## An overview of South Asian Security Physiognomies in the Context of Regional Power Balance Strategies

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### Abstract

South Asia is very effervescent region in terms of its geopolitical and geo-strategic uniqueness on the globe. India and Pakistan are two nuclear states in this region having conflicting and rocky relations. In the backdrop of the negative security externalities originating from US intervention in the region of South Asia, the hypothesis is that China is the only regional actor that has all the inducements and the capabilities to deal with the threats to the regional peace and stability. In South Asia, in terms of material physiognomies such as the regional delineation and its power polarity is blurred. By evaluating and investigating its security environment, this research study suggests how this dearth of clarity could be alleviated. India's role within the region is even more controversial. We found that in light of the regional disputes between India and Pakistan, China's role is probably the most critical for the regional security and stability.

**Key words:** Balance of power, Bilateral engagement, Regional Security Complex, Regional power politics, security externalities.

## Introduction

South Asia holds immense importance in security paradigm owing to its volatility. The conventional disparity is endeavored to be reduced by attaining nuclear capability. This bilateral engagement between two states, which has always been at odds, determines the course of regional politics and security largely. These nuclear states share common borders with each other. This security complex becomes more intricate by presence of two great powers i.e. China and Russia. The interests of both these powers are linked to this region in competition for balance of power. So security is inevitable in this nuclear armed regional belt. Any misapprehension between the nuclear states can lead to a nuclear conflict in the region.

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The balance of power is inevitable for the regional security of South Asia along with the international peace and security. Balance of Power between the nuclear neighbors may create a milieu of mutual dissuasion. The cold war between two super powers then, did not convert in to a direct war due to this power balance. Balance of power of this region is problematic and uneven. It is evident that if this region experienced any upset in terms of balance of power, there would have been a war between Pakistan and India. The China's role is very significant in keeping the balance of power in the South Asia. China is an important stake holder in the region and has the direct effect on it if the region experienced any crisis. Hence the role is more wide-ranging in this Regional Security Complex and in maintaining the Balance of power in the region. China's engagement with Pakistan over decades is evident of its realistic foreign policy approach in catering to its strategic requirements.

# Power Balance in the Context of Regional Security

Power Balance theory is an outcome of different philosophies of multilateralism and collaboration among the stake holders in the regional security complex (Ikenberry, 2002). The extent to which the settlement is value the cost is a stuff of argument amongst conservatives and liberals. However it is established that multilateralism policies do prompt some increase in cooperation from other states. In the world scenario, there is no fundamental régime in International community of nations and all nations are sovereign actors. However, nations around the globe make attempts to get power at maximum level in the anarchical global system (Warleigh-Lack, 2006). Since there is a great possibility that if states do not achieve authority and power they have the potential to be the subservient to other dominant countries consequently suffer security and stability issues in the region. Ultimately anarchistic arrangement induces the countries to upsurge there in the region because geographical sustainability cannot be detached from power enlargement. In consequence to balance of power scenario in the region, the struggle for power becomes a natural state of concern in global politics (Paul, T.V; Writz J., 2004). Particularly small states often cannot attain security depending upon their own internal resources. As a matter of concern, they have to be contingent on great powerful states for accomplishing a balance of power against a stronger enemy in the order to have regional survival (Hettne, 1991; Mittleman, 1996).

Zinnes (1967) proposed that there can be at least six different balance of power structures:

| Table 2.2 Different Expressions of Balance of Power |   |  |
|---|---|--|
|   | Two alliances, one non-aligned state that matters<br>A + B + E > C + D or A + B < C + D + E   |  |
| power<br>A + B = C + D + F                          | No alliances, but power of each less than sum of all<br>nations<br>Sum of Xi >Xj for j=1,N where N = when i is not<br>equivalent to j       |  |
| aligned state                                       | One alliance most powerful but above condition<br>met<br>Sum of Xi >Xj for j=1N where N = total number of<br>nations, and A > B > C > D > E |  |

**Source:** O'Connor, T. (2013). "National Security Theory," MegaLinks in Criminal Justice. Retrieved from: <u>http://www.drtomoconnor.com /3040/3040lect02.htm</u>.

Balance of power denotes to the overall notion of one or more states' power jointly intended to use in order to balance the power of other state or cluster of states (Joshua, S. Goldstein, 2005). The states who are endangered adopt the strategy of constructing armaments in order to obtain countervailing proficiencies. Likewise threatened states try to balance the emerging power's military power. Reaching military alliances, making up armaments through internal resources and procurement from external sources are the main ways to main the balance of power in the regional security environment. Peace is usually generated by the symmetry of power exists between the actors because no state expect triumph. In the regional security dynamics, it is essential to have equilibrium in capabilities of the states to deal with any emerging lawless situation because the balance of power approach presented that sovereign states have a genuine and legitimate right to deal with its affairs, irrespective of their magnitude and power capabilities (Paul, T.V; Writz J. James & Fortman Michael, 2004). We have a very good example of South Asian regional power balance. In May 1998, India conducted its first nuclear device and balance of power tilted in favor of India disturbing overall balance of power of the region. But it was indispensable for Pakistan to neutralize the disturbed power balance and consequently Pakistan also detonated its first nuclear device to maintain power balance in region.

It is evident from the history that relations of China and Pakistan are more based on the notion to maintain the power balance in the region. To achieve balance of power in the regional power politics and to save their sovereignties they are engaged in balancing process of relationship. Actually it an arrangement counters to intimidating power (Joshua, S. Goldstein, 2005). In different regions, it is observed that emerging powers or alliances origins of complications. Once a state or a group of states advance much in attaining military power within a region, that state or a group of states may become violent towards bordering states. As a result, alliances can practice power balances with or without the connotation of extra-regional big-powers. However for balancing emerging power in the region is by obtaining or developing weaponries by using internal resources. The broader purpose of power balance in the regional power politics is to create a steady dissemination of power aiming of averting conflict (Paul, T.V; Writz J. James & Fortman Michael, 2004).

Pakistan and India have a long history of rivalry but it is evident that there is no war between the two rival states, when there is equivalence in power distribution. However, the power equivalence in the region constrained the rival states to involve in reconciliation process and accept the sovereignty of other state irrespective of the bulk and size of the state. Some of the researchers of hegemonic stability theory have a view that war is an outcome of power equality while supremacy of the hegemonic state is a mechanism for peace safeguarding in the region (Gilpin, Robert, 2001). But in contrary to that the United States materialized a solitary power status in international power politics and accomplished its hegemonic status that failed to carry harmony (Simon, 1995; Emmers, 2012).

It is noted that the United States dishonored philosophies of International by laws number of times in the history of nations and attacked Afghanistan and also Iraq on different alleged reasons. At the time of cold war scenario, quasibalance of power distribution existed amongst the United States and former Soviet Union (Sheehan, 1996). The nations of world were alienated into two encampments, the capitalist and the communist. The US and the USSR, both established alliance for strengthening their position in the world power politics scenario. As alliances and coalitions are driven by mutual securities so United States manage to establish coalition with Western Europe that is NATO whereas USSR established Warsaw pact with the support of communist regimes. This approach prompted the nations to participate in a race to make alliances worldwide. The American backed SEATO and CENTO alliances were formed to counter communist menace. The motivating factors behind this alliance were that Pakistan's apprehension of Soviet threat and its alignment with India but the United States interested to counter communism forces. It is evident that cold war between the US and USSR couldn't exacerbate to a direct hostility in line of balance of power and panic of mutually certain devastation (Medeiros, 2005).

# **Regional Security Complexes in South Asia**

The Regional Security Complex in the subcontinent has been affected by many Neo-realist and Constructivist factors. The anarchic state between India and Pakistan and process of militarization and nuclear propagation proves the foundations of the neorealist. The regional security complex in the subcontinent can be sketched through the coherent patterns of enmity and amity between India and Pakistan. The regional security complex in South Asia will further be clarified through the following figure;





**Source:** Unpublished thesis of Maryam kamal: "Changing regional Security paradigms: A study of Mumbai Attacks 26/11"

The roots of hostile relationship can be connected with the web of social standards and morals, as the historical long-standing enmity due to the religious alteration between the Muslims and Hindus, the cultural dis-balance, and security risk from the territorial adjoining to next neighbor and its intimidating susceptibilities. On the other hand, we can observe the liberalist's weak security apparatus through regional institutions, as SAARC is practically stationary. It has never advanced any grounds for collective security nor economic development. Analytically the subcontinent inherited all menaces and jeopardies that contributed in the regional security threats.

# South Asian Regional Power Politics

In South Asia, in order to understand the power of balance strategy in the regional power politics, it is imperative to understand the rivalry between the two states in this region. Although Kashmir is long standing unresolved issue between the two rival states and two full scale wars had happened but no one could completely dominate the other state only because of balance of power in the region of South Asia. Burgeoning states always have limited resources to afford any higher and sustained conflict. Kashmir is always a major issue in the regional power politics. India and Pakistan engaged in the 1<sup>st</sup> war in October 1947.

| Regional Crisis                                 | Proximate Origin   | Resolution  | Consequences   |
|---|--|---|--|
| 1947-48<br>First Kashmir<br>war                 | Pakistan-<br>supported raiders<br>enter Jammu and<br>Kashmir   | None; semi-<br>permanent<br>division of the<br>state; international<br>mediation efforts<br>ineffective | Still in dispute   |
| 1948<br>Indian<br>incorporation of<br>Hyderabad | Hyderabad state<br>appeared to be<br>seeking<br>independent<br>status                                      | Indian army<br>invasion of<br>Hyderabad   | Absorption into<br>Indian Union (now<br>in Andhra Pradesh)                     |
| 1960<br>Indian military<br>occupation of<br>Goa | Alleged Goa pro-<br>Indian revolt, but<br>use of force<br>instigated by<br>domestic<br>elements, political | Incorporation of<br>Goa   | Goa first a Union<br>territory, now a<br>separate state<br>within Indian Union |

Table 2.1 - Conflicts in South Asia

|  | pressures on<br>Nehru  |   |  |
|--|--|---|--|
| 1962<br>India-China war                                  | Massive Chinese<br>response to<br>Indian probing<br>along disputed<br>borders  | Major Indian<br>military defeat in<br>east, standstill in<br>west, Chinese<br>withdrawal from<br>some, but not all<br>claimed territory | Led to unsuccessful<br>US-UK effort to<br>resolve Kashmir;<br>India-China border<br>and territory<br>disputes remain,<br>but several<br>agreements<br>reached recently |
| April 1965   | Dispute over<br>Rann of Kutch<br>reaches a crisis  | Resolved several<br>years later by<br>International Court<br>of Justice   | Led to subsequent<br>India-Pakistan war  |
| September 1965<br>India-Pakistan<br>war                  | Initiated by<br>Pakistan in an<br>attempt to contain<br>growing Indian<br>power,<br>internationalize<br>Kashmir dispute                        | Military standstill,<br>US-British<br>pressure to stop<br>fighting, followed<br>by failed Soviet<br>mediation effort                    | Independent state<br>of Bangladesh has<br>normal relations<br>with India, and now<br>with Pakistan   |
| 1984-present<br>Siachen Glacier<br>dispute               | Probably Indian<br>belief that<br>Pakistan was<br>attempting to<br>control the<br>glacier,<br>reminiscent of<br>1959-61 conflict<br>with China | Unresolved, but<br>escalation limited<br>by human and<br>material cost and<br>secondary<br>strategic<br>importance of<br>territory      | Symbolic<br>importance of not<br>yielding for both<br>sides prevents a<br>settlement,<br>technical means of<br>verifying pullback<br>becoming available                |
| 1984, 1985<br>Suspicion of<br>Indian attack on<br>Kahuta | Threat raised with<br>Americans by<br>Pakistanis   | Indian denial, no<br>strong evidence of<br>preparation for an<br>attack   | Led to some CBM agreements   |
| 1986 Suspicion<br>of Soviet attack<br>on Kahuta          | Threat raised with<br>Americans by<br>Pakistanis   | Denied by Soviet<br>Union   | Resolved at pre-<br>crisis stage   |
| 1987<br>Brasstaks  | Massive Indian<br>military maneuver<br>escalated into full-<br>fledged crisis; no<br>military action   | India reoriented<br>provocative<br>military exercise;<br>United States<br>reassured both<br>sides there was                             | Nuclear program<br>accelerated in India<br>and Pakistan; no<br>resolution of India-<br>Pakistan tensions,<br>but some minor  |

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|  |  | nothing to be alarmed about   | CBMs agreed to.  |
|--|--|---|--|
| 1990<br>Multifaceted<br>Kashmir Conflict | Combination of<br>domestic political<br>weakn3ess in<br>both India and<br>Pakistan;<br>Kashmiri uprising,<br>support by<br>Pakistan for<br>Kashmiri<br>separatists;<br>compound crisis<br>complicated by<br>nuclear alarm. | Mutual realization<br>that no significant<br>military activity<br>likely; U.S.<br>intervention and<br>reassurance to<br>both sides.   | Led to<br>establishment of<br>important military<br>CBMs regarding<br>pre-notification of<br>military exercise<br>and preventing<br>airspace violations. |
| 1993<br>Mounting<br>Tension              | Multiple blasts in<br>Bombay;<br>accusations of<br>Pakistani<br>culpability;<br>subsequent<br>atrocities in<br>Kashmir   | Pakistan denied<br>role in Bombay<br>and Kashmir<br>episodes.   | None; repeated<br>terrorist attacks in<br>India in subsequent<br>years, but cross-<br>border movement<br>apparently tapered<br>off after 2002 crisis.    |
| 1998<br>Nuclear Tests                    | Major diplomatic<br>crisis after India<br>Pakistan tested<br>nuclear devices<br>and set<br>themselves forth<br>to be nuclear<br>weapons states;<br>no evidence of<br>any threat of<br>attack.                              | Both countries<br>sanctioned and<br>begin extended<br>series of<br>negotiations with<br>the United States<br>about their<br>adherence to<br>precepts of global<br>nonproliferation<br>regime. | Sanctions relaxed<br>by Clinton; most of<br>them lifted by Bush.   |
| 1999<br>Kargil Mini-War                  | Pakistan-<br>sponsored jihadi<br>and regular units<br>occupy territory<br>on the Indian side<br>of the LOC;<br>border crisis, with<br>strategic<br>undertones; gross<br>Pakistan   | War fought from<br>May to July but<br>limited to Kargil<br>sector; American<br>pressure on<br>Pakistan to<br>withdraw back to<br>own territory<br>behind LOC.                                 | LOC begins to<br>assume permanent<br>status.   |

|                                      | miscalculation of<br>India response.   |   |  |
|--------------------------------------|--|---|--|
| 2001-2002<br>Border<br>confrontation | Indian buildup<br>armed forces after<br>terrorist attacks;<br>direct pressure on<br>Pakistan, indirect<br>pressure on<br>United States to<br>force Pakistan to<br>stop/reduce<br>support for jihadi<br>and terrorists. | Lasted ten<br>months; resolved<br>by American<br>pressure on<br>Pakistan to<br>reduce cross-<br>border terrorist<br>attacks and<br>Pakistani<br>assurances. | Major effort to start<br>a new peace<br>process initiated by<br>Prime Minister<br>Vajpayee in April<br>2003; continued by<br>Congress-led<br>coalition since<br>2004-05. |

**Source:** Kanti P. Bajpai; P.R. Chari; Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema; Stephan P. Cohen (1995). SumitGanguly, Brasstacks and Beyond: Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia, New Delhi, Manohar, pp. 7-8.

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The British devised the policy that princely states could assent to either of the state based on topography and demography of the states. However the ultimate standing of many states was settled easily but two other states along with the Kashmir untaken extraordinary glitches. Rigidities and tensions nurtured as the Maharaja were unable to manage the decision that definitely discouraged pro-Pakistani offshoots in the state. Aggressions initiated as the tribal uprising started. On the other hand, the India mounted violent attack to recapture the area, it had gone astray. Consequently Pakistan responded the situation; the war from the spring through December 1948 was widespread. Approximately 1500 soldiers of India and Pakistan died on each. However, Pakistan managed to get two-fifths of Kashmir in this war (www.globalsecurity.org, 1947). This first war proved irresolution of Kashmir issue because of fact both the states didn't start engagement to accelerate into full scale war as both the actors had almost with similar power capability. Pakistan had always outwardly look for its security. As the US and USSR were making alliances in the context of co Cold war. So Pakistan joined the western bloc for seeking desired security and regional balance of power.

# South Asian Security Dynamics in the Context of World Power Politics

In the world power politics scenario, the United States developed its relations promptly in South Asia especially with Pakistan against the backdrop of the

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Cold War. In the South Asian region, Pakistan has a unique strategic geographic position that offered west to make strategic partner to counter communist evil forces. As a result Pakistan and United states established mutual security agreement on May 19, 1954 and escorted in an era of distinctive affiliation.

United States delivered Pakistan with defense and economic assistance generously to achieve its objectives in the regional politics. But Misapprehension took place in 1959 and had more worsen during the China India border conflict. Initially, in 1959, Pakistan permitted US military bases in Peshawar for the surveillance over Soviet zone. One of the US spy plane U-2 shot down by Soviet Union. This plane took off from Peshawar, the Pakistani territory. This incident carried Pakistan in straight conflict with USSR. A spy plane U-2 without a doubt generated security threats for Pakistan. At that time the Pakistan was the closest strategic partner of United States. Pakistan amenably acknowledged that US spy plane U-2 took off from Pakistan (Bhutto, 1969).

On the other hand, border conflict (1962) between China and India has a substantial significance in the regional and international power politics. This conflict leads the stake holders to make new alliances to counter the antagonistic state. Initially, China had unceremonious alliance with USSR but far along this alliance split and revolved to antagonism in the border conflict between China and India in 1962. However, Pakistan had signed the SEATO and CENTO backed by US. But India remained non-allied and did not join any bloc. On 13<sup>th</sup> April 1947, India managed to establish diplomatic relations with USSR (www.axisglobe.com). On the Indian non-allied policy, USSR also bolstered India on every issue in the United Nations Security Council. USSR turned antagonistic towards China. Former Soviet Union blatantly reinforced India against China during border conflict 1962 in all respect with the economic resources and militarily resources.

USSR transmitted gigantic cache of weaponries to upkeep India against China. USSR also accentuated on extensive manufacturing and military assembly in India. It is estimated that \$35 billion amount of weaponries handed over to India from 1960-2000 by the USSR (<u>www.axisglobe.com</u>). Contrariwise, in the context of Korean Confrontation, US also supported India against China. United States supported India with heavy armed aid against China. So during this period of India's war with China huge armaments were given to India for the categorical determination of resistance against China. As per the standings of aid the paraphernalia was used to counter China (Cohen, 1976) but it is evident that India used that armaments and weapons later against Pakistan during Pakistan India 1965 war.

However, the regional security complex of the South Asia is straightforwardly understandable underneath that it is evident that enemy of my enemy is my friend (www. thinkexist.com). This really describes the situation of Subcontinent during 1960s once both the super powers, the United States and the USSR buttressed India to counter China and in 1965; China gave generous support to Pakistan in the Pakistan India war. The one side and generous support to India by the two super powers empowered India in the China India 1962. It is evident from the history that USSR, U S and France were given huge aid to India against China. The USSR opposed Pakistan only because of joining anti-communist bloc. Even USSR supported India diplomatically at United Nations forum besides the military and economic assistance. Ghana's President openly protested against West armaments to India in China India conflict (Karki, 1971).

As a close ally of US, Pakistan did not manage its relations with USSR. In the Pakistan India war 1965, USSR, France, and West gave assistance to India. But the considerable US military support for Pakistan was only after authorization security agreements SEATO and CENTO. It is approximately estimated that during the period 1954 to 1965, Pakistan acknowledged \$630 million militarily support and \$55 million worth of equipment acquired (Stephen P. Cohen, 1976). Nevertheless India was not US ally against containment of communism, but it managed to collect huge assistance from US, USSR, UK, and many other states. One of the other significant elements in international politics was the nuclear test by China in1964. In India's neighborhood, China emerged as a very strong nuclear power because of this nuclear test. This nuclear capacity of China instigated other stake holders of the world to support India in gaining nuclear status as soon as possible. It is because of this India in 1974 made its successful nuclear explosion.

#### China's Role in the Regional Power Balance

In the regional power of balance approach, China's role is significant to maintain the power equilibrium in the South Asia and she always actively played its role to maintain a balance in the region. China supported Pakistan in all the conflicting issue between the two rival states of South Asia. Pakistan China alliance ultimately merged to strategic arrangement. China delivered Pakistan enormous armaments in order to reinforce the capacity of Pakistan to counter the potential threat from India and empowering it in managing peripheral hostility. A forceful Pakistan meant a tougher Chinese security in contradiction of any peril from another state in the region. Because of the uniqueness of strategic position of Pakistan in the region, China was always profound in Pakistan to create a track to Middle East. It's domineering while tracking strategic concerns, to be unquestionable that the ally's powers means

are out of opponent's stretch (Snyder, 1984). Both In Pakistan and China, the internal and external dogmata and resources gave an upward momentum to their mutual strategic relations based on common security in the region. The leadership and establishment vicissitudes in both China and Pakistan did not affect this entente because of the vital scope of mutual benefits in the regional power politics (Yaacov, 1983).

| Table 2.3 China's policy towards Pakistan 1950 to 2011 |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| Time Period  | Issues   | China's Policy   |
| 1950-1960  | <ul> <li>India-Pakistan War 1947–<br/>1948</li> <li>Kashmir issue</li> <li>TheU-2aircraftincident</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>China's neutral policy of nonaligned</li> <li>China's close ties developed with India and Pakistan followed west and made alliances for balance of power in the region</li> <li>Bilateral relations emphasized in 1955</li> </ul> |
| 1961-1970  | <ul> <li>Kashmir issue</li> <li>1965 India Pakistan war</li> <li>Containment of communism</li> </ul>   | <ul> <li>Backed Pakistan to solve<br/>Kashmir issue by United<br/>Nations resolutions</li> <li>China provided economic,<br/>military and technical<br/>assistance to Pakistan</li> </ul>   |
| 1971-1980  | <ul> <li>Kashmir issue</li> <li>1971 India Pakistan war</li> <li>Soviet invasion of<br/>Afghanistan</li> <li>The Indian nuclear<br/>explosion of 1974</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Vetoing Bangladesh's entry<br/>into the UN</li> <li>Condemned soviet<br/>intervention in Afghanistan</li> <li>Supported Pakistan militarily<br/>anddiplomatically at United<br/>Nations</li> </ul>                                |
| 1981-1990  | <ul> <li>Kashmir issue</li> <li>Cold war between US and<br/>USSR was on peak</li> <li>Afghanistan crises</li> </ul>  | <ul> <li>Backed Pakistan<br/>diplomatically on all<br/>international platforms<br/>including United Nations</li> </ul>   |
| 1991-2000  | <ul> <li>Kashmir issue</li> <li>India Nuclear test may 1998</li> <li>9/11 incident</li> <li>India's increasing influence in Afghanistan</li> </ul>               | <ul> <li>During this era, close<br/>understanding between<br/>Pakistan and China on all the<br/>issues. China fully backed<br/>Pakistan except Kargil issue,<br/>where she maintained its</li> </ul>                                       |

|           | Kargil issue  | neutral policy.  |
|-----------|---|--|
| 2001-2011 | <ul> <li>Kashmir issue</li> <li>War on Terror</li> <li>US-India civil nuclear deal</li> <li>Military standoff 2002</li> <li>Mumbai terrorist attacks</li> <li>Abbotabad Incident (US killed usama Bin Ladin)</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>China's policy shift on<br/>Kashmir issue to resolve it by<br/>bilateralism</li> <li>Supported Pakistan on war<br/>on terror</li> <li>Supported Energy<br/>requirements of Pakistan</li> <li>Diplomatic efforts to diffuse<br/>the military standoff<br/>situation</li> </ul> |

Source: Compiled by the researcher on the basis of Asian Survey (1950-2011)

From the above table, it can be concluded easily that Chinese foreign policy has been based on principles of peaceful co-existence since the early 1950's. It is noted that China has been fundamentally enduring by these principles; nevertheless, China may perhaps overlook them in the situations if it suits its national interests. But at same time now the operational Chinese foreign policy has moved from idealism to realism and is grounded more on pragmatism than principles. In the meantime, China has incorporated new concepts of mutual security and harmonious relations security into the Chinese foreign policy in dealing with international relations. In2006, Chinaintroduced its future policv through the concept of Harmonious World. In2007, these concepts were institutionalized as the central theme of China's 17<sup>th</sup> policy orientation in the Communist present foreian Partv Formulation Congress(Wang, Zheng, 2007). of pro-active foreignpolicymatchingitsrisingpowerstatureintheinternationalcommunity has become necessary for China (Yongnian Zheng, 2007).

It can be concluded that the stability is grounded on the rational inference that nuclear weapons have functioned an imperative determination in the logic that both the states had not moved to a full scale since 1971(Simon, 1973). As during the cold war era nuclear warning preserved stability, so it can be deducted related stabilizing paraphernalia in South Asia (Malik, 2003). A terrorist attack in India on November 26, 2008 claimed 163 innocent human lives. The former Indian army chief straight forwardly quantified that Pakistan's peril of nuclear usage discouraged India from extremely allowing for conventional military attacks on Pakistan in the back drop of the incident (Hindu, 2009, March 10). In brief, the politicians and experts understand nuclear arms are indispensable to maintain state's security and guaranteeing state existence. From their standpoint, nuclear deterrence averts conventional confrontations, preserves stability and gets opposing states to the discussing

table. Talks in Agra and Lahore declaration are the good examples in this context (Malik, 2003). Pakistani Prime Minister invited Indian Premier in Feb, 1999 which gives rise to in Lahore declaration. They agreed to resolve the entire core and the coat problems on the negotiating table by using diplomatic means to resolve long standing Kashmir issue and categorical ambition to deal for decisive actions in armaments regulator and evade jeopardies of engagement (Ahmad, 1999).

# Conclusion

It is understandable easily from the above discussion that South Asia is a nuclear breaking point and many scholars highlighted that there is a great possibility of nuclear war in the region of South Asia, if the issues remained unresolved. The magnitudes of a nuclear conflict are too horrific to anticipate. Politicians in New Delhi and Islamabad have a comprehensive thoughtful of each other's prospective, competences, targets and strategies. This experience is observed in the Kargil War and military standoff maneuvering that demonstrates the "stability-instability" paradox that nuclear armaments have presented to the reckoning in South Asia, protagonists of nuclear dissuasion in Pakistan and India have faith in that atomic dissuasion is vital to avert conflict between the two states. Their argument is based on the scenarios of Kargil clash and military deadlock which will not worse further than a conventional conflict due to the peril of nuclear warfare.

On the other hand, Chinese foreign policy was not to assume a lead role in international system under Deng Xiaoping. Jiang Zemin shifted the focus to proactively engaging with the world and seeking to develop a new international order. When Hu Jintao assumed power, he inherited a number of internal and external challenges as a consequence of rapid economic development including strategic containment; separatism; terrorism; and creating a rightful place for China in the international system as a great power. China is trying to create stable political and strategic environment in the neighborhood and in South Asia as well. Now China's approach is to the world is focused on three broad objectives: 1) Building relations with U.S. to prevent the emergence of any coalition getting China. 2) Maintaining a Zone of Peace around China especially for economic strengthening. 3) Securing and diversifying access to natural resources. The most important objective ofChinese diplomacy is to create a zone of peace within the above said parameters; it can continue to develop its comprehensive national power. It can be said that China is changing its policy patterns from a bilateral mode of diplomacy to a multilateral mode of diplomacy.

It can be easily concluded from the above analysis that in the regional security complex of South Asia, there is a great potential of armed and nuclear conflict between Pakistan and India if power balance between the two rival states became upset in the future. Whereas Pakistan accomplished a pseudo power balance concerning both states no engagement develop none the less trivial clangs and conversation of mutual intimidations. One of the other example of nuclear deterrence between Pakistan and India terrorist attacks on Indian territory by a rebellious group on November 26, 2008 in which 163 innocent human lives. The world is anxious one more armed engagement between both nuclear states India and Pakistan. However Indian reaction to the incident didn't worsen the situation and India didn't activate its military against its neighbor. This pre-emptive action of Indian administration astounded the world as well. After accomplishing efficacious nuclear balance equivalent to India no conflict occurred between both rival states of the region.

## End Notes

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