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**ROLE OF INDIA IN AFGHANISTAN UNDER THE STRATEGIC DEBATE OF SOCIAL REALISM;
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN**

Abstract

Afghanistan is the new front line and source of insecurity between the traditional rivals. The study is based on the grounded methodological analysis of Indian role in Afghanistan and the changing regional security scenario in post-9/11 era. The changing embryonic regional paradigm is challenging the status quo and indicating a major shift in the security trends in South Asia with severe implications for Pakistan. The study critically analyses the relational concept of security, which will be defined under an area of concern in South Asia rather than a precise condition, supported by the realist and behavioral paradigm 'Social Realism' justifying Indian realist ends through social means in Afghanistan. It examines the historic events of India-Afghanistan nexus, and explores growing Indian influence in Afghanistan and her smart activities in order to attain her preferred outcomes. It also discusses the possible repercussions for Pakistan's security, strategic encirclement and Indian hegemonic intentions.

Key Words India, Afghanistan, smart power, security, hegemony

INTRODUCTION

The historical narratives of South Asia reveal extremely violent chronicle. The region witnessed series of invasions and trading voyagers that shaped the multi-cultural width from north to south. The Afghan land has historical ties with the South Asian region, but in the aftermath of the partition and the non-fulfillment of Afghans' aspirations on the Durand Line, resultantly, Afghanistan turned hostile towards Pakistan, providing an opportunity that could be exploited by India regarding Kashmir against Pakistan. Since 1947, Afghanistan preferred India versus Pakistan despite the shared porous border and undeniable cultural and religious similarities. Pakistan got the opportunity in the wake of Soviet intervention to operate in Afghanistan, whereas the Russians were supported by India. During the Soviet-Afghan war, Pakistan lost more than achieved as compared to India. However, after Soviets' withdrawal from Afghanistan and collapse of Soviet Union in 1991, the era did not mark the end of global powers' interest in Afghanistan. The geo-political interest shifted towards the geo-economic significance of the newly freed Central Asian Republics². The change in the political structure of Afghanistan and breakdown of the writ of the state vis-à-vis different autonomous ethnic clans of authority led to emancipating insecurities and created political vacuum in Afghanistan that invited the major regional actors to play their role with the support of global powers.

9/11 marks the watershed point between the violent historic epics of Afghanistan to the raise of 'terrorism' verses the Western musts. The ascension of 'terrorism' and the impact of War on Terror on Afghanistan changed the regional security scenario of South Asia. Pakistan as the key supporter and funder to Taliban government in Afghanistan was forced to change its policy from

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² Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords* (London: Pan Books, 2001).

pro to anti-Afghan Taliban or to be bombed to Stone Age and lose its strategic alliance with US to India as a major regional player in Afghanistan. India appeared as the major beneficiary during the Soviet-Afghan war and the War on Terror that further strengthened the Indian operative dynamics in South Asia. India displayed its smart power in Afghanistan with US support and vertical alliances of Iran to Afghanistan challenging the regional status quo in order to gain her preferred outcomes and Afghanistan appeared as the extension of Kashmir issue between two arch rivals. Thus, a change has been felt in the strategic security mapping of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan. India which naturally inherits the hegemonic right in South Asia changed her policy from defensive to proactive. The opted proactive strategy of India opened the doors for the smaller states in South Asia such as Afghanistan or opened the doors for India to play a major regional role in Afghanistan. India displayed her smart power vis-à-vis her preferred outcomes; she persuaded her realist ends through social means in Afghanistan. India invested in different soft aid and development projects in Afghanistan and stretched her hard stance to attain her smart ends. Since 2001, India is developing multi-dimensional security, political, economic and social projects without keeping her boots on ground. India is the largest regional donor and contributing with \$ 3 billion in Afghanistan's development, which is definitely without any sense of altruism, which reveals her realist ends. India's main objectives are to play her regional role and hegemonic designs, to counter growing Chinese influence under US support, to access the energy and market resources of the Central Asian States, and to impact Pakistan decisions and encircle her strategically. Indian strategy in Afghanistan has been elaborated under the grounded theory of Social Realism defining India's realist ends via social means in Afghanistan.

Pakistan perceives India in Afghanistan as a mean to encircle and isolate Pakistan, to encounter the non-conventional approach of Pakistan, and to put an end to the strategic depth of Pakistan in Afghanistan. Pakistan is really anxious due to the Indian involvement in Afghanistan. The Indian policy pressurizes Pakistan; to disassociate itself from Taliban and change its policy towards Kashmir in order to sustain her regional commitments. Pakistan's response tangled between the military and the civil leadership. Pakistan also claims that India is supporting the separatist elements in Baluchistan's insurgency. Islamabad has reported many times and provided proof to the Afghan President about the role of the Indian consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat in fueling violence and terrorism in Pakistan especially in Baluchistan³. Pakistan believes that India is following Chanakya's strategy 'to encircle and to isolate Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan brands Afghanistan as an enemy equated with India⁴. Pakistan perceives this multi-layered India-Afghanistan partnership as zero sum attitudes to regional cooperation, which is ultimately leading to security implications.

INDIAN ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN (POST-9/11)

During War on Terror, Pakistan gained recognition regarding her role and her geo-strategic importance with respect to Afghanistan, whereas, India was surprised that Washington did not seek isolate Pakistan after 9/11⁵. However, the event of 9/11 proved to be very supportive to the Indian policy towards Afghanistan. India quickly assessed the impact of 9/11 on the region,

³ Rizwan Zeb, *Cross Border Terrorism Issues Plaguing Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations*, 2006.

⁴ Raiphea, "India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership: An Analysis of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan Perspectives," *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications*, 2013, <http://www.ijsrp.org/research-paper-0413.php?rp=P161040>.

⁵ Vasantha R Raghavan, "The Double-Edged Effect in South Asia.," *The Washington Quarterly (Print)*, 2004, 147-55.

which may lead to increased political space for Pakistan and reduced opportunities for India. According to Fani⁶, India's main concerns after 9/11 were Pakistan would find new diplomatic and media support for the cause in Kashmir, and US would be under pressure to balance its strategies between Indian and Pakistan. Therefore, Indian strategies inculcated importance of Afghanistan in her regional policies, "since the ouster of the Taliban, India has worked to become Afghanistan's most important partner for reconstruction in recognition of the country's strategic importance for India within and beyond the South Asian region"⁷.

India's constructive role in Afghanistan is not new for India and Afghanistan, but in post 9/11 the Indian role in Afghanistan is fairly new to India's security agenda, it threatens Pakistan's strategic depth, which has long been vital to Pakistan in Afghanistan. It also enhances Pakistan's fears of strategic encirclement. According to D'Souza that India's growing influence in Afghanistan and Pakistan's imagined concerns of encirclement in what it perceives to be its 'strategic backyard' is due to 'zero-sum' geopolitical rivalry between India and Pakistan, dubbed by Western analysts as the 'new great game', which is seen as a source of further instability⁸. In post 9/11, India is considered a major stakeholder in Afghanistan's security, social and economic development and keenly observing the unfolding scenario after the US withdrawal from Kabul⁹, and Afghanistan's policy is also receptive towards Indian influence and initiatives. In December 2001, India reopened the Indian embassy in Kabul followed by number of consulates. According to Akram Zaki, India has six consulates in Afghanistan, and the rest are security centers, to provide security to Indian workers¹⁰. Pakistan is in continuous fear due to India's massive engagement through the present number of consulates in Afghanistan [in Jalalabad, Kandahar, Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif] that led to the perception of cooperation and competition in Afghanistan as zero-sum game between both nuclear neighboring states¹¹. Pakistan asserts that India is using her consulates in Afghanistan to aggravate the situation in southern Afghanistan bordering Pakistan, supporting the Pakistani Taliban and the separatists' movement in Baluchistan.

India is displaying her soft image for the security and development in Afghanistan; she adopted a cautious approach by relying on her soft role rather bringing her boots on ground in order to attain her broader interests in South and Central Asia. "In such a situation, India engaged herself in Afghanistan for reconstruction as a soft power"¹². Indian interests are not confined to encounter Pakistan; India broadly is aspiring for stable Afghanistan as a strategic priority and responsibility of a regional power. However, under Pakistan's pressure and US unappreciated Indian role in Afghanistan, in January 2010 India was excluded from the International Conference in Afghanistan and her concerns were ignored and New Delhi was declared irrelevant to the evolving security dynamics in Afghanistan. "The London conference decided

⁶ Muhammad Fani, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy : Challenges and Opportunities after 9/11," 2005, http://www.worldcat.org/title/pakistans-foreign-policy-challenges-and-opportunities-after-911/oclc/774452753&referer=brief_results.

⁷ Christine Fair, "India in Afghanistan and beyond : Opportunities and Constraints," 2010, http://www.worldcat.org/title/india-in-afghanistan-and-beyond-opportunities-and-constraints/oclc/822967275&referer=brief_results.

⁸ Shanthie Mariet D'Souza, National University of Singapore, and Institute of South Asian Studies, *India, Afghanistan and the "End Game"?* (Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, 2011).

⁹ Dinoj Upadhyay and Athar Zafar, "Assessing India's Decade-Long Engagement in Afghanistan," 2013, <http://icwa.in/pdfs/IBAssessingIndias.pdf>.

¹⁰ Akram Zaki, "Former Ambassador, Former Secretary General & Minister of State of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan," n.d.

¹¹ Sadika Hameed, "Prospects for Indian - Pakistani Cooperation in Afghanistan," 2012.

