PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND JAPAN

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Abstract

The region of South Asia is vulnerable due to nuclear powers of India and Pakistan. Former launched its program in reaction to China whereas latter followed the suit in Indian reaction. Pakistan undertook atomic explosion as India again tested its nuclear devices in May 1998. The atomic explosions in the region paved the way for international reaction. Japan being first and last victim of nuclear weapons also came forward and made efforts to restrain Pakistan from following action of India. After explosion by Pakistan, international community including Japan condemned nuclear race in South Asia. Pakistan had to face Japanese reaction at various levels. It seems that Japan is also not satisfied with justification of Pakistan regarding Pakistan-North Korea nuclear cooperation. However nuclear proliferation is not restricted only to Pakistan.

Keywords: Bilateral relations, nuclear program, public policy

Introduction

The South Asia is a region of seven countries including two nuclear countries i.e., India and Pakistan. Being economically weak and unending political problems, both the countries possess nuclear warheads which are vulnerable for international peace. The region is vulnerable for the entire world including Japan due to semi cordial and friendly relations and unending tension between Pakistan and India. Moreover, both countries have deep rooted mistrust. In addition to it due to extremism, religious and non religious factors, India and Pakistan do not want cordial relations. It may add fuel to injury. If once war begins any country may use nuclear weapons as a last resort which may affect the entire world.

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Japan has always asked both the countries to restrain from nuclear tests, horizontally and vertically and sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Government of Pakistan was persuaded to sign the CTBT which it found how to do if India is unwilling (S. Numata, personal communication, 2010, January 25). But, both the countries are reluctant to respond positively to the call of international community. Japanese should keep saying that Pakistan should come to sign CTBT and NPT but it is like a dream as they understand the importance of security position on side of Pakistan. Japan is also pursuing India to sign both the treaties. However, nuclear problem will not be a big matter in future relations between India and Pakistan (Y. Nakagawa, personal communication, 2010, February 2). If India signs CTBT Pakistan may not do so as it might want equal status with India (T. Hirose, personal communication, 2010, January 12).

Every country should be justified in developing nuclear weapons because NPT is unfair treaty as five countries are admitted as nuclearized excluding others. They never tried to abolish nuclear weapons and if they try to abolish something in this regard then it will be alright. Pakistan and India do not sign treaty due to domestic problems. The Prime Minister Hatoyama of Japan during his visit to India asked the host country to sign CTBT but [Indian Premier] replied that U.S and China are not ratifying treaty so Professor Hiromoto Takenori thinks that without their ratification India will not sign the treaty (H. Takenori, personal communication, 2010, January 20).

Pakistan wants nuclear free world in an ideal scenario but ground realities are that it is not a nuclear state by choice but by compulsions because of its own national security interests. Japan keeps reiterating its ideal version that it is nuclear free but it is for domestic audience as well as for national stature and policy so it continues to pursue that (A. A. Gilani Syed, personal

communication, 2010, February 25). Regarding reactionary trend of nuclear development in the sub-continent, Takeuchi Y. Teddy told the author:

> The nuclear weaponization is a result of chain reaction. China exploded nuclear device in 1964 which was followed by India in 1974 and 1998 and then Pakistan entered in the scenario in 1998. Future repercussions of chain reaction may be economic. China is No. 2 in the world and emerging as major market where as India is coming forward. The economic development of these two countries in terms of population and GDP [has changed their importance] so priority has been changing for these two countries. Secondly, political means it is highly related to first factor, particularly for Pakistan is big factor how to do [deal] with extremists and terrorists. Relatively security priority for Pakistan has been changing though India is number one concern for Pakistan. Thirdly, international pressure. These three factors are different from the past. Some structure of competition of these nuclear out lets among these three countries is there but factors of reactionary trend are changing (T. Y. Teddy, personal communication, 2010, February 9).

Japan knows that Pakistan's nuclear program is reactionary one and Indian [nuclear program] also (T. Hirose, personal communication, 2010, January 12). The Government of Japan and Japanese people do not know the background of Pakistan's nuclear program and understand that India conducted explosion in 1974 and then Pakistan started its nuclear program and accept that it was forced to do that (J. A. Afridi, personal communication 2010, January 16).

Japan has expressed concerns on the atomic program of both the countries. When India and Pakistan conducted nuclear explosions in May 1998 Japan without assessing the nature of the explosions held both the countries in one line and imposed economic sanctions. It is a fact beyond any doubt that Pakistan was compelled to explode nuclear device after Indian tests in 1998 and in view of failure of international commitments of non- proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia.

Nuclear programs of India and Pakistan is almost at par in terms of size. If it continues as it is now, then the economic strength will show it by making big progress in case of India and Pakistan find very difficult to collect all its resources for the program (K. Muraoka, personal communication, 2010, January 26).

Pakistan should abandon its nuclear program unilaterally which will create positive image of Pakistan at least towards the Japanese people (A. Mizutani, personal communication, 2010, February 4).

Pakistan's Nuclear Program

Pakistan launched its nuclear program with the establishment of Pakistan Atomic Energy Committee in 1955. It was upgraded as Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in 1956. The program got momentum in the 1960s in reaction of Indian efforts to acquire nuclear bomb. It is common notion that Pakistan launched its nuclear program after atomic tests undertaken by India in 1974. The first elected Prime Minister of Pakistan; Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had set his mind much earlier for developing nuclear capability as deterrent in South Asia region. He summarized his nuclear ideas in his book entitled *The Myth of Independence*. He rejected the idea of limiting nuclear weapons to only five countries (i.e. the U.S, the USSR, China, France and the United Kingdom) (Bhutto, 1969). He considered nuclear technology vital for Pakistan and held that in case Pakistan gives up or suspends its nuclear program, India will

be in position to blackmail Pakistan with its nuclear advantage (Bhutto, 1969). He went to extent for building atomic bomb for Pakistan that he along with his nation was ready to eat grass or leaves (Bhutto, 1969).

The defeat in war of 1971 in the hands of India proved catalyst for Pakistan to move fast to acquire nuclear technology. It did to Bhutto what India's defeat in 1962 had done to Nehru and what the Israeli obliteration of the Osirak reactor at Tuwaitta in 1981 did to former Iraqi President Saddam Hussain.

The country began taking brisk walk towards acquiring atomic energy. The construction of Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) with the help of the Canadian General Electric Company in 1972 and signing of contract with Saint-Gobian Techniques Nowelles (SGN) in March 1973 for processing plant at Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) and beginning of its construction on 18th October 1974 were the land marks.

Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan laid the foundation of the Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL) on 31st July, 1976. His task was to build indigenous Uranium Enrichment Plant.

Pakistan conducted first cold test of a weapon (test of the implosion using inert natural uranium instead of highly enriched uranium) in the tunnels of the Kirana Hills, Balochistan on 11th March 1983 (Azam, 2000). In the same year, Pakistan announced of having capability of producing low enriched uranium. In May 1998, it undertook nuclear explosion in the hills of Chaghi, Baluchistan.

Due to prevalent security conditions in the West Asia region, political turmoil and lack of good governance, ethnicity, extremism and law and order situation in Pakistan, and alleged connection between al-Qaeda / Taliban and security agencies of the country, the world has fear that nuclear weapons of Pakistan may fall in the

hands of the terrorists. Japan is really concerned about the future of Pakistan and if it can help it would like to do so (T. Hirose, personal communication, 2010, January 12). If Taliban over control Pakistan that will be the worst scenario for international community including Japan. The Future of Pakistan is not good especially due to security position (T. Ito, personal communication, 2010, January 16). The United States is not going to sign civil nuclear agreement to Pakistan due to A.Q. Khan. It has greatest concern to save Pakistan's nuclear weapons to be fallen in the hands of the terrorists (H. Takenori, personal communication, 2010, January 20).

The concern of the Western countries including Japan is outcome of propaganda of opponents of Pakistan's nuclear program. Because:

- Pakistan has established the National Command Authority (NCA) headed by its Prime Minister. The Chief of Army Staff is also its member. The authority holds its meetings regularly to review the safety of strategic instruments and other issues. In presence of this authority it has remote chances that nuclear weapons may fall in the hands of the terrorists;
- The country has developed well efficient Command and Control System for safety of the nuclear weapons. The system has important representation from the military;
- Regular reviews are carried out to analyze the security issues of the atomic nukes and steps are taken if any gap is identified;
- The safety of the nukes is guarantee to existence of Pakistan. The nuclear deterrent in the sub-continent has indirectly contributed towards up keeping of the atomic weapons safely;
- The terrorists do not have support of the people of Pakistan. They mustered soft corner of a few but more than majority of population of the country hate them and their activities.

Their such hatred will not allow pro terrorists political party to capture the Government of the country;

- It has been alleged that the terrorists enjoy support of some circles from the Pakistan army. The Government of Pakistan has always dealt such types, when ever identified, with iron hand and improved intelligence network;
- The recent successful military operations against the terrorists in Swat valley and South Waziristan clearly indicate that the terrorists are unable to get any big success in their designs. It shows that they are running from pillar to post for their survival and have shattered strength.

The Government of Pakistan has assured the international community that its nuclear weapons are secure and in safe hands. Japan believes that Pakistan's weapons are strongly guarded by its government (H. Takenori, personal communication, 2010, January 20) and are very secure.

Japan's Reaction on Pakistan's Nuclear Tests

The nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan in May 1998 received reaction from Japan on public and official levels:

Reaction from Japanese People

Japanese are allergic from any type of explosions and not ready to accept justification that if India exploded Pakistan went for it also. They do not know about nature of relationship between India and Pakistan. Japan says that when North Korea undertook nuclear blast it did not go for that so they do not accept Pakistan's plea that it responded to Indian action. It does not see that Japan has U.S defense shield and Pakistan is without it (M. A. R. Siddiqui, personal communication, 2010, January 15).

Reaction from Government of Japan

Soon after the Indian nuclear test, Seichiro Noboru, a special envoy of the Japanese Prime Minister arrived Islamabad in 1998 with a written message from Hashimoto for Pakistan's Prime Minister. While talking to foreign correspondents, he told that Japan was providing aid worth 500 million dollars a year to Pakistan and it was likely to be stopped immediately if Pakistan carried out the test (Dawn, 1998, May 18). Japanese Government official told reporters on the sidelines of G-8 summit at Birmingham in 1998:

> The message being conveyed is that we would not like to find ourselves in a position where we would have to do to Pakistan what we have had to do to India (Dawn, 1998, May 16).

Reaction by Japanese Press

The first test received protest from Japan. The Japanese press deplored the situation. *Asahi Shimbun* wrote in its edition dated 29th May 1998, "We cannot dispense of efforts to improve insufficiencies in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which is unfair towards countries without nuclear capabilities". It also wrote that a multinational Security Council is needed to provide an opportunity for dialogue between India and Pakistan. The *Yomiuri Shimbun* stressed on urgent need to create framework to bring about peace between India and Pakistan and wrote that there are signs that the Pakistani government swayed between domestic public opinion calling for nuclear tests and international public opinion to abandon the tests (Yomiuri Shimbun, 1998, May 29)." The *Mainichi Shimbun* wrote that it is not too late for India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear weapons development" (Mainichi Shimbun, 1998, May 29).

According to the Director General of Science and Technology Agency of Japan, Sadakazu Tanigaki, the nuclear tests undertaken by India and Pakistan were against the aspirations of the Japanese

people and want ultimate ban on nuclear weapons (The Chugoku Shimbun, 1998, May 29). Masayoshi Takemura, leader of New Party Sakigake submitted protest letter to Embassy of Pakistan in Tokyo which stated:

> We could never accept Pakistan's testing since it was a violent act conducted while ignoring repeated urges from the international community including Japan to refrain from testing (The Chugoku Shimbun, 1998, May 29).

Pakistan-North Korea Nuclear Connection: Japan's Reaction

It is alleged that nuclear exchange took place between Pakistan and North Korea and other countries. However, it is uncertain to say that whether such cooperation got patronage of the officials of the Government of Pakistan. Proliferation cannot occur without either collision by the security agencies or instructions from the state leadership (Niazi, 2004). If any proliferation has taken place, the best persons to debrief are Vice Chief of Army Staff (R) K.M.Arif, Lieutenant General (R) Rafaqat Syed, Director Generals of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI),Lieutenant General (R) Hamid Gul, Asad Durrani, Jehangri Qazi and Ziauddin Khuwaja (Niazi, 2004). "He [A.Q.Khan] was just one of the cogs in a machine. He was a very important player but he was not the only player. The confession [made by A.Q.Khan for proliferation of nuclear technology in 2004] is part of a compromise that will allow Khan and any one in the armed forces who approved his actions to suffer limited consequences" (The Nation, 2004, February 6).

While commenting on control on nuclear program of Pakistan, Kunio Muraoka told the author:

> Nuclear scheme of Pakistan is very tightly controlled by the military. Benazir Bhutto did not know anything and Nawaz Sharif was blind on nuclear

> development as she was but he was closer to the military than her. Ghulam Ishaq Khan was exception and he knew ever thing. As Finance Minister, Ghulam Ishaq Khan was to finance nuclear program so he was taken to very close circles at very early stage. According to a biography of A. Q. Khan written by his friend, Benazir Bhutto was shown a small mechanism to size of a football and was told that this is a bomb you have and apparent I [Kunio Muraoka] think military is in control (K. Muraoka, personal communication, 2010, January 26).

The former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto once claimed that she purchased blue prints of nuclear technology from North Korea during her reign (The Nation, 2004, February 12). However, she denied any violation of international law and said,

> We had given a commitment to the international community that we would not export the nuclear technology but we had not given any commitment nor were asked to give any that we would make imports to develop our indigenous technology reign (The Nation, 2004, February 12).

In an interview to Voice of America, she told that people do not believe that what was asked DR. A. Q. Khan did so (confession) aimed at covering up those involve reign (The Nation, 2004, February 12). She revealed that then Minister for Commerce under the Government of General Musharraf took upon advertisement in the year 2000 inviting tenders for the nuclear export (The Nation, 2004, February 12). While addressing press conference in Washington, D.C, Benazir Bhutto said, "Dr. A. Q. Khan did not take any money, he did not export any nuclear technology and he is not a traitor" (The Nation, 2004, February 12). She pointed out that since its inception; Z. A. