

Tehseena Usman
Minhas Majeed Khan

DRUG TRAFFICKING FROM AFGHANISTAN TO PAKISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

Drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Pakistan is a dilemma which has its roots in regional geo politics and cold war rivalries. It is not only the biggest threat with severe implications for social sector and good governance in both the countries but also to regional security. Pak-Afghan drug trafficking has emerged as a lucrative business and a biggest challenge to keep Pak-Afghan relations on solid footings. Both countries are closely linked in drug trade. Afghanistan produces largest and fine quality of opium while Pakistan is an important consumer, transshipment point and important regional actor involved in drug trade. Blaming Afghanistan for drug smuggling to Pakistan deteriorates their relations which are already strained because of cross border infiltration of militants. The current article highlights the issue of drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Pakistan. It endeavors to find ways and means to address the issue effectively so as to reduce the pitfalls of drug trade on their bilateral relations. Moreover, it recommends a regional approach treating Pakistan and Afghanistan as a single entity to dismantle poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and its infiltration to Pakistan.

Introduction:

Drug trafficking is the biggest challenge with the detrimental effects on Pak-Afghan relations. It has played an important role in fuelling insurgency, destabilization, terrorism and exacerbating the current Pak-Afghan conflict. Pakistan sees Afghanistan a narco state where the world 90 % opium is grown. Its geostrategic location, geographical proximity and porous border play an important role in narco-trafficking from

Afghanistan. Pakistan blames Afghan government for not taking a hard-line on poppy cultivation and giving it a secondary importance in counter insurgency strategies in post Taliban setup.

Both Taliban and Hamid Karzai government inherited the drug economy which was fuelled by cold war rivalries and civil war. However, the Taliban government banned it successfully in 2001 for a brief period, until their government was toppled by US military intervention. One of the biggest challenges faced by Afghanistan after the ouster of Taliban is the horrendous increase in poppy cultivation and its trafficking. Poppy is converted into heroin in laboratories at different places in Afghanistan. Local administrators and senior military officers take a share of the profit as it is transported through their provinces to the international markets. Drug trade has negatively impacted economy, social sector and politics of Afghanistan. It is the root cause of all evils in the country. To say it is a menace which has weakened state's authority, administration, reconstruction process and halted economic development would not be wrong. Concurrently, it has breded militancy, corruption and has deteriorated security situation in Afghanistan.¹

Moreover, the drug trafficking, with considerable involvement of different actors has provided for warlordism, strengthened the nexus between drugs and guns. It has produced a massive and daunting criminal activity that threatens the integrity and capacity of the Afghan state to maintain law and order. The force multipliers of the drug economy have been hasty and could be persistent if nothing significant is done on an immediate basis. This paper analyses specific components of the Afghan- Pakistan drug trafficking and challenges hindering counter narcotics efforts in post Taliban set up. It also dwells upon the impact of drug trade on their relations and explores what options are open to both the countries to come up with the effective counter narcotics strategy.

Evolution of Drug Economy in Afghanistan and Pakistan's Linkage:

Drug market can be divided into four categories i.e. cannabis, cocaine, amphetamine type stimulants and opiates. Opium and its derivatives heroin are opiates, which are obtained from poppy plant². Opium is an analgesic and narcotic drug. It is produced from unripe seeds of opium poppy (*Papaver Somniferum*) which is a plant of the family *Papaveraceae*. It is obtained by making a small slit in a seed capsule of the poppy after the plants' petals fall. The slit seed capsule generates a milky substance that changes color and converts into a gum-like brown mass when it is exposed to air. This raw opium is then processed into a powder or treated further to obtain morphine or heroin. One of the biggest features of the plant is the ability to grow in harsh weather conditions.³ Afghanistan as the largest opium producing country is well documented and has a long history. In the 1950's when poppy cultivation was banned in Iran, Afghanistan became the chief opium producing country. Iran was Afghanistan's main market in the beginning. But in the 1970's when western demand for Afghanistan drugs increased, Pakistan and Afghanistan became the main suppliers to the international market.⁴

In the late 1980's Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran became the leading producers of opium. They replaced the golden triangle of Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand in opium production, thereby earning the title "Golden Crescent." Three events paved the path for Afghan drug trade and its trafficking to emerge as an illicit business.⁵ The first and foremost factor was the Iranian revolution of 1979 which banned opium production and stopped consignment of drugs from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Secondly, the drought of 1978 pushed the production to new heights and increased the farmers' reliance on growing poppy. Similarly, during and after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, an increase in poppy cultivation was witnessed. The Russian invasion shut the supply routes, thus starting a new era in the opium surge. In this regard, it heightened the importance to look for new markets i.e. Europe and America.

Since Soviet's invasion, Afghanistan has not enjoyed a strong centralized government and stability. It has witnessed wars and drug economy which has penetrated every section of society by and large. Afghan war lords in order to finance the Soviet- Afghan war planted the crop in Southern Afghanistan that produced opium paste, which would be sent to international markets via Pakistan to generate revenue to feed their armies. The ISI and CIA officials ignored the activities and used the money to sponsor militancy in Afghanistan so as to achieve their war objectives.⁶

Moreover, as the country's formal economy shattered due to civil war in the country, Opium became the chief source of generating revenue for local administration and military. Some Mujahidin commanders became directly involved in the drug trade to generate income and finance their military operations. Between 1989-1992 Mullah Nasim Akhunzada, who remained a power war lord of Helmand province was deeply involved in drug trade. He earned profits and increased his power base because he received less funds from ISI.⁷

In 1989, he threatened farmers of dire consequences in case of inability to grow opium. He is said to have opened office in Zaidan province to manage drug trafficking. Hardliners such as Hikmatyar and Mulvi Younus Khalis also relied on drug trade to consolidate power. Hekmatyar even went for two years war with Mullah Nasim for the control of opium fields in Helmand province.⁸

On the other hand, in 1980's in the wake of anarchy as a result of Soviet-Afghan war large scale opium production started in Pakistan. It produced 800 tons of opium per year and 70% heroin supply came from Pakistan to international markets. In the decade of 1980, Pakistan's ISI military and army also said to have links with trade including production and trafficking to US and other European countries.⁹ During the said decade, CIA preferred to tolerate the link between mujahidin, drug trade and military because it was in US interest. Alfred McCoy, a professor of Southeast Asian history at the University of

Wisconsin, contended that CIA and ISI sanctioned the rebels' drug trafficking because of their violent resistance to the Soviets, "If their local allies were involved in narcotics trafficking, it didn't trouble CIA. They were willing to keep working with people who were heavily involved in narcotics". He said.¹⁰

At that point in time, major Opium production in Pakistan concentrated in FATA, Bannu and Dir. In these areas the opium farming included entire tribes and was a major source of economy. Throughout 1980's during Zia ul Haq rule drug production reached unprecedented levels even involved Zia ul Haq's close associates such as General Fazal Haq.¹¹ In 1983, the then ISI chief Akhtar Abdur Rehman fired the entire staffers of ISI in Quetta because of their collusion with drug trade and sale of weaponry destined for Mujahiddin only. In 1986, Major Zahairuddin and two months later Lieutenant Khalil-ur-Rehman was arrested for carrying 220kg of heroin from Peshawar to Karachi.¹²

Both the cases point towards the strong linkage of army and drug trafficking. The lucrative drug trade was thriving in Pakistan's society, polity and army until 1992 when General Asif became army chief who started a rigorous effort to clean every section of Pakistan society with the menace. After the Soviet withdrawal between the period (1989-1999) a crackdown program was initiated with \$100 million against poppy production which turned out to be successful with crop substitute program. Although with the coming of Taliban, drug trade received a boost and Pakistan became a major transportation route but it ceased to be a drug producing country.¹³

