since their early military intervention in the conflict, which is to turn Syria into a purely Iranian area of influence as applied in Iraq. .

Iran has expressed its anger at Security Council resolution 2328, which was sponsored by Russia on 28/12/2016, which included protection of civilians from violence, recognizing the fact that Tehran is not in its interests. The description of Ali Shamkhani, Secretary General of the Supreme National Security Council, from tension in Syria and save terrorists. He was the first to take out the Russian-Iranian differences to the public, after being shelved aside for a long time, and followed the Russian positions after the end of the battle of Aleppo, to confirm that the city will not let the Iranian militias to do what it wants, while Tehran hoped to deliver From Aleppo a propaganda speech for « victory from God »confirms the dominance of Iran on the future of Syria, but the wind did not come as ships desire , and Aleppo now is besieging Iran and driven it to the corner.

The Russian-Turkish agreement on the cease-fire has weighed heavily on the Iranian role, which has shown a clear confusion because this agreement "trampled" the military intervention of the regime and Iran in Syria, which called for an urgent visit to the Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Moualem to the Iranian capital Tehran on 30/12/2016 to meet with his Iranian counterpart Jawad Zarif to discuss the content of the agreement and its implications on the Syrian regime and the Iranian role at the same time, because it involved the two contingencies of the Syrians and the Iranians to a large extent: first, that the agreement was done under the auspices of Russia and Turkey only away from Iran and the Syrian regime. The second is the talk of the Turkish Foreign Minister Mouloud oglu, who stressed the absence of any role for Al Assad in the future of Syria, and his call on Iran to pressure its armed militias to respect the cease-fire, following the purchase of Russia and the allegiance of the militias of the Shabihah and turn them from the Iranian embrace to the Russian barn by providing them with money and weapons , and was able to attract various military arms and morals as the militias of the "Jerusalem Brigade" Palestinian based in

Aleppo, and the militia «Desert Falcons» deployed in the areas of the Al alawyah on the Syrian coast, and reflects the nature of the difference between the Iranian and Russian projects and their goals and motives in Syria.

The Turkish and Saudi role in supporting the opposition forces

Ankara is a key player in the Syrian crisis because of four pressing issues: the problem of refugees and displaced Syrians, the problem of the Kurds and the fear of Syrian Kurds in supporting the PKK, not allowing the Syrian Sunnis to be displaced, as in Mosul, the Gulf role absent. The decline of the Saudi role due to the collapse of oil prices facilitated the decline of the role of the Syrian opposition forces inside Syria, facilitating the victory of the Syrian army in Aleppo, and resolving the battles in a zero way that facilitated the two sides to the negotiation negotiations in Kazakhstan and Riyadh in Saudi Arabia.

The Syrian opposition and behind it Riyadh insists on a peace plan beginning with the departure of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a prerequisite for the success of the negotiations. The insistence of the opposition appears to be hardened despite the decline in the Turkish demand for the departure of President al-Assad. The balanced role of the Turkish government has not succeeded in agreeing with the Assad regime through Iraqi mediation. On the Syrian regime through the dominant role of Russia, and the influential Iranian role and guarantor. The Syrian opposition also insists on referring files of murder and torture to the International Criminal Court. It is not about issues that occurred after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in 2011, but about the oldest events dating back to 1982, from the famous massacre of Hama whose book is still open by Syrian jurist.

American goals of the American role protector of the Zionist entity

Washington used the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and the outbreak of the Syrian-Lebanese crisis to stand against the Lebanese opposition against Damascus. The expulsion of Syrian forces from Lebanese territory became a top priority for the United Nations. Former President Bill Clinton with former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Thus, Washington found an entry into the American role, which is to "never allow, calming the crisis between Damascus and Beirut." To make it easier for it to build a dual role between Damascus and Tehran at the same time, Washington has made it clear that the expulsion of Syrian forces from Lebanon will not end Damascus' clear political tutelage over Beirut.

Washington has found no more success in Riyadh than in beating Hezbollah to direct its diplomatic attack on Iran's supportive role. Damascus, which has practiced its terrorism outside the Syrian border (in Lebanon) by killing Ghassan Tuani, Samir Kassir, Kamal Jumblatt, Rashid Karami, Raymond Edde and others, as the Lebanese opposition claims, and more deeply influencing Hezbollah, which succeeded in capturing Israeli soldiers on more than one occasion, and the threat of national

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security Zionist conflict on more than one occasion, the most obvious of which was the July 2006 war.

