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**Communal Madness of the Punjab 1947:
The Sikh Community and the Partition of India**

Abstract

The Sikh problem emerged as a very crucial one in the Partition of India. They made up only 2% of India's population and most of them lived in the Punjab. At the time of partition, they also demanded a separate state for themselves as they believed that they formed an important part not only of the province but had played a major role in the British Indian army. They wanted a state for themselves to be carved out of the Punjab where they had lands, shrines and most of their property rights. The 3rd June plan 1947, however, completely ignored their demand and announced the creation of only two independent states, a Hindu majority India and a Muslim majority Pakistan. The new boundary line was drawn right through the Sikh area and their most important city, Amritsar, fell inside India. As a result, violence broke out in the major cities of the Punjab between the Sikhs and the Muslims. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed and even the authorities could not control the situation. The Sikhs shouted Pakistan Murdabad, which meant death to Pakistan and with a deep-rooted anger and hatred attacked Muslims everywhere.

Key Words: Sikhs, Muslims, Partition, India, Pakistan

The Sikhs were attempting to institutionalize themselves as a community in the 1920's and 30's, "in the midst of constitutional and political challenges in India", particularly after the Lahore Resolution of 1940 that heightened their fears of a Muslim state being imposed on them.¹ Cripps Mission further made them anxious of their status as it offered the provinces the right to opt out of the Indian Union if they did not wish to be a part of the Union. It was construed as a concession to the Muslims by conceding the Punjab to the Muslim League, thereby subjecting their community to Muslim Rule.² The publication of the Cripps report made them all the more fearful of a looming calamity and this led to the formation of a Sikh Volunteer Force in the regions they stood in a majority; an anticipatory move taken in the probability of a breakdown of law and order in the Punjab, in case Muslims also decided to resort to violence.³ The British-Sikh relations that had so far been kept away from any major eruption, given the appeasement of the 'Martial race' by the colonial masters particularly during the great wars, seeking their good will by granting them lands and friendly agricultural policies, now seemed to be on a different trajectory, thus developing a major crack in one of the pillars of British rule in the Punjab.⁴ The British role in militarizing the Sikhs and Muslims of the Punjab for their benefit did contribute to making the two communities trained and armed for any deathly encounter, a prospect that appeared not too far in the future. From as early as 1930's the Sikhs were no longer content in accepting their position as a mere recognizable minority in the province and had begun to assert "a form of territorial nationalism based on an ethno-religious identity."⁵ The war years saw a recruitment rate of 36% in the army from the Punjab,⁶ a ratio that did not add any less to the general mayhem when Partition was announced, witnessing the two communities pitted in a cleansing spree against one another.

Partition of India cannot be understood without analyzing the dynamics of the vengeance and retribution unleashed by the communities residing in the province as soon as independence was declared. However, it is not difficult to understand the vindictiveness and ferocity of the Punjab killings,⁷ in the wake of a mass migration that made some 6.5 million Muslims flee India for West Pakistan and around 4.7 million Hindus and Sikhs to leave West Pakistan for India.⁸ It was as Penderel Moon remembers, "a complete breakdown, or rather reversal of the ordinary moral values. To kill a Sikh became almost a duty; to kill a Hindu hardly a crime. To rob them was an innocent pleasure, carrying no moral stigma; to refrain was a mark not of virtue but a lack of enterprise."⁹ This was Bhawalpur in West Pakistan. The story remained similar in the other part of divided Punjab with the delicate difference of the community that was perpetrating the violence and the one that was the victim. A group of Sikhs paraded naked Muslim women before they were publicly raped, vandalized and set on fire.¹⁰ This was Amritsar in August 1947. Both sides plunged into a spate of medieval violence unable to restrain an anger and a wrath which did not characterize their past existence, at least not in its all out ferocity and fury.

As mentioned earlier the Sikhs were the smaller of the three major communities residing in the Punjab, but at the same time the more militarized. In early 1947 they had been complacently watching the negotiations from the sidelines hardly cognizant of the fact that they would soon be fighting a battle for survival as independence drew nearer on the horizon. From February onwards they, fearing a permanent ouster, jumped in to demand a share for their community, adding to "social tensions in the localities, a degree of violence that was beyond anything the actors at the All-India level or the region had imagined."¹¹ The resignation of the Unionist government of Khizr Hayat Khan on March 2, 1947, threw the province into a

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political impasse. This provided a pretext to the Sikh community to draw the attention of the authorities to their demands. On March 4, a joint Hindu-Sikh public meeting convened in front of the Lahore Assembly formalized the Sikh opposition to the formation of a Muslim League Ministry in the Punjab. Master Tara Singh, President of the Shromani Gurdawara Prabandha Committee told a charged crowd; "Our motherland is calling for blood... We crushed Mughlaim and we shall trample Pakistan. The Sikhs ruled the Muslims with their might and even now shall rule."¹² These words had an immense impact on the crowd and the community, as Master Tara Singh was undeniably the Sikh leader with the greatest following at the time. Clashes erupted between the Muslim and joint Sikh-Hindu groups particularly among students.

This was the beginning of the tragedy of the Punjab as it began to show that Hindus and Sikhs would now follow a common path in their animosity towards the Muslims. The latter were not silent in the commotion either. It were Muslim gangs in Lahore that "with weapons in hands, in some places, steel helmets on their heads, indulged in murder, loot and arson on a scale never witnessed before in the Punjab during hundred years of British rule."¹³ An official linkage of the Akali Dal and the All India National Congress transpired on March 8, at the behest of Tara Singh demanding the immediate Partition of the Punjab.¹⁴ But at the same time there were voices from among them that condemned Partition of the province as 'a betrayal ____ a deviation from the path of the Sikh Gurus.'¹⁵ This admonition came from Baba Kharak Singh, a widely respected and elderly statesman of the community who also issued a statement that a decision to divide the Punjab was unfair because it dealt with the future of lakhs of Sikhs in Western Punjab.¹⁶ This obviously was a departure from the asserted Congress position, which advised the Sikh peasantry to migrate from the villages in West Punjab, reiterating, "that there could be no settlement on the basis of United Punjab."¹⁷ Nevertheless the Sikh element in the Congress prevailed and no further migration took place. However, by the middle of March 2,090 persons had died and 1,042 injured, of which a large disproportionate number were Sikhs, a number that could have exceeded if unorganized mass migrations were allowed to continue.¹⁸

The second round of Sikh mobilization came after the historic June 3 statement by the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, that announced August 1947 as the date for division of India on notional basis. The Radcliffe Line that was to divide the subcontinent separated the area that had the densest settlement of the Sikhs in the whole of the Punjab, outside the Princely States, and the most fertile.¹⁹ It is noteworthy that Sikh cultivators with familial ties in Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Ferozepur, had been awarded these lands around the four rivers __Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej and Beas__ as inducements to serve with Indian army in World War I, and with great effort they had developed them into thriving Canal Colonies.²⁰ The Sikhs were therefore in no mood to accept the Plan that went right through their ancestral lands and shrines. The Maharaja of Faridkot at a Sikh Conference in Delhi declared the June Plan as 'unholy' and appealed to the Sikhs to unite against Partition.²¹ In a statement issued on 6 June Master Tara Singh declared, "We cannot accept anything like a notional division. It is not a matter of mere political power for us, our very existence is at stake."²² This in fact was the beginning of a sordid tale that the Punjab witnessed in the summer of 1947. It was a clear call to the Sikhs to engage in violence "unless the Partition line was drawn as far west as possible to include the majority of the Sikh population on the Indian side of the line."²³ The Akali Dal issued a countrywide call for *hartal* on 28 June, with clear instructions that no peasant was to plough the fields, no shops were to be opened, no Sikh was to sleep and no prayers were to be observed.²⁴ It was a success; processions were taken out urging the Sikhs to unite for their cause, with fiery speeches by leaders. It was a success more so because no occurrence of violence was reported despite the growing discontent and annoyance with both the Congress and the Muslim League.

By July 1947 it was clear that all the Sikh uproar was in vain. The Boundary Commission's Award was to be on notional lines. All pleas regarding land possession, shrines and military representation were not to be taken into consideration by any of the contenders. This meant trouble, as the Sikhs were not ready to give up on their claims. At a meeting with the Governor of Punjab, Sir Evan Jenkins, Giani Kartar Singh openly stated that, "there would be trouble unless arrangements were made such as to bring three-quarters or at least two-thirds of the Sikh population into Eastern Punjab."²⁵ An exchange of Muslim and Sikh population was also suggested along with property with measures for settlement in West and East Pakistan respectively. Such plans were not feasible and required a lot of time and resources; both of which were not available to a collapsing Imperial rule in India. The June Plan and the Radcliffe Award were to seal the fate of India with the Sikhs getting very little of their demands. A migration of the magnitude that ultimately took place across Punjab boundaries went naively unaccounted for by all making decisions at the top. A peaceful transfer of population in the Punjab required an agreement on boundaries, which was never sought.²⁶ The Sikhs were not ready to accept that Lahore, Lyallpur and Nankana Sahib "should or could belong to Pakistan."²⁷ Their demand would jeopardize the entire scheme of Partition and could not be acceptable to the Muslim League at any cost. Tension mounted as days passed and it began to be visibly clear to the Sikhs that their claims would go unheeded. They were also eyeing Gurdaspur,²⁸ to be included in India, and being advised by the Hindu press to seek some kind of a settlement with the Muslims to be included in the Punjab united.²⁹ The largest involuntary exchange of population in modern history³⁰ exposed the paper-thin preparations of the administrators and insensitive disregard of direction at all tiers of communal leadership.

Jinnah's demand for an undivided Punjab persisted till June 1947 as he continued to ask for all of Punjab and Bengal, calling the Congress Partition Resolution as 'sinister' and 'a stunt'.³¹ In a statement published in *Dawn* on May 1 1947, Jinnah ruled out any division of Punjab and Bengal.³² This logic in the backdrop of his initial demand of Partition of India to gain a separate homeland for Muslims on the basis of a separate identity, however, found no acceptance either with Mountbatten or the Congress and was thus 'quietly dropped'.³³ Wanting India's division and Punjab's unity was a stark inconsistency, as was asking for self-determination for Muslim majority areas and denying it to areas where Hindus and Sikhs were in a majority; it was unfeasible and unrealizable leading many to believe that it was here that seeds of tragedy were sown.³⁴

Master Tara Singh in mid 1940's had warned the British government, that "the morale of Sikh soldiers would be affected if Pakistan was forced on Sikhs."³⁵ The latter had given their verdict long before their fate was sealed. Sardar Baldev Singh, Defence Member of the Interim Government had said, "Sikhs should be prepared to make all sacrifices if the verdict or the Boundary Commission went against them."³⁶ Though they had themselves asked for Partition and were the first to ask for division of the Punjab, "but after the notional division had placed seventeen districts in West Punjab and only twelve in the East they began to fear that their community would be divided into two, with roughly equal numbers ending up in the two successor states."³⁷ The Sikh leaders knew it would not only divide their community, lands and shrines but also yield nothing in the form of any of their demands being accepted. For them it was clear that even Partition "would solve no problem: minorities would remain in both halves and assigning 'middle areas' to one or the other half would be an explosive exercise...splitting a province that was otherwise homogeneous in speech and culture, and many other ways too."³⁸

It was Partition of the Punjab that was the main bone of contention and was the subject of unparalleled butchery. Death was not the ultimate sentence these warring communities deemed enough for their opponents. As Francis Tucker writes, "Long after the victim was dead they would slash and slash away at the body, carving it up. They were just like dogs that had taken to killing sheep --- just an insensate, devilish lust to wallow in the blood of helpless creatures."³⁹ The Punjab killings brought a whole province to a standstill. All talks with Sikhs had failed and despite some hopes of a League-Sikh rapprochement encouraged by Giani Kartar Singh's overtures towards the League leadership fizzled out in making Jenkins realize that the Sikh leader "had been intriguing in a desultory way with the Muslim League for some time past."⁴⁰ Master Tara Singh and Baldev Singh also did not hold Kartar Singh in much esteem. Nevertheless the butchery unleashed was neither one sided nor lacking of any reasoning or motivation.

...if 250,000 Sikhs and Hindus were killed in western Punjab, between 250,000 and 500,000 Muslims may have perished in eastern Punjab. The Sikh jathas that attacked Muslims across eastern Punjab after 15 August were usually armed with Bren guns, Tommy guns, grenades, rifles, revolvers, pistols, spears and kirpans. Often the Jathas were motorized: members moved on trucks and jeeps. Among their ranks were Sikhs from northwestern Punjab, wanting revenge.⁴¹

The Rawalpindi massacre of Sikhs in March 1947 was the earliest and one of the bloodiest carnage at the hands of Muslims. Gujrat, Mianwali and Shahpur were the worst hit districts of Rawalpindi Division. The infamous 'Thoa Khalsa' incident where 100 Sikh women committed suicide in a well to save their honour,⁴² was received by the community with exceptional rage and reciprocated with equal ferocity in other parts of Punjab, where the Muslims paid a heavy price. "The March massacres had created not only a motive, especially among Sikhs; for revenge; they had also established a precedent that officials and police could orchestrate attacks on minority populations with impunity."⁴³ This was reciprocal violence, in many cases planned and pointed towards a total collapse of state machinery.

Punjab with its three major contending parties, did not see an easy fate when freedom came. In most cases it was the "anonymity of crowd experience that increased the likelihood of brutality."⁴⁴ As Ian Talbot argues in *The Deadly Embrace* (2007), that it was official compliance and planning that led to mob killings in the districts and cities of the Punjab, where in most cases they seemed to be taking orders from their police and civilian superiors; "they were not spontaneous assaults or the results of temporary moments of madness."⁴⁵ This connivance added to the turmoil. In the Sikh Princely States of Kapurthala and Patiala "troops not only attacked the Muslims and the refugee trains but joined in assaults on neighbouring districts", sometimes making it "impossible for a Muslim to pass safely through the state".⁴⁶ Instead of persecuting the perpetrators of March violence in Rawalpindi, the way was paved for a greater holocaust in East Punjab. The imperial state was fading out but the nation states not bothered to be given a stable foundation. With so many killed on both sides the two nations were bound to carry the heavy burden of blood and death unceremoniously for decades to come.

The onus of Punjab massacres and the resultant communal madness nevertheless fell largely on the Sikhs as they groped in the dark for a redress of their grievances. It is also recorded that the "total number of Muslims killed (in East Punjab) was more than the number of Hindus and Sikhs who perished in West Punjab".⁴⁷ The British knew it much before it actually started.

There is going to be trouble with the Sikhs, When, and how bad, the Governor cannot say. Raids on Muslim Villages have begun in Amritsar and Lahore district and along the Jullundhar Hoshiarpur border, and there have been four attacks on, or attempts to interfere with, trains in the past two or three days. Muslim casualties in Amritsar Rural area alone since night of 30th/31st July are 23 killed, including 3 women and 2 children, and 30 wounded.⁴⁸

The situation was bleak ever since the scepter of violence had been raised in the province. When it spread to the small towns, villages and *qasbas* of the Punjab, "it took on a new intensity".⁴⁹ The rural massacres, admitted Governor Jenkins, "were new."⁵⁰ Among the major cities Lahore and Amritsar were particularly ablaze. Hundreds of houses were burnt, and people running from their scorching houses were shot on the streets on the pretext of breaking the curfew.⁵¹ The rapidly "expanding chaos made the British keener still to escape from India."⁵² In this haste a lot more was lost and the three communities found themselves embroiled in a stateless chaos. The wave of 'Communalism' that engulfed all residents of the Punjab, at times took on the form of a Civil War with all sorts of weapons being used to exterminate the enemy group. Some writers have characterized it as an ethnic cleansing on the part of the Sikhs "to eliminate Muslims in East Pakistan in order to create a Sikh State after Partition."⁵³ The Muslims were not only "butchered but systematically expelled from East Punjab," with leaders of some Princely States being the perpetrators of this project.⁵⁴ This to a large extent was in retribution of the incidents of Muslim Violence in West Punjab, but had distinct overtones too, when the Sikhs failed to acquire for themselves the desired state.

The Sikh dream of a separate state was a far-fetched idea; they being only a small population of the province. Once they realized that it would not be materialized, their hopes sunk. They had always considered the province as their homeland; many of their "Gurus were born in the villages and towns of the Punjab, and they constantly traversed this ancient land".⁵⁵ It was a sacred and blessed land that symbolized their history, legends, culture and religious roots. Sikh history with its focus on revival of Sikh traditions had been an ongoing process since the late nineteenth century.⁵⁶ Master Tara Singh's swaying of the Kirpan on the Assembly steps on March 4, 1947 was a reminder of the great sacrifices made by the Sikh Gurus and a gesture of defiance to the forces that were set to deprive them of their lawful heritage in the contemporary context of Partition. It was also an invitation to the Sikh masses to join his ranks in the struggle for their rights and for this 'mass violence' could be used as a useful device. However, once they realized that their political leadership would not be able to assert their rights by virtue of numbers, they began making "outlandish claims on Muslim territory areas of West Punjab, and subsequently, by ethnically cleansing Muslims from East Punjab."⁵⁷ The formation of the Akali Dal, and the subsequent creation of SGPC were the quintessence of this struggle.⁵⁸ Despite all this they could never muster a concerted struggle for reasons that are not difficult to comprehend.

The fighting skills of the Sikhs did not match their acumen on a negotiating table. They antagonized the Congress and the short-lived unity ended in disappointment; the British were never on their side; whereas right from the beginning they were the avowed enemies of the Muslim League. Inherently they were a divided community and could not muster a united stance throughout the struggle. Upholding a nationalist cause, they were fundamentally a communal group. The British repeatedly affirmed that that Sikhs were acting as a community, to a purpose and with coordination.⁵⁹ Finally, the division of India in three parts was never on the cards. It was a mistake on their part to think of a separate Sikh land that could be carved out of the subcontinent. The British never contemplated such an eventuality. It was a losing battle that they were fighting all along. Once they realized it, there was no other recourse than annihilate the enemy through violence. In the tense days of planning for Partition one of their pamphlets read; "With clear vision, determination and vigour that is characteristic of our virile race, we shall extricate ourselves out of this whirlpool of annihilation that is facing us. Our phoenix-style like rise shall signal the fall of our enemies."⁶⁰ It was an ominous threat that became a gruesome reality in the near future.

It was clear from the start that a clinical division of Indian territory between the Hindus and the Muslims was not possible due to the overwhelming presence of a third community in the Punjab.⁶¹ Their fate, however was lumped with other non-Muslims, and in the Boundary Commissions made to draw a line between the two states, they were to be inserted in the category of 'other factors'.⁶² Although the violence of the Punjab in 1947 cannot be solely attributed to the Sikhs, "it is believed that a large part of it was the result of deliberate actions, on the part of Sikh gangs and *jathas* instigated in many cases by their leaders, and also supported by Sikh Princely States, ex-Military and civilian officers, many of whom provided arms to the raiders".⁶³ Besides, their demands also fell short of a logical root. The terms of Partition clearly elaborated Muslim and Hindu majority areas; or Muslim and non-Muslim regions. There was not to be a third category. In fact the "boundary commissions began with what was called a notional division between East and West Punjab, based solely on the district population figures from the 1941 census."⁶⁴ This was the sore point, which prompted them to resort to extreme violence, which also became the cause and consequence of mass exodus. And it was this "determination of the Sikhs to preserve their cohesion" that became the source of violent exchange of population.⁶⁵

The Sikh demands went through a series of transformation; and so did their loyalties, the Congress being the major victim. In March 1947 their pronouncements were devoid of any inclusion of land dispossession but as July approached it became the hallmark of their political discourse. In fact Master Tara Singh had been working on these lines since May when he welcomed Jinnah's statement regarding an exchange of population, thinking that exchange implied property as well.⁶⁶ It was a naivety they had to pay for dearly. Then came the transition from mass reluctance to mass resistance or acceptance of violence,⁶⁷ once it was becoming obvious that their stance was being disregarded. On June 20, the Master appealed to the Sikhs living in the western districts to shift to the eastern districts in order to "Consolidate the community."⁶⁸ Though the Sikhs in the western districts did not receive his appeal with much enthusiasm, his later call for a *hartal* on July 8 was a resounding success.⁶⁹ It also meant that the variants among the Sikh community such as the moderates, the lower caste Sikhs and the '*Mazhabi* Sikhs' could not carry the day with them, largely because the land based question ultimately forced them to migrate too.⁷⁰ It was the politics of agitation of the Akalis led by Tara Singh that led the province into a state of war. It was no secret that they considered the massacre of the Muslims as the only way to force them out of East Punjab to facilitate an exchange of Population.⁷¹ The outcome was the furiously fought battle on the Punjab soil with epic casualties and loss, both in human and material terms.

To Partition a country of thirty million people, which had been governed for 98 years as a single unit, was a staggering task, even if all the residing populace were friendly and anxious to progress.⁷² And the fact is that they were far from friendly or yielding in any sense of coming to even a small compromise. It was "ethnic cleansing of the unwanted population."⁷³ What happened as a result became the greatest tragedy of the subcontinent. The communal madness of 1947 was the outcome of a disturbing callousness of the administration, their hasty unplanned departure, a nonchalant leadership and the inability of the communities to come to a peaceful, workable solution. The Sikhs sidelined in the most crucial of times, rose in unmatched fury that engulfed the whole province. Nothing short of ethnic cleansing, it fell at the mercy of men turned into beasts, trains reaching their destination filled with dead bodies, properties confiscated by unlawful owners, children brutally hacked to death or orphaned, women raped, murdered or forcibly abducted and millions crossing over to uncertain destinies. Though Sikhs have been largely blamed for the mayhem, none of the communities emerged unscathed from the tragedy. The scenario was of "death and destruction"⁷⁴ that became the 'enduring symbol'⁷⁵ of 1947.

¹ Tan Tai Yong, *The Garrison State: The Military Government and Society in Colonial Punjab 1849-1947*, Lahore: Vanguard Books Pvt. Ltd., 2005

² For a detailed discussion on Sikh response see Tan Tai Yon, "Sikh Responses to the Demand for Pakistan, 1940-1947", in the *International Journal of Punjab Studies*, Vol. 1(2), 1994.

³ Ogilvie to Pinnell, 30 March, *Transfer of Power*, Vol. I, 564.

⁴ Tan Tai Yong, 290.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 291.

⁷ Barney White Spunner, *Partition: The Story of Indian Independence and the Creation of Pakistan*, London: Simon and Schuster, 2017, 254.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India*, London: Chatto & Windus, 1961, 217.

¹⁰ Spunner, *Partition*, 233.

¹¹ Ayesha Jalal, *Self and Sovereignty: Individual and Community in South Asian Islam since 1850*, London: Routledge, 2000, 494.

¹² *Dawn*, 16 March 1947.

¹³ Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit*, 78.

¹⁴ Subhasis Ray, "Intra-Group Interactions and Inter-Group Violence: Sikh Mobilization during the Partition of India in a Comparative Perspective", *Journal of Genocide Research*, Vol. 19, No.3, 2017, 389.

- ¹⁵ *Dawn*, 21 March, 1947.
- ¹⁶ *Civil & Military Gazette*, 8 April, 1947.
- ¹⁷ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁸ Subhasis Ray, "Intra-Group Interactions and Inter-Group Violence", 390.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*
- ²¹ *Civil & Military Gazette*, 14 June, 1947.
- ²² *Dawn*, 6 June, 1947.
- ²³ Subhasis Ray, "Intra-Group Interactions and Inter-Group Violence", 391-392.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*
- ²⁶ Rajmohan Gandhi., 360.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*
- ²⁸ Gurdaspur was one district that had been given to Pakistan but later in connivance with the Boundary Commission and its Chief Sir Cyril Radcliffe it was handed over to India thus creating the long-standing dispute of Kashmir State.
- ²⁹ IOR, L/P & J/5/250.
- ³⁰ Kavita Daya, *Violent Belongings: Partition: Gender, and National Culture in Postcolonial India*, New Delhi: Yoda Press, 2013, 122.
- ³¹ Nicholas Mansergh and Penderel Moon, *Transfer of Power: Constitutional Relations between Britain and India 1942-47*, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Vol. XII, 1979, 778.
- ³² *Ibid.*, Vol. X, 543-45.
- ³³ Rajmohan Gandhi, *Punjab: A History from Aurengzeb to Mountbatten*, New Delhi: Aleph Book Company, 2015, 345.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, 364.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, 325.
- ³⁶ *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XII, 17-18.
- ³⁷ Ishtiaq Ahmed, *The Punjab Bloodied, Partitioned and Cleansed*, New Delhi: Rupa Publications, 2013, 354.
- ³⁸ Rajmohan Gandhi, 340.
- ³⁹ Francis Tucker, *While Memory Serves: The Story of the Last Two Years of British Rule in India*, London: Cassell, 1950, 495.
- ⁴⁰ *Transfer of Power*, Vol. IX, 287.
- ⁴¹ *Rajmohan Gandhi*, 355.
- ⁴² Ian Talbot, ed., *The Deadly Embrace: Religion, Politics and Violence in India and Pakistan 1947-2002*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007, 4.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 9.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.
- ⁴⁵ See Ian Talbot, *The Deadly Embrace*, 2007, 4-17.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.
- ⁴⁷ G.D. Khosla, *Stern Reckoning: A Survey of the Events Leading up to and Following the Partition of India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989, 290.
- ⁴⁸ *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XII, 459.
- ⁴⁹ Ilyas Chattha, *Partition and Locality: Violence, Migration and Development in Gujranwala and Sialkot, 1947-61*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011, 123.
- ⁵⁰ *Transfer of Power*, Vol. XII, 516.
- ⁵¹ Alex Von Tunzelmann, *Indian Summer: The Secret History of the End of an Empire*, London: Simon & Schuster, 2007, 206.
- ⁵² *Ibid.*
- ⁵³ Ilyas Chattha, 8.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 10.
- ⁵⁵ Harjot S. Oberoi, "From Punjab to Khalistan: Territoriality and Metacommentary", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 60, No.1, 1987, 27.
- ⁵⁶ Ian Copland, "The Master and the Maharajas: The Sikh Princes and the East Punjab Massacre of 1947", *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 36, No.3, 2002, 657-704.
- ⁵⁷ Gurharpal Singh, "Sikhs and Partition Violence: A Re-evaluation", in Ian Talbot, ed., *The Independence of India and Pakistan: New Approaches and Reflections*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013, 122.

⁵⁸ Ian Copland, "The Master and the Maharajas: The Sikh Princes and the East Punjab Massacre of 1947".

⁵⁹ Paul R. Brass, "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946-47: Means, Methods and Purposes", in Ian Talbot, ed., *The Independence of India and Pakistan: New Approaches and Reflections*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013, 39.

⁶⁰ *The Liberator*, "Spokesman of the Sikh People", Delhi 27 July, 1947. Cited in Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition*, Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 33-34.

⁶¹ Gurharpal Singh, "Sikhs and Partition Violence: A Re-evaluation", 121.

⁶² Paul R. Brass, "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946-47", 27.

⁶³ *Ibid*, 29.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 27-28.

⁶⁵ Penderel Moon, *Divide and Quit*, 280.

⁶⁶ *Transfer of Power*, Vol. X, 340.

⁶⁷ Subhasis Ray, "Intra-Group Interactions and Inter-Group Violence", 398.

⁶⁸ *The Hindustan Times*, 20 June, 1947.

⁶⁹ Subhasis Ray, "Intra-Group Interactions and Inter-Group Violence", 399.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*.

⁷¹ See footnote of Paul R. Brass "The Partition of India and Retributive Genocide in the Punjab, 1946-47: Means, Methods and Purposes", in Ian Talbot, ed., *The Independence of India and Pakistan: New Approaches and Reflections*, 54.

⁷² Lionel Carter, ed. *Punjab Politics, 1 June 1947-14 August 1947: Tragedy, Governor's Fortnightly Reports and Other Key Documents*, New Delhi: Manohar, 2007, 179.

⁷³ Ilyas Chattha 155.

⁷⁴ Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan*, London: Yale University Press, 2007, 142.

⁷⁵ Rajmohan Gandhi, 356.