¹² Rahil Majeed, "Indo-Afghan Relations after September 11: Implications for Pakistan," *IOSR-JHSS IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science* 15, no. 3 (2013): 09-14.

that the time had come to woo ‘moderate’ section of the Taliban to share power in Kabul. Pakistan seems to have convinced the West that it can play the role of mediator in negotiations with Taliban”¹³. Obama’s miscalculated announcement of NATO troop’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011 also left India with a frightful future of Afghanistan. But India’s persistent soft role, development process and enduring interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s inability to control terrorism changed the US perception to pro-Indian policies in Afghanistan. In 2011, in Karzai’s regime, India signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement for cooperation with Afghanistan in the political, security, economic, trade, capacity development, education, social, cultural, civil society and people to people contacts; the agreement does not include the presence of Indian combat troops in Afghanistan¹⁴. 2012, in Kabul Conference India offered its economic support and regional integration for Afghanistan, in the same year India also hosted the Investment Summit on Afghanistan in Delhi. In December 2013, the Afghan President Hamid Karzai visited India and requested for greater security cooperation, asserting India’s regional alliance in post-2014 US withdrawal to ensure stable Afghanistan. India is willing to play her major role and fill the security gap in Afghanistan not only vis-à-vis Pakistan as a counter strategy but to attain her other broader objectives vis-à-vis China. US early withdrawal in 2014 was not in Indian interest neither she endorses US continued presence. US presence in Afghanistan is backed by India until she secures her interests and broader options¹⁵.

POWER POLITICS: INDIAN REALIST ENDS

Phenomenologically, power explains change or shift in status quo¹⁶. Under the classical realists, system is briefed as, “‘it’s a jungle out there’. Anarchy is the rule; order, justice and morality are the expectations” ‘Thomas Hobbes’¹⁷. “The law that power rules the relations of states a principle that lies at the heart of all realism, classical, modern, and contemporary-points to expansion constrained only by limits of nation’s power, or by countervailing outside power”¹⁸. Whereas, the higher domains of virtue are acknowledged by the realists, but realism stresses that ‘in the world as it is, the final arbiter of things political is ‘power’. Realists assert that power is the sole interest behind every major unit-actor in the international arena, Morgenthau linked power to human’s nature. According to Morgenthau ‘the act to seek power’ is by default inbuilt in human’s nature, and the ability to accept the ‘truth’ is in conflict with human’s fundamental capacity of recognizing reality. “Morgenthau closes *Scientific Man verses Power Politics* by declaring that man is caught in a perennial human tragedy, experiencing the contrast between the longings of his mind [reason] and his actual condition [necessity and lust for power]”¹⁹. His focus in *Politics among Nations* was intrinsically bound to the concept of power in international politics and the centrality of the concept in IR.

Nonetheless, power is a contested in nature but according to this study the concept of power is least contested in nature [as compare to security]; power has been the ultimate source of

¹³ Harsh Pant, “India In Afghanistan: A Rising Power or A Hesitant Power?,” *Note De Recherche Working Paper* ., 2010.

¹⁴ Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Role in Afghanistan,” 2012, CIDOB.
https://www.cidob.org/es/content/download/35196/.../OK_SUMIT+GANGULY.pdf

¹⁵ Eva Gross, “Afghanistan: The View from India,” 2014, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Alert_1_India-Afghanistan.pdf.

¹⁶ Ewan Harrison, “Waltz, Kant and Systemic Approaches to International Relations,” *Peace Research Abstracts* 39, no. 6 (2002): 763–957.

¹⁷ Robert G Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” *Int. Org. International Organization* 38, no. 02 (1984): 287.

¹⁸ Steven Forde, “International Realism and the Science of Politics: Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism,” *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (June 1, 1995): 141–60, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600844>.

¹⁹ S Molloy, *Hidden History of Realism: A Genealogy of Power Politics*. (Place of publication not identified: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

inspiration by material as well as the social constraints of unit-actors in the international system. Power is the absolute end, whether it is a question of survival or a step forward towards influence and hegemony. In the existing arena power has changed its dimensions from material capabilities to social entities. In the era of nuclearization power has been mushroomed according to different required domains of interests. Whereas, Foucault defines power as “immaterial, as a ‘certain type of relation between individuals’ or refers power to a relationship in which force is exercised. “It has to do with complex strategic social positions that relate to the subject’s ability to control its environment and influence those around itself”²⁰. Foucault emphasizes that ‘truth’ is inbuilt in the system of power, which is culturally specific, inseparable from ideology which often coincides with various forms of hegemony. “We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exorcize power except through the production of truth”²¹. Foucault’s relational concept of power doesn’t base on interest oriented power accumulation process; he believes that power is everywhere and produced by multiple virtues of constraints²² and the ‘other’ of power is resistance. Power is shaped by individuals and the levels of truth production process that integrate the relations of force operate to form global domination.

Consequently, power politics has been undeniable throughout the history of South Asia. The unremitting violence and struggle for power has set traditional rivalries in the region which didn’t allow the inhabitants of South Asian subcontinent to come out of political disorder. Secondly, lack of opportunities and economic disarray, contributed as the most supporting element in sustainable political anarchy. Thirdly, being as a strategic region and a trading route, the subcontinent observed a series of interest-oriented invasions and ascendance of different cultural realms, in the passage of time that added more ethnic and religious divisions. Lastly, major powers interests and interference in the region as a part of their hegemonic policy [or Great Game] have maximized the anarchical nature and introduced many new versions of terror and chaos. Nonetheless, power politics and anarchy has been traced out as a persistent indicator in the South Asian politics during the period of the study, decline of US global uni-polarity and rise of China as an economic giant gave another realist edge to power politics in the region, which ultimately enhanced Indian role in the region and pushed Pakistan in the borrow of security concerns. Nevertheless, what India is pursuing in Afghanistan is social power based on her material capabilities and realist interests in the region, what can be called as ‘Social Realism’ is the attainment of state’s material [realist] interests through social means.

Malign Security Dilemma in South Asia

Security dilemma is the direct consequence of the anarchic environment in global politics. Jervis defines security dilemma as unintended force [built around perceptions and misperceptions among the defensive states], and structural in origin. It is the result of the two states’ interaction in which the gain of one is the loss of the other leading to uncertainty and war between the two states. Further, he asserts that the dynamics of security dilemma are self-enforcing resembling to spiral. Whereas, according to Herz, security dilemma is based on six components, 1) anarchy is the ultimate source security dilemma, 2) uncertainty and fear are the ultimate consequences, 3) accumulation of more power, 4) enhanced security concerns, 5) security dilemma can be one of the causes behind war, and lastly, 6) security dilemma is a self-reinforcing process ‘a vicious

²⁰ Michel Foucault, “Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977,” 1980, http://www.worldcat.org/title/powerknowledge-selected-interviews-and-other-writings-1972-1977/oclc/6554112&referer=brief_results.

²¹ Mark Philp, “Foucault on Power: A Problem in Radical Translation?,” *Political Theory* 11, no. 1 (1983): 29–52.

²² Stephen Frederick Schneck, “Michel Foucault on Power/Discourse, Theory and Practice,” *Hum Stud Human Studies* 10, no. 1 (1987): 15–33.

cycle' spiral in nature²³. Tang perceives that lack of malign intentions between states is the one of the most important factor to determine a genuine security dilemma which has been ignored by many scholars. Lack of malign intentions reflects defensive states with benign nature, whereas offensive states are malign in nature. He further emphasizes on the material and psychological factors that regulates and affects the security dilemma. Tang's rigorous definition of security dilemma states that security dilemma is the result of anarchic environment that pushes the state to acquire more power in an active security dilemma. Accumulation of more power has to be encountered with reaction and material and psychological regulators resulting in much exacerbated or deep security dilemma. The changing scenario shifts the defensive-benign states to offensive-malign states pushing them into a spiral of insecurity, causing expansionist/imperialist threats or mutual threat/deadlock ending on war or threat of war.

Since 1947, Pakistan and India inherited traditional security dilemma, due to the fear of their survival [not because of power accumulation]. Along with ideological and psychological regulators both states resulted in exacerbated or deep security dilemma in the region. Both states contributed in arm race [nuclearization] and political alliances [US and USSR] that eventually changed the newly born states to offensive and malign actors fearing war or threat to war in South Asia. Though, security dilemma sustained and balance of power was attained or supposed to be attained in the region after nuclearization, but the obvious malign intentions and war threat reveals illusionary security dilemma in South Asia that pushed the region in scrounge of non-state actors and terrorism. Whereas, Pakistan's stance has been derived by the fear of re-absorption and question of survival from many times larger India and her centrality of strength in the region that pushed Pakistan to attain balance of power in the region and maintain the status quo. Whereas, Indian aspirations are dominated with hegemonic intentions to influence the region, Indian internal strength through her democratic model and economic growth has left Pakistan far behind in terms of internal stability. While her external efforts to enhance her influence in the region in Afghanistan via Iran under US support, reveals her coalitional hegemonic intentions in the region, challenging the status quo against the traditional maintained balance of power in the region.

Indian Regional Hegemonic Intentions

India lies in the heart of South Asia; by default India qualifies some of the supporting ingredients for being a regional hegemon. Along with her liberal values, growing economy and rich culture, India shares strategic interests in the region and her regional policies depict her growing sphere of influence in South Asia. "In a nutshell India's hegemony in the region is more of the making of the domestic compulsions of these surrounding countries than the policy of India, which in any case on theoretical foundation would rather abhor it"²⁴. It is difficult for India to get hegemonic recognition by the peripheral states in South Asia, in addition, India cannot be a legitimate hegemon in the presence of Pakistan; Indian hegemony is more elaborated as 'soft hegemon' or the 'benevolent hegemon' in the region. India requires consent and legitimacy by the other regional states for the favorable outcomes. Legitimacy is often provided by the states which get benefited from the hegemony of certain state in the region, as the case in Hegemonic

²³ Shijing Tang, "The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis," *Security Studies* 18, no. 3 (2009): 587–623.

²⁴ "India and its Regional Hegemony in South Asia History Essay," 2015, <https://www.ukessays.com/essays/history/india-and-its-regional-hegemony-in-south-asia-history-essay.php>.

Stability Theory (HST). “According to HST, others states will cooperate with a benign hegemon because they benefit strategically and economically”²⁵.

The Pakistan factor has the capacity to some extent that can hinder the Indian regional hegemonic dynamics in South Asia. “A regional hegemon is confronted with a peer competitor; it would no longer be a status quo power. Indeed, it would go to considerable length to weaken and maybe even destroy its rival. Of course, both regional hegemon would be motivated by that logic would make a fierce security competition”²⁶. Pakistan perceives India as a regional hegemon with the ability to enhance Pakistan’s security concerns, while India is functional towards a workable coalitional hegemony in the region. According to Watson²⁷ who presented the formulation of ‘concert’ collective hegemony that gave its horizontal and vertical axis with a fore and potential relationship in order to maintain their asserted equilibrium and hegemony. India to some extent follows collective hegemonic pattern in the region; India is operative in Afghanistan under the horizontal support of United States [to counter China in South Asia], and under the vertical alliance via Iran to Afghanistan [to counter Pakistan]. “A working concert requires two sets of predictions. One is the commonality of interest amongst the great powers collectively; the other is the vertical axis of consent whereby the lesser states in the region would be willing to accede to any such arrangement”²⁸. Whereas, Afghanistan has interests-oriented ‘bandwagon’ tilt towards India “paradoxical behaviour is visible in how buffered states react to and use their unique positions”²⁹.

The Indian collective hegemonic objectives are not supported with consent and legitimacy of all the South Asian states, especially by Pakistan due to security reasons. Thus, Indian role in Afghanistan with the external alignment and US support, and with the vertical axes with Iran to Central Asian states against China has been perceived as change in the regional dynamics of South Asia with enhanced security implications for Pakistan. Pakistan is not satisfied and feels threatened by the Indian active and multidimensional role in Afghanistan and trying to maintain the status quo, while Indian quest for regional role vis-à-vis China and access to the Central Asian states is strategically encircling Pakistan and challenging the attained status quo in the region.

INDIAN SMART ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN

India is relying on her direct soft and hard power strategies, and enhancing her economic, cultural and political influence, making Indians as the most popular nation in the region. India is considered a major rising power in the twenty-first century, according to Husain as per Pricewaterhouse Coopers’ study, India’s GDP in nominal terms will increase to \$7919 billion by 2030, making her the third largest global economy after China and US³⁰. Besides that Indian growing economy, India has also increased her defense expenditure; her estimated defense budget [2013-14] is \$ 37.4 billion, which later was announced to be enhanced to \$ 40.07 billion by 2015. India also has built her air force base in Tajikistan, and has been training Kyrgyz forces; she resumed military cooperation with Nepal in 2012 and deployed some security

²⁵ Ian Clark, *Hegemony in International Society* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011), <http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/public/content/politicalscience/9780199556267/toc.html>.

²⁶ John J Mearsheimer and W.W. Norton & Company, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York; London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014).

²⁷ Adam Watson, “International Relations & The Practice of Hegemony,” 2002, <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/english-school/watson-hegemony02.pdf>.

²⁸ Clark, *Hegemony in International Society*.

²⁹ Wayne McLean, “Regional Security Complex Theory and Insulator States The Case Study of Turkey” (University of Tasmania., 2011).

³⁰ Javid Husain, *Pakistan and a World in Disorder: A Grand Strategy for the Twenty-First Century*, 2016.

personals in Afghanistan for security purposes. Some of India's strategic community members believe in the need of Indian hard presence as well, though the policy is not much appreciated by the majority due to the disastrous memories of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka in 1980s. According to Kasuri³¹, India has denounced any physical military deployment on Afghanistan, due to two reasons; first, US did not permit Indian physical involvement because of Pakistan's mounting security fears, secondly, Indian political leadership timidity on the issue of troop's deployment.

Besides, since 1950, approximately 100,000 Indian military troops have been participating in UN keeping mission around the world. According to Wagner³² that India seems to qualify as a soft power due to her in-home democratic traditions, Gandhian non-violence and peaceful conflict mediation, cultural imperialism, and lastly global projection through Bollywood. "The extant of popular support for India a by-product of its 'no-strings-attached' strategy of reconstruction assistance, soft power projection, and outreach to all major Afghan ethnic groups is particularly striking when compared with Afghans' perceptions of Pakistan"³³. India's economic integration of Afghanistan at the regional level has been sought as the major influential tool of Indian soft power. "These development and changes in Indian foreign policy towards the region reflect a change from hard to soft power strategies in dealing with the neighbours"³⁴.

For Tharoor³⁵, India is a soft power possessing all the contributing essentials of co-optive power, emphasizing on India's strategic advantages, economic dynamism, political stability, proven military capabilities, nuclear space and missile programs under the broad perspective of great power. India is giving soft support and encouragement in Afghanistan, through "the aspects and products of Indian society and culture that the world would find attractive not in order directly to persuade others to support India, but rather to enhance our countries intangible standing in their eyes"³⁶. The attractiveness of the societal state model is the basic idea behind the Indian soft power, in order to pursue her national interests' vis-à-vis Pakistan in Afghanistan. "India has adopted soft power approach towards Afghanistan, to revive her historical, traditional, socio-cultural and civilizational linkages with the country"³⁷. Secondly, India's soft stance and involvement in Afghanistan has been under continuous US support, India's physical economic and social project has been protected by the US security presence in Afghanistan. "The greatest benefit of the current situation is that New Delhi has employed the soft-power approach as it has the tacit cover of US and NATO security forces"³⁸.

Tharoor defines power, as the ability to alter the behavior of others to get what one wants, Nye believes that power is the ability to alter others' behaviour and produce preferred outcomes, he further said that power can be exercised in three ways: coercion (sticks); inducement (carrots); and attraction (soft power), but according to Nye's recent addition *The Future of Power* in which he elucidated a policy oriented concept of smart power to get preferred outcomes [commanding

³¹ Mahmood Kasuri, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy Challenges in the Emerging Global Scenario," *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 2015, 29–50.

³² Christian Wagner, "India's Soft Power: Prospects and Limitations," *India Quarterly* 66, no. 4 (December 1, 2010): 333–42, <https://doi.org/10.1177/097492841006600401>.

³³ Larry Hanauer and Peter Chalk, *India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan Implications for the United States and the Region* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2012), <http://proxy2.hec.ca/login?url=http://site.ebrary.com/lib/hecm/Doc?id=10678761>.

³⁴ Wagner, "India's Soft Power."

³⁵ Shashi Tharoor, "India as a Soft Power," *Indiantencentq India International Centre Quarterly* 38, no. 3–4 (2011): 330–43.

³⁶ Tharoor.

³⁷ Majeed, "Indo-Afghan Relations after September 11."

³⁸ Kasuri, "Pakistan's Foreign Policy Challenges in the Emerging Global Scenario."

change, controlling agendas, and establishing preferences]. Nye put in plain words that relational power explains the ability of commanding others to change their initial preferences, while the other dimension of smart power is to shape their instincts that others prefer what you want. “You can affect their behavior by shaping their preferences in ways that produce what you want rather than relying on carrots and sticks to change their behavior ‘when push comes to shove’³⁹. Such relational power reality possesses special strengthening effects on the foreign policy outcomes. Thus, the smart power strategies are not for maximization of power or preserving hegemony, it is to get successful outcomes from the implemented strategies. He also mentions that there are five questions that can describe what can be achieved by a smart power, 1) what goals or outcomes are preferred?, 2) what resources are available and in which context?, 3) what are the positions and preferences of the targets of influence attempts?, 4) which forms of power behaviour are most likely to succeed?, and lastly 5) what is the probability of success?.

As in case of Indian role in Afghanistan, India is projecting her soft and hard power, New Delhi has been using her military as a power projection tool throughout the South Asian region and the Indian Ocean. Whereas, Indian soft power is practiced under her broader agenda of a smart power, India on both levels [soft and hard] is pursuing her regional and global interests. India believes that “to be effective, India needs to mix hard and soft power, now that its sphere of aid delivery is expanding substantially”⁴⁰. The following ‘Table’ is explaining Indian smart power ‘means and ends’ in Afghanistan in order to attain her preferred outcomes [smart power] in the region.

Table: India’s Smart Power in Afghanistan under Nye’s Model

No.	Nye’s Model	Indian Smart Power in Afghanistan
1.	What goals or outcomes are preferred? →	1) To play her regional role, 2) To enhance her regional influence vis-à-vis China, 3) To access the Central Asian market, and 4) to encircle Pakistan and influence her decisions.
2.	What resources are available and in which context? →	India is spending around \$ 3 billion in aid and development in order to achieve the following objectives in Afghanistan 1) security, 2) political, 3) economic, and 4) social.
3.	What are the positions and preferences of the	The Afghan government is

³⁹ Joseph S Nye, “Soft Power,” *FOREIGN POLICY*, no. 80 (1990): 153–71.

⁴⁰ Dweep Chanana, “India as an Emerging Donor,” *Econpoliweek Economic and Political Weekly* 44, no. 12 (2009): 11–14.

targets of influence attempts?

in a desperate position to find an alternative to fill the vacuum after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, whereas the Afghan people are in grievous misery and desperation looking for help and support.

4. Which forms of power behaviour are most likely to succeed? →

Soft power including hard power to achieve preferred outcomes under smart power.

5. What is the probability of success? →

Since 2001 Indian proved to be successful in her strategic policies in Afghanistan.

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Pakistan is still stuck in the traditional subsystem studies, with more emphases on security implication and the question of its survival. Peace between the two major actors in South Asia is not very convincing; they cannot go to war due to nuclear capability which both enjoy, but diplomatically, clandestinely after one another's neck. The mindset 'enemy of my enemy is my friend or enemy factor' is disastrously implemented that led to the emergence of Afghanistan as part of a dominant conflict in South Asia between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan-India dynamics view each other as zero-sum rivals in South Asia. Menon and Kumar say that "sadly neighbours don't ever go away. A neighbour inflicted with Hobbesian anarchy refuses to be ignored and attempts to export its anarchy"⁴¹, as per Zaki⁴², Ajit Deol's doctrine in India is 'offensive defense' and destroys Pakistan from within. While, D'Souza⁴³, believes that India's growing aid diplomacy in the strategic backyard of Pakistan proven to be fatal between zero-sum rivals, which is also dubbed by the westerns as the 'New Great Game', the source of insecurity in the region. As Barno say that many nations have shown their interest in the region, which assures the renewal of 'Great Game' that once, played out there and in some ways or other still continues⁴⁴. According to Bukhari Indian role in Afghanistan has negative implications for Pakistan. Pakistan has now to be worried about the security of its western borders that incurs

⁴¹ Menon and Kumar, "World Scenario and Indian Grand Strategy."

⁴² Zaki, "Former Ambassador, Former Secretary General & Minister of State of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan."

⁴³ D'Souza, National University of Singapore, and Institute of South Asian Studies, *India, Afghanistan and the "End Game"?*

⁴⁴ G. Barno, "Beyond Afghanistan: A Regional Security Strategy for South and Central Asia," *USA: Center for a New American Security*, 2011, http://www.worldcat.org/title/beyond-afghanistan-a-regional-security-strategy-for-south-and-central-asia/oclc/727126451&referer=brief_results.

huge politico-economic costs. Political cost includes deteriorated relations with Afghanistan while economic cost includes increased defense expenditures⁴⁵.

Nonetheless, Indian soft presence and developmental strategies in Afghanistan are not done with sense of altruism. It is in Indian national interest to strengthen Afghanistan. Indian involvement in Afghanistan is always seen as mounting threat by Pakistan, which will be blocked whenever, wherever possible. Pakistan's former president Pervez Musharraf stated, "if Pakistan perceives Kabul getting too close to New Delhi, the ISI could be ordered by the government to take suitable 'countermeasures'"⁴⁶. Pakistan perceives India as existential threat and Pakistan's polices in Afghanistan support a pliant regime to provide her with strategic depth against and Indian interference.

On the other side, US-India collaboration regarding the Afghan policy has seriously impacted the regional security scenario in South Asia. It has left Pakistan more vulnerable as far as her security is concerned. It has made its key western border with Afghanistan also quite unsafe along with the already-insecure eastern border with India. It has put more pressure on Pakistan's already scarce resources to spend in the security sphere to counterbalance India's aggressive designs. It has also affected the Kashmir issue and the right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people⁴⁷. US concern about the regional security of South Asia has been missing the essential part during this era. India-US increased collaboration has put Pakistan at a disadvantage as far as military technology parity is concerned. US must consider that security in South Asia could not be guaranteed without a resolution of the vital Kashmir issue according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Pro India-US security policy in South Asia and Afghanistan, without giving due weight and consideration to the purely regional context of security of South Asia and consideration of Pakistan's sensitivities, would lead to creation of Indian monopoly in the region, which would jeopardize Pakistan's interests and may jeopardize US interests in the region in future⁴⁸.

Thus, Pakistan's security concerns are genuine. It feels that the country which previously had to face a conventional military imbalance from India in the east will now have to encounter the enemy on the western border. This will require substantial distribution and resultant dilution of military forces⁴⁹ that may result in multiple implications, as rise in extremism, radicalization, drag on economy and flight of capital, loss of life, overstretched military and intelligence forces, poor investment from abroad, strategic encirclement, RAW ingress in FATA, and difficulty to gain access to CAS⁵⁰.

CONCLUSION

Indian role in Afghanistan and the changing regional security scenario of South Asia have proven under the theoretical approach of 'Social Realism'. Indian realist ends through social means in Afghanistan reveals her opted smart power tactics [including hard and soft powers] in order to attain her broader interest oriented regional goals. "A strategy relates means to ends, and

⁴⁵ Shahid Hussain Bukhari, Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Bahauddin Zakariya University Multan, August 26, 2016.

⁴⁶ Kasturi, "India's Role in Afghanistan."

⁴⁷ Ali Zulfiqar, Controller, HR Media Group Publishing Ltd. Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, May 22, 2016.

⁴⁸ Zulfiqar.


⁴⁹ S.M. Shahzad, Station Commander (Navy) Lahore, Station Headquarters, Pakistan, May 11, 2016.

⁵⁰ Shahzad.

that requires clarity about goals (preferred outcomes), resources, and tactics for their use”⁵¹. Realism has been taken as the base understating of the study behind the Indian long run objectives, but it could not justify the Indian soft power in Afghanistan [social involvement]. Neither any other discussed theory justified Indian social involvement in Afghanistan with realist ends. Indian motives are not without sense of altruism or as soft power in Afghanistan. Indian presence in Afghanistan is critical to regional security scenario of South Asian and challenging the prevailed status quo with grave relational security implications for Pakistan. The question arises if India is displaying her soft power in Afghanistan so why Pakistan is strategically encircled and heading towards Chinese and Russian orbit? Pakistan’s security concerns enhanced after Indian involvement in Afghanistan which shows the changing regional security scenario and paved the way for other regional powers to intervene in regional structure of South Asia. Thus, India is heading with her smart tactics under ‘Social Realism’.

The term ‘Social Realism’ is given according to grounded analysis of the study; it specifically refers to Indian realist ends via social means in Afghanistan. Nye has discussed ‘Liberal Realism’ in ‘*The Future of Power*’ with reference to US power status, and institutional and economic efficacy within the global perspective, asserting that there is no politics in pure economic relations, “but an important dimension of economic power behavior is to make others more dependent on you than you are on them”⁵². Another theoretical debate of ‘Strategic Realism’ by Schelling supports the study, in which ends are related to means [use of available resources to gain any objective]. Moreover, states are the rational unit of analysis; secondly, actor’s preferences are dominating the value system, and actor’s clash interest is materialized within a strategic environment. Under the rational assumptions of strategic realism, Smith states not to suppose that “the actor is functioning with perfect efficacy or that all rational decisions are right ones merely that an actor’s decisions are made after careful cost-benefit calculation and the means chosen seem optimal to accomplish the desired end”⁵³. According to this study the lacking factor of Strategic Realism that it mostly includes “the use or threat of use of armed force as a conscious choice of political actors who are intent on rationally pursuing their objectives”⁵⁴. It also states that the strategic theory is not just study of military power, but it neither highlights the social involvement. However, what this study generated is ‘Social Realism’, which is inducted from the grounded investigation based on primary and secondary data analysis of the Indian role in Afghanistan, as shown in the following figure,

Figure: Social Realism




⁵¹ Joseph S Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), <http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=634489>.

⁵² Joseph S Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008), <http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=634489>.

⁵³ M.L.R. Smith, “Strategic Theory: What It Is...and Just as Importantly, What It Isn’t,” 2011, <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/04/28/strategic-theory-what-it-is%E2%80%A6and-just-as-importantly-what-it-isn%E2%80%99t/>.

⁵⁴ Smith.



Indian smart presence [with the preferred outcomes] in Afghanistan is justifying Indian realist and social involvement. Realism has been linked within the social aspect because the ingredients of a smart power fall within the preferred outcomes of hard and soft power. “As we have seen, states are no longer the only important actors in global affairs; security is not the only major outcome that seeks, and force is not the only or always the best instrument available to achieve those outcomes”⁵⁵. Thus, the term ‘Social Realism’ has been chosen to identify the Indian role in Afghanistan or in other words smart power with preferred outcomes can be defined in terms of ‘Social Realism’, a combination that can be generated by merging the realist and behavioral paradigm. Social Realism as a specific generated grounded theory for the study identifies anarchy as a constant variable, a common factor between states, which has been supported by various discussed approaches and theories. Secondly the centrality of unit actors in the regional anarchic structure, resulting in power struggle, whereas the nature of struggle varies according to their preferred outcomes, is using various means [political, social and economic] in order to attain their ends. Thus, smart power [the preferred outcomes or realist ends] is attained through social means, justifying ‘Social Realism’.

Indian enhanced role in Afghanistan is defined under Social Realism which is challenging the regional status quo, whereas the security perspective has been taken as relational concept which is resultantly can be obtained anywhere or everywhere due to prevailing anarchic patterns among the state-unit actors. Security is relational in its structure dependent on other forces to be defined in terms of its gravity and has spiral impact. Pakistan is facing grievous security implication since its birth but with advent of and influence of India in Afghanistan, Pakistan feels strategically encircled with severe security implications, according to this study security is relational due to Indian presence in Afghanistan but it has spiral impact that has surrounded the region with its abrupt consequences and extra regional alliances.

⁵⁵ Nye, *The Future of Power*, 2008.