In the Syrian Spring, the US administration found its way. The US Congress passed a law to hold Syria accountable, which the Bush administration described as the "rogue state" And the Hamas movement in the Gaza Strip, and from here it has emerged to the government of President Barack Obama that weakening the positions and the role of Damascus in Lebanon and Palestine will serve the Zionist ally, because of intimate family relations between Washington and Tel Aviv, as described by US researcher Daniel Pipes. However, the confusion in the American role, especially after the inclusion of factions in the Syrian opposition within the terrorist movements, such as the Nusra Front, which encouraged President Bashar al-Assad to make his offer to eliminate terrorism, to serve the Western countries affected, especially after the bombings in the capitals of European cities.

Washington aims to support the allies in the Middle East, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, Cairo, Damascus and Tehran, so it is the most important ally of the Syrian opposition, and hopes to change the latter in power, to facilitate normalization with the Zionist entity.

The systematic Shiite cleansing of the Sunnis

There are signs of simulating the Mosul experience in Syria

In the beginning, the studies do not deny the occurrence of widespread violations of human rights in Syria by all parties in the Syrian crisis. A member of the Arab League delegation to Syria, Anwar Malek, confirmed the recording of real cases of killing and torture in Syria during the period of the Arab inspection in the Syrian state. The Syrian regime is ashamed of its occurrence, because it did not stop or even hide it. The authoritarian structure of the Syrian Baathist regime was based on the abolition of the Islamic and liberal opposition, the argument of the conflict with Israel, the claim that it defends the monotheism of the Arab nation. Once the Syrian revolution broke out, it became clear that Damascus needed a Shiite ally from Tehran, In which he used a sectarian speech against the Sunnis in an attempt to simulate what happened in Mosul of the ethnic cleansing and cleansing of the Sunnis and to make the city completely Shiite, under the pretext of expelling the Islamic state organization from the city. The Syrian regime, like Iraq, was unable to cover the armed role of the Iranian Shiite militias and its plans to expel the Sunnis under the pretext of combating terrorism and extremism without talking about the violence against these civilians against unarmed civilians. International support to expose them, with the exception of the Turkish agency for Riyadh, where Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan rejected the displacement of Sunnis from Mosul and Aleppo, and rejected the sectarian Al Safwi proposal, which spoiled the agenda of the Syrian opposition.

The issue of the elimination of the Islamic state organization in Syria and Iraq

The former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who accompanied her appearance in this post, spoke of the outbreak of the Arab spring revolutions, the conflict in the American role in support of democratic freedoms, and what may be enticed by the arrival of hardliners to power, which may jeopardize US interests. Putting a linear plan for democratic transformation, the far-right faction deviated from radical radicalism, conspiring against popular revolutions.

Despite the international community's disdain for the power of the state, the shock of the possibility of the non-believers (Takfiris), filling the vacuum of collapse of the Syrian state, as happened in Iraq, has put the international community on a clear agenda to eliminate state organization. Sunnis and the ambiguous role of Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, in response to the excessive extremism of Salafism in the organization of the state. It is possible that the fight against the Islamic state organization is a common denominator among all parties in the Syrian theater. However, all the parties did not abandon the front in defense of the prestige of the Syrian state, which damaged its entire infrastructure, including the archaeological sites destroyed by the hordes of (Takfiris), in Palmyra And others, as happened in Iraq previously.

The crisis of displaced Syrians and the problem of migration

The Arab spring revolutions in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia are involved in the crisis of political asylum, migration and displacement, which forced the inhabitants of cities in armed conflict between the authority and the opposition. Apart from the Tunisian model, which resulted in a peaceful transition, All the remaining revolutions led to deviation from the linear march of the revolutions, in different directions, ended to the militarization of the Egyptian experience and the division of society, the sectarianism of Yemen and retreat from the hope of unity, internationalization of the Syrian crisis in preparation for division, the absence of the state and the multiplicity of authoritarian models In the Libyan experiment, Nicolas Bou and Dominique Lagarde concluded the "exceptional experience of peaceful Tunisia," despite the dark point of the transformation of Tunisia, into the most Arab countries exporting to the jihadists under the banner of the state "advocated" in Syria and Iraq, which Tunisians fear today, The people and the authority, because of the possibility of the return of more than 2000 jihadists to the Tunisian territory, following the crisis in Mosul and Aleppo.

The Syrians are separated from the territory of armed conflict, divided into three categories: displaced persons, refugees and illegal immigrants. Studies estimate that they reach more than 4 million displaced people since the beginning of the Syrian crisis until 2016. Most of them managed to escape through Turkish territory. They are distributed on Arab lands and are considered the largest refugee complexes in Jordan, where this small country suffers from the repercussions of the Syrian crisis and

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receives more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees. In addition to the crisis of the Syrian refugees who reached the German border. The EU signed an agreement with Turkey to entrust it with the care of the Syrian refugees and provide them with humanitarian relief in the camps with a European international grant amounting to \$ 60 billion . A dangerous journey that has turned the Mediterranean into the largest maritime graveyard in human history because of the sinking of dozens of Syrians fleeing the war, not to mention the involvement of the human trafficking mafia in smuggling Syrians with flagrant violations of their rights.

Scenarios for the future role of Iran in Syria

The first scenario: the escalation of the Iranian role in Syria: The Iranian role is likely to escalate in the Syrian equation in light of the current situation that Syria is a key link within the circles of the sectarian belt aimed at the reconstruction of the Iranian Empire again, and there are indicators to achieve this scenario:

- Possess some of the cards that can be moved and influence, including the paper of armed militias deployed on the ground.
- The existence of a specific Iranian vision and strategy, and leaders who believe in it, working hard to implement them through various institutions, using the tools of strength in both, solid and soft, in a way that made them able to win and buy the loyalty of some political and intellectual leaders from outside the Shiite movement.
- The state of Arab laxity and the divergence of the Gulf views towards some of the dangerous files in the region, especially the file of terrorism and its fight against the Syrian, Yemeni, and Qatari crises and the low oil prices. If the Arab deal with the Iranian threats continues as such, it is expected not only to expand in Syria, Shiite militia groups more Arab countries in general and the Gulf in particular.

But these Iranian cards are not enough for Iran to continue to implement the plan to change the demographic structure of the people and the Syrian territory - the main objective of the Iranian project in Syria - by continuing to conclude agreements on the exit of militants and their families from certain cities and regions due to military pressure and suffocating siege to Idlib or others to replace them. To clear the area between Damascus and the Lebanese borders of the year in full, which explains the attempts to ignite the situation and violate the ceasefire agreement, this plan requires special capabilities and special capabilities at the regional level And international.

Scenario II: Stability of the Iranian role: This scenario refers to the arrival of the Iranian project in Syria to the limit allowed regionally and internationally, as the Iranian role stands at the point of stability in the Syrian areas liberated by the Shiite militias without progress to that point through regional or international pressures such

as Turkey or Russia, but this scenario is also unlikely to contain the Iranian dictionaries on the so-called principle of stability, as the Iranian expansionist project cannot accept the reliance, especially under the Iranian regime theocratic expansionist ideas, and this is now incompatible with the American, Russian and Turkish insisted.

The third scenario: the decline of the Iranian role: This scenario likely refers to the fall of the star of Iran in Syria and the occurrence of transformations prevent Iran from making strategic progress after some Syrian areas have become a circle that has surrounded Iran and its gains since 2011. There are indicators to achieve this scenario:

Absence of social incubator: The role of Iran in Syria is the most bare role of the "social incubator" unlike the situation in Lebanon and Iraq, and the movement of movements under one faction and one leadership after the fall of Aleppo can then withstand and attack stronger and wider, in addition to the huge financial cost required by The Iranian project in light of the deterioration of the Iranian economy despite the lifting of economic sanctions, as the area of the role proved to be greater than its national capabilities.

Russian-Turkish rejection of the Iranian military progress: to realize the Iranian desire to declare strategic victory and control of areas of influence contrary to Russian and Turkish interests, in addition to the outbreak of Russian-Iranian differences that would not allow Russia to expand Iran at the expense of its interests in Syria, Iran is bound to comply with Russian calculations. It is facing difficult choices. The clash with the Russian role will put it in a confrontation with everyone without exception, and will therefore respect everything that maintains its relationship with Moscow in order to avoid a major loss.

The new American policies: towards Iran and its rejection of the expansionist Iranian project in the region regarding the words of Trump and his presidential team, which revolves around the strategic necessity of pruning Iran's nails and striking its expansionist project in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, especially Trump's remarks at the Arab Islamic Summit in May 2017 to isolate it, and actually in the US military strikes on the bases of air capillaries and military tuff to stop Iranian expansion.

Deterioration and withdrawal of some of the Iranian militias: We have seen in the global media the retreat of Shiite militias from points of advanced backward from Lathakia to Altnf, and reflects the credibility of the statements of the head of strategic affairs at the Institute of Political and International Studies in the Iranian Foreign Ministry diplomat Mustafa Zahrani that the Iranian regime began to think to remove Its forces and mercenaries from the Syrian territory, and that this option has become a serious subject for discussion in Iran, but his country does not have a strategy to get out of the war in Syria, and the confirmation of the Secretary-General of the Lebanese Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah 05/13/2017 that the military is being dismantled party sites on Lebanon's eastern border with Syria and its withdrawal.

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Conclusion

In conclusion, it is necessary to refer to some of the motives that we have referred to some of them that lie behind the Iranian decision makers to play a role in Syria, despite their statements such as defending the Shiites and protect Shiite shrines, including:

First: strategic / political, to expand the sphere of Iranian influence in the region, taking advantage of the absence of the so-called "role" state, as a result of the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime during the 2003 US military invasion, and also exploiting Arab weakness due to the poor conditions in the region since 2011 of Revolutionary waves, civil wars and security disturbances prevented the existence of the so-called "deterrent" state, leaving all this space a "vacuum" that provided a strategic opportunity for Iran to pass its plans in the target countries to become a number in the regional equation that cannot be overcome. Bargaining force alive for any developments related to its nuclear program under Western policies fluctuating. Access to the Mediterranean is an Iranian dream as Iran relies on exporting natural gas to world and European markets, which is the first market in terms of volume of consumption, especially in light of the sharp decline in crude oil prices over the past years as a result of rich gas in the Mediterranean region, in addition to the rich gas fields in Syria and the most important in the area of Palmyra.

Syria serves Iran's strategy in the region. It represents the vital link between Tehran and Hezbollah. Syria also believes that Tehran must defend the arms paths of the Hezbollah party in Lebanon on the one hand and counter the Iranian strategy for the Arab regional axis. For Iran, on the other hand, Syria is the heart of the Iranian strategy, and the statement of the Iranian thinker Mahdi Tayyib is only proof of this. "If the enemies attacked us and wanted to take Syria or Khuzestan province, the priority here is to preserve Syria." Syria is Iran's No. 35, and its strategic importance and it is greater than the importance of the Arabistan region [of Ahwaz] for Iran.

Second: Ideological / doctrinal, it is located deep in the sectarian Shiite crescent that extends from Iraq through Syria to Lebanon and the Arabian Gulf. This expansionist project was developed during the two periods of the rule of former President Ahmadinejad [2003-2013] with the launching of the 20th Horizon Charter, Iran by 2025 in the region to the "super-territorial state", and defined the region in the Charter as "Southwest Asia region," which includes both the Middle East and neighboring countries as a vital first circle, followed by Central Asia and the Caucasus, and Syria which lies deep in the Middle East.

Iran's role in Syria and its philosophy in Syria is no longer in need of evidence, especially since Iran is no longer conceals its unlimited support for the Syrian regime through direct military aid. All the major battles fought by the Syrian regime are planned and directed by the Revolutionary Guards. At the end of 2016, the number of fighters of the Revolutionary Guards was estimated only with about 8,000, deployed in hotbeds of tension and conflict areas, especially in Damascus and the countryside of Damascus and Latakia, to win the war and the tilt of the equation in favor of Iran -

Syria Assad. General Qassem Soleimani, who is traveling between Iraq and Syria, Brig. Gen. Ismael Qa'ani, Sulaimani's deputy in the Qods Force, who leads the Guard forces in the battles of the Aleppo countryside, Brigadier General Qassem Rustami, former commander of the Guards' Oil in the state of former Iranian President Ahmadi nejad, and his task is to combat the military support in Syria, etc. In contrast, the death from these leaders since the beginning of the Iranian intervention in Syria 2011 reached to more than 1000 dead, according to the newspaper (Tasnim) "Iranian close to the Revolutionary Guard.

Information on Iran's financial support for the Syrian regime and militias has been mixed. While experts at the Fars Center for Middle Eastern Studies estimated the amount of Iranian payments to the Assad regime in cash, armaments, processing and training at \$ 15 billion annually, plus \$ 2 billion for militias coming from Iraq, Lebanon, The newspaper «Science Monitor» US Iranian financial support to the Syrian regime \$ 35 billion annually.

The Syrian crisis recorded more than 800,000 dead 8 million displaced persons and refugees behind the border, Damascus' transfer to the Russian guardianship, the loss of prestige and sovereign decision, the transformation of its territories into a scene of competition and the Saudi-Iranian conflict. And the Syrian crisis became closer to completion because of the boredom of the disastrous results of the Syrian revolution is not feasible, and has been based on more than 70 foreign nationalities, and the intervention of many international forces in the internal affairs of Syria, all as a punishment for Damascus for its role in the exercise of small hegemony over Lebanon for more than half a century ago.

In light of the above theory of games, we find that Iran is likely to be the loser in Syria, not only lost a large financial cost to eliminate the opposition, but lost lives and fighters, military and non-military, and became Aleppo besieged, and then lost the Sunni world as a result of the sectarian war against all Sunnis, not only in Syria, but in all the target countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and other Arab and Islamic countries. Washington also says that the time of American condescension for Iran's expansion or implicit support ended with the departure of Obama, Will return to Iran to The besieged site.

There are the most important scenarios we have reached in this context .Today we have three different levels of conflict, and at each level there are many actors and parties involved. At the international level, Russia is competing with the United States for its interests in Syria. At the regional level, we have Turkey on the one hand, which shares at least 560 miles of the border with Syria, in competition with Iran and Saudi Arabia on sectarian issues, and expansion in Syria. On the third level, we have local groups inside Syria that are fighting each other. The Syrian regime, which has always been using the term sovereignty, has resorted to relying more and more on Shiite militias to fight, as opposed to armed opposition groups that are now divided into those radical Islamists. Under the banner of the Syrian Free Army, which lost its existence day after day?

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These complex maps make it very difficult for any American administration to build an effective policy in Syria. All those conflicting interests have to agree on what they want to achieve in Syria. At the same time, they must agree on their understanding of the different terms. When we say "cease-fire" or "truce" or "zones of escalation", otherwise these ideas or concepts will become "theoretical" terms, meaningless on the ground, and the various parties will continue to fight the ill intentions of the parties in their policies towards Syria.

Therefore, it is not difficult for the Syrian opposition to accuse the "reduction of escalation zones" agreement as a plan to divide Syria. Russia wants to use the "zones of escalation" as a way to freeze the conflict in Syria, and then increase the chances of the Assad government to bite into the territory controlled by the opposition. When the United States disarms from Raqqa and Deir al-Zour, Syria will have no other option, instead of handing over the land to the Syrian government for its rule, because the United States will not be able to send troops there to take full control of these areas. Despite the rhetoric that the Trump administration has used each time to distinguish from the Obama administration at every turn, at all levels, it seems to follow Obama's previous footsteps in Syria, focusing on the organization of the Islamic state as we have said, relying on the militias Local, to get rid of terrorist groups, agree with Russia to reduce escalation, or freeze the conflict, because you have no interests to invest more resources to solve, and stay as far away as you can from the "Syrian quagmire."

This is the future of the international conflict on Syria, namely the freezing of the conflict, and its prevention, but without its solution, because all these international parties, especially the United States, are not ready to invest any additional resources to resolve the Syrian issue definitively. In addition, the issue of the Syrian refugees will continue to be raised as the terrorist violence in the Middle East and Europe escalates. This increases the suffering of the Syrians, whom no one in this harsh world seems to care about.. Syria today is a typical example of the failure of the international community to resolve an issue that early intervention was able to solve, but the vision of narrow interests and the fear of failure after what happened in Iraq ended with the situation in Syria to what it is today. The increasing pain and suffering with Assad's attachment to his location, his ill-fated desire to destroy Syria as a solution to it, refugees who find only the sea a safe haven, and terrorist organizations increasingly violent and black, found in Syria an appropriate habitat for them to control and implement unless they dreamed of never achieving it. The result we all know that Syria, that we used to know, is not and will not return as it was before.

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