After Taliban capture power in Afghanistan they turned a blind eye and harvested the crop until July 2000, when they banned the crop calling it unIslamic. The drug economy boomed during their stay in power to generate revenue. In the words of Abdul Rashid, the former head of the Taliban's anti-drug force in Kandahar, "opium is permissible because it is consumed by *kafirs* [unbelievers] in the West and not by Muslims or Afghans." He also gave some other political reasons for growing

opium. “We allow people to grow poppies because farmers get good prices. We cannot push people to grow wheat because there would be an uprising against Taliban if we forced them to stop poppy cultivation, so we grow opium and get our wheat from Pakistan”. He said.¹⁴

Taliban however, banned the crop in July 2000. Many commentators believed that the ban on poppy production was imposed in lieu for international recognition as a political force and aid. Some also believed that the aim behind the ban was stockpiling of the crop to slow down supply for increasing price. However, Taliban contended that the ban was imposed for Islamic reasons. Most of the poppy at that time was grown at Taliban controlled areas of Helmand, Kandahar and Nangarhar. Currently, opium production is more in Pushtun provinces of South and South West Afghanistan i.e. Farah, Helmand, Nimroz, Uruzgan Kandahar and Zabol.¹⁵

Push Factors and Actors Driving Afghanistan’s Drug Economy

Drug trade constitutes one third of Afghan illicit economy and the largest source of generation revenue and foreign exchange. The analysts have mostly treated opium production and its trafficking a local phenomenon ignoring the factors driving its production and actors involved in its production. The factors that drive farmers to grow opium is of immense importance and need to be highlighted for better understanding of the phenomenon. The dynamics that compel farmers to grow opium are poverty, crop profitability over the other crops (such as wheat), lack of modern irrigation infrastructure; favorable environmental conditions, assured markets, political instability, absence of law and order situation in the country and porous border with Pakistan. A report launched by UN Office on drugs and crimes titled “*Afghanistan’s Farmers Intentions Survey 2003-2004*”, concluded that the factors that drive farmers to cultivate opium are; extreme poverty in the country; greater pay offs of the drug and the absence of credit system.¹⁶

The national human development report (NHDR) for 2007, positioned Afghanistan as the poorest country in Asia. ¹⁷Majority of the country's inhabitants are anxious about physical needs i.e. food, clothing and protection. Poppy farming is the major source of physical security. There is a close relationship between the people's basic wants and poppy cultivation. Major chunk of population is thoughtful about how to live on by ensuring food security thereby getting employed in poppy cultivation. ¹⁸In addition, Afghanistan has chiefly agrarian economy. Opium production adds 35 per cent to Afghanistan's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while cereal crops contribute about 27 per cent only. Hamid Karzai has not been able to develop modern economy for Afghanistan by developing any industrial structure or reconstruction opportunity zones. Even India which is fifth largest donor and playing a pivotal role in Afghanistan reconstruction has not been able to place a concrete industrial infrastructure to improve Afghan economy. ¹⁹

Moreover, it is the only crop that withstands harsh environmental conditions. The farming in Afghanistan mostly relies on cyclic rainfall and has century's old, obsolete poor water-management system.. As such, productivity per hectare is low. Resultantly, Poppy is the favorite crop rather than black cumin, wheat, or some other crop. ²⁰

Furthermore, regional and international demand for Afghan opium is strong. Afghan drug trade has the market structure, comparative advantage, and factor availability to enlarge opium production significantly. Europe provides the largest market for Afghan drugs. The UNODC report 2009 revealed that 'Europe Monitoring Center for Drug and Drug addiction' exposed heroin to be the major cause of death in Europe citing heroin a major threat. The report also stated that 150 tons of Afghan drugs were used by Europeans during the period 2009. ²¹

The Afghan drug trade and its trafficking has become a multilayered international illicit business that links several actors in a close relationship i.e. the producer, distributors, consumers

and money launderer. The drug economy has infiltrated every section of Afghan society including its government, Afghan society, war lords, local militia and Taliban. Vanda Felbab-Brown pointed out in National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) report on *Narco-Jihad: Drug Trafficking and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan* that different actors are engaged in Afghanistan's opium production i.e. Taliban, government officials, law enforcement agencies, war lords, and tribal leaders.²²

Former assistant secretary of state for international narcotics and law enforcement, Robert B Charles, contends that money from drug trafficking are funding the Taliban. They are the ones who once barred opium cultivation. He further highlights that the profits are also shared by the Hezb-i-Islami faction led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.²³ In 2009, The Afghan Taliban earned \$ 15 million from opium trade, drug traffickers \$2.2 billion and Afghan farmers \$ 444 million.²⁴

Apart from the aforementioned groups, Afghan war lords make huge profits from controlling the opium trade who in turn used it to maintain military power, sustain instability within Afghanistan and sponsoring terrorists' attacks in the neighboring countries. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in the Afghanistan opium survey-2005 clearly states that "There is a nexus between drug traffickers and war lordism." Provinces which are controlled by war lords are suitable for trafficking. War lords are either elected to, or have placed their supporters in parliament who keep a blind eye on their activities. Mr. Sherzada Akhund former governor of Helmand province, encouraged farmers to grow more poppy before he was removed from his office.²⁵ Thomas Scweich who remained US coordinator for counter narcotics and justice reform in Afghanistan resigned in 2008 argued that not only Taliban who were the enemies of Karzai government generated revenue from the drug trade, but also his supporters did the same. A case in point is that press reports in 2008 charged Ahmed Wali Karzai (President Karzai brother) of his being involved in drugs trafficking which was denied by him and President

Karzai.²⁶ Moreover, in Afghanistan government officials notified people not to grow poppies and asked that poppy fields should be destroyed, but they supported farmers to cultivate poppy via many means because the government officials generated more of their money from poppy cultivation.²⁷ Therefore, it is clear from the above analysis that post Taliban ministers are involved in drug trade and have set permissive conditions for poppy cultivation. Surprisingly, entire Afghanistan 50% opium comes from one single province- Helmand. This southern province of Afghanistan has become the world's largest place of illicit drugs crossing Columbia for coca, Morocco for cannabis and Myanmar for opium.²⁸

Some circles in Pakistan believe that in order to take advantage from the chaos and insecurity in Afghanistan, India has established four consulates in Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat and Jalalabad, in addition to an oversized Embassy in Kabul, which has made the diplomatic representation of India the largest in Afghanistan. Largest even than that of the United States. Keeping in view the security and socio economic situation in Afghanistan, there exists no business or consular validation for India to open a consulate in the remote and small Iranian town to Zahidan on the border of Balochistan province of Pakistan. It is believed that these Indian consulates are strengthening and forging links with the Afghan warlords sympathetic to northern alliance and drug dealers who are working to promote drug culture, ethnic and sectarian incidents in Pakistan. In this regard, recruitment to these forces are being given by Indian intelligence agency RAW's agents in the Indian consulates on Pak-Afghan border. In addition, financing for violence and terrorism against Pakistan is provided through drug money.²⁹ These charges are denied by Indian and Afghan government but the increasing poppy yield does raise several doubts about the seriousness of the Afghan's government efforts that have the potential to stall counter insurgency efforts and Pak-Afghan relations.

Afghanistan Counter Narcotics Strategies and Its Impact:

In 2003, Opium cultivation in Afghanistan rose from 150,000 acres to 510,000 acres in 2004; in 2005, it touched 104,000 hectares; in 2006 it increased to 161,000 hectares and eventually to 193,000 hectares in 2007. The territory which is used for opium currently has increased than the territory for coca cultivation in Latin America i.e. Colombia, Bolivia and Peru combined.³⁰ Favorable weather conditions produced opium yields (42.5 kg per hectare) higher than 2006(37kg/ha). As a result, in 2007 Afghanistan cultivated an unexpected 8,200 tons of opium (34% more than in 2006), which made it the world's major drug provider thereby producing 93 percent of world opium. The Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009, by the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) pointed out that poppy cultivation during the 2008–09 spread at 123,000 hectares (ha) and its production at 6,900 metric tons (mt). The mentioned figures represents decline from the 2007–08 figures of 22% and 10% correspondingly but both numbers still continue to be very soaring.³¹

Indubitably, the decline in poppy yield can be credited to the multi-year overproduction, which decreased opium prices in Afghanistan, rather than to counternarcotics strategies alone. Furthermore, increasing high price of wheat in Afghanistan, made it unaffordable for many Afghans to buy enough cereal even with opium poppy, some Afghans farmers shifted a portion of their land to grow wheat to meet their demand for wheat and avoid purchasing wheat on the market.³² Afghanistan today left aside China of nineteenth century that had a population at that time 15 times larger than Afghanistan and has become a hub for poppy cultivation and its supply.

Karzai government in an effort to eradicate poppy cultivation and stop trafficking, formulated National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) in 2003, in consultation with Britain and US for Afghanistan based on four assumptions; i.e. to dismantle drug trade by disrupting drug traffickers' network and their supporters; to reduce demand for drugs, to develop and strengthen state institutions at central and provincial level; to

address problems of drug users and to strengthen legal rural livelihood. ³³In addition, he appealed farmers to declare “Holy war” on drugs at Berlin conference in 2004, but his appeal did not bear any fruit. Moreover, he established the Afghan ministry of counter narcotics that convicted 90 drug lords and passed counter narcotics legislation in 2005. ³⁴ The government failed to achieve success in eradicating drug production and its trafficking because the policies were not fully implemented. It lacked support from different actors involved in counter narcotics and could not provide alternative livelihood to farmers. In addition, corruption, weak monitoring system and implementation strategies reduced its effectiveness.

All the efforts by international community to eliminate poppy cultivation have failed even. American endeavored to convince the Afghan government to utilize crop dusters to destroy opium have been turned down on the ground that this would be harmful for environment, other crops and for human health. Karzai government attitude towards formulating a comprehensive anti narcotics strategy showed that he considered it counterproductive to counter insurgency and establishing the writ of the government. Some American officials believed that the stance which he adopted was because the election was due in April 2005 and he didn't want to annoy rural voters who were expected to take part in election. ³⁵ Afghan government and CIA resisted from destroying the crop and seriously initiating the measures to curb the trade which is the main source of Afghan people livelihood, out of the fear that they will lose the support of local population making them pro Taliban. Secondly, it will divert the US attention from war on terror. Furthermore, in 2010 Pakistan and Afghanistan with the coordination of UNODC pledged to initiate joint operations against drug traffickers but nothing has been done at implementation level and the operation has not been initiated. ³⁶

Routes Used For Drug Trafficking In Pakistan

Afghanistan and Pakistan are inseparably linked in drug trade. Opium is transited out of Afghanistan via Iran, Pakistan and Central Asian Republics. Some of the opium remains in the

transit countries for local consumption while the remaining is transported beyond to the international markets. In 2009, 160 tones of heroin were transported to Pakistan, 115 tones to Iran and 90 tones to CARS. The above mentioned figures show that Pakistan is receiving heavy flows which are increasing as the security situation deteriorates in the country.³⁷ Different routes and methods are used for drug trafficking from Afghanistan and have complicated both the countries efforts to eradicate the menace. Drugs are mostly carried through Pak-Afghan border region which runs through FATA and Baluchistan on camels, donkeys, motorbikes, and in small caravans of two or three vehicles. They are also hidden in specially designed vehicle cavities and cartons of items meant for legal import.

In order to address and understand the challenge of drug trafficking, it is essential to understand cross border dynamics of Pak-Afghan region through which it is transported. The economy of FATA is closely linked with Afghanistan for many reasons i.e. geographical and ethnic proximity. Pakistan and Afghanistan shares 24600 km long, rugged, mountainous, politically disputed, and difficult to control border. Because of mountainous terrain, FATA does not have much agriculture land. The residents of FATA are mostly engaged with illegal trade emanating from Afghanistan. i.e illegal trade in arms, drugs, informal trade of legitimate goods and foreign exchange through *hawala* or *hundi* (informal money transfer system).³⁸

The drug trade in southern and eastern Afghanistan has strong connections with Pakistan's tribal areas. In Pakistan, the difficult areas in terms of poppy cultivation are chiefly concentrated in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). In these areas, the absence of government writ and legitimate economic opportunity for impoverished populations makes them prone to indulge in drug trafficking. FATA, KPK and Swat are becoming fertile grounds for drug smuggling. Apprehensions about losing community acceptance in counter terrorism operations and lack of monitoring mechanisms due to ongoing counter terrorism operations in the Pak-Afghan border areas are the dynamics that obstruct the counter narcotics efforts

in FATA. The region is beyond the writ of state. The anti narcotics force (ANF) does not have presence in the region and no interdictions were made during the period 2000-2009. According to the UNODC, \$27 to \$30 billion worth of drugs are smuggled from Afghanistan, via Pakistan, to other parts of the world annually. Out of this, drugs worth \$1.5 billion stayed in Pakistan.³⁹


The exact statistics on the amount of drug trade specifically through FATA is scantily documented but FATA area and part of Baluchistan constitute major trafficking routes to Europe and beyond.⁴⁰ In addition, the topology of border areas encompasses natural passes and deserted roads which are not monitored. During the decades of nineties and even currently, Khyber Pass is one of the important high ways in drug trafficking from Afghanistan because of its closeness to poppy growing areas of eastern Afghanistan.⁴¹

In addition, coastal areas in Sindh province are the traditional routes used by the traffickers for shipment of narcotics to America, African and European countries. Moreover, Makran coast is another favorable rout by traffickers where large drug consignments are carried on launches to high seas for further shipment. Another route is from Hyderabad to Lahore from where drugs are transferred to Indian states such as Punjab, Rajistan, Delhi Mumbai and Gujrat.⁴²

Albeit, people involved with trade are not militants or Taliban but the territory used for transit are in the control of Taliban or militants which are mostly taxed by them. Different militant groups are present in FATA thriving on drug trade, kidnapping and smuggling from Afghanistan. The militant groups generate income from drugs via taxation, protection or facilitations rather than being directly involved. Different reports show that *Lashkar-e-Islami* a prominent militant group in Khyber agency generates income from drugs through taxation, protection and facilitation thus controlling the transit routes passing through their territories.⁴³ Despite the fact that, Pakistan army entered Khyber agency in 2002 to curb militancy in

Khyber agency after the US intervention in Afghanistan. The army remained there for some time but was soon withdrawn by striking peace deals, leaving the area at the mercy of different militant groups such as *Lashkare Islami*, *Ansar –ul- Islam* and *Tawhed-dul-Islam*.

Elimination strategies need to be enhanced, mainly in Khyber Agency where there is also inclination towards crop growing within walled compounds to hide the crop from the authorities. There is a likely hood that Pakistan is going to provide a transit route to drug trafficking as long as the production of narcotics in Afghanistan remains at alarming levels and Pakistan’s border region with Afghanistan remains porous.



Source: The World Drug Report 2010

Implications of Drug Trafficking On Pak-Afghan Relations:

Drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Pakistan has stalemated both countries efforts to develop their relations on solid footings, because drug money is used to sponsor militancy. Pakistan’s geographic location next to Afghanistan put the country in a susceptible position in terms of drug trafficking as well as drug abuse. It has highly affected Pakistan’s security as well as its society by increasing the number of drug addicts and organized crimes.

A survey conducted in 2004, revealed five million drug addicts in the country. In addition to drug addiction it has also increased the spread of Human Immune Deficiency Virus (HIV). In 2004, National AIDs control Program revealed 7.6% AIDs increase than .4% in 2003 which increases every year with the rise in Afghan narco- trade. Moreover, it has allowed for crime rates, gang warfare, corruption and organizations that operate outside law. Problems have been complicated in Karachi and Quetta where it has resulted in gang warfare. The gangs fight for control of smugglers depot, supply routes and profits from drug trade.⁴⁴ Layari which is situated in Karachi is a slum area having a population of one million. It is a place from where the largest criminal gangs operate and a hub of drugs from Afghanistan, arms and gang warfare.⁴⁵

Drug money is considered to be the main source of financial funding for extremists, securing trade routes, promoting militancy and insurgency in both Afghanistan and in Pakistan which poses threat to the stability of both the countries. As a result, both the countries blame each other for allowing each other's soil for sponsoring militancy and terrorism. The narco-trafficking from Afghanistan to Pakistan is not only waning writ of the state but also strengthening the bond among drug traffickers, criminal groups, insurgents and Taliban. Consequently, this linkage of drugs, crime, and insurgents posed stiff resistance to counter terrorism operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas. This constitutes major challenge to both countries because the nexus of the drug trade that support the conflict is not countered in either Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Conclusion:

Poppy cultivation and its trafficking from Afghanistan is thriving by leaps and bounds. All counter narcotics efforts by the Afghan government since 2001 have failed to exterminate the drug menace. In fact, the policies have strengthened the nexus between the farmers and insurgents thereby lying negative impact on counter terrorism efforts. The government officials are encouraged more by self-interest; consolidating their positions rather than by national objectives. Some analysts also believe

that they are extracting money from all quarters, including India's Research and Analysis Wing which is interested in inculcating anti Pakistan feelings by turning dominant figures against Pakistan, than in poppy suppression.

In addition, NATO has also failed to eradicate drug trade in Afghanistan. They could not simply destroy all the opium crops, because of the risk of collateral damage which may further alienate local farmers, who are already tired with the international presence in their country. It is highly recommended that policy makers and analysts should not ignore the role of drug trade in fuelling insurgency as it provides finances to insurgents. Given the regional dynamics, it is suggested that a multipronged comprehensive strategy including diplomatic manoeuvres, intelligent intelligence and treating Pakistan and Afghanistan as a single entity will play a crucial role in defeating drug trade. In addition, socio-economic, judicial and political reforms in both countries are highly suggested.

Moreover, UN's corruption, drugs trafficking and crimes conventions offer foundations to all halting drug trade. It suggests alternatives to farmers and addresses the problems of drug users. At the same time, increasing drug trafficking have highlighted the porous nature of Pak-Afghan border which is neither in the control of Pakistan nor Afghanistan. Both have handed over the region to smugglers, drug traffickers and insurgents. Therefore, in addition to border management regimes, illicit trafficking and joint corruption regimes should be established. Such regimes will play an important role in institutionalizing their relations; establishing secure environment and initiating licit economic activities. Moreover, time is ripened for initiating a constructive and meaning full dialogue on Durand line which will not only play an important role in controlling drug trafficking but will also play role in ironing the current insurgency.

Notes and References

- 1 Amina Khan, “Afghanistan and the Drug Trade”, Retrieved Dec 12th, 2012 from website: <http://www.catalogo.casd.difesa.it>.
- 2 Civil Military Fusion Center, “Afghan Opiates as a Regional Dilemma”, (June, 2012), 3.
- 3 Encyclopedia Britannica, Opium and its History, Retrieved Nov 1st, 2013 from website *Encyclopedia Britannica* <http://www.britanica.com>.
- 4 Loius Dupree and Linett Albert. (Ed), *Afghanistan: A Perspective in Afghanistan in the 1970s* (New York: Prager, 1974), 257.
- 5 Pierre Arnaud Chouvy, *Opium Uncovering the Politics of Poppy* (USA: I.B Taurus, 2009), 65-70.
- 6 Razia Sultana & Sadia Aziz, *Current Affairs Digest* (March, 2010): 15.
- 7 United States Institute Of Peace, “How Opium Profits Taliban”, No. 62, (2009), 7-8.
- 8 Ibid. pp. 7-8.
- 9 Congressional Research Service, *Afghan Narcotics and US Policy*, RL. 32686, (April 21, 2009), 22.
- 10 *Star Tribune*, September 30, 2001.
- 11 Vanda Felbab Brown, “The Drug Conflict Nexus in South Asia: Beyond Taliban Profits and Afghanistan”, Retrieved on Nov7, 2013 from website, *Brooking Institute* <http://www.brooking.edu>.
- 12 Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban Islam and the Great Game in Central Asia* (New York, Taurus: 2001), 120.
- 13 Ibid. p.122.
- 14 Ibid. p.118.
- 15 UNODC, “The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment”, (July 2011), 9-10.

-
- 16 UNODC, “Afghanistan’s Farmers Intentions Survey 2003-2004”, (Feb, 2004): 5-7.
- 17 IRIN, “Afghanistan: Fifth Least Developed Country in the World”, (Nov 18, 2007), Retrieved on Nov 6th, 2013 from website *Humanitarian News and Analysis* <http://www.irinnews.org>.
- 18 *The Frontier Post*, July 27, 2013.
- 19 Ibid.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 UNODC, “Afghan Opium Survey”, (Sep, 2009), Retrieved on Nov 7th 2014 from website *UNODC* <http://www.unodc.org>.
- 22 The National Bureau of Asian Research, “Narco-Jihad: Drug Trafficking and Security in Afghanistan and Pakistan”, No. 20, (Dec, 2009) Retrieved on Nov 2nd 2013 from <http://www.nbr.org>.
- 23 *Daily Times*, Jan 3rd, 2005.
- 24 UNODC, “The Global Afghan Opium Trade: A Threat Assessment”, (July 2011), 7-8.
- 25 *The New York Times*, Sep 3rd, 2006.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 *Daily Afghanistan*, June, 2005.
- 28 Nasreen Ghufuran, “Afghanistan in 2007: A Bleeding Wound”, *Asian Survey*, 48:1, (spring, 2008), 158-159.
- 29 *Daily Mail*, 2009.
- 30 UNODC, “Afghanistan Opium Survey,”(Oct, 2007).
- 31 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey, “(Sep, 2009).
- 32 UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey, (Sep, 2009).
- 33 Syed Adnan Ali Shah, Internal Dynamics of Afghanistan After the 2005 Parliamentary Elections and its Impact On the Region,” *Strategic Studies*, xxvi: 2, (Summer, 2006).
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 *Daily Times*, Jan3, 2005.

-
- 36 Rahimullah Yousafzai, "Pak-Afghan Relations: A Pakistani Narrative", Retrieved on May 12th, 2011 from PILDAT website: <http://www.pildate.org>.
- 37 Civil Military Fusion Center, op. cit. p. 2.
- 38 Asif Mian, "FATA: Tribal Economy in the Context of Ongoing Militancy", *Conflict and Peace Studies*, 2:3, (Sep, 2009): 1-2.
- 39 *The Express Tribune*, June 27th, 2012.
- 40 Asif Mian, op.cit. p.1-2.
- 41 Ashish Shukla, "Drug Trafficking in Pakistan: Threat to Regional Security", *Himalaya and Center Asian Studies*, 14:3, (July2010).
- 42 Ibid.
- 43 UNODC , "The Global Afghan Opium Trade and Threat Assessment", (July, 2011), 35-36.
- 44 Peter Chalk, "Pakistan Tackles Impact of Afghan Opium Trade", Retrieved on Nov 1st, 2013 from Christine fair website <http://www.hom.comcast.net/>.
- 45 United States Institute of Peace, "Conflict Dynamics in Karachi", No. 82, (2012), 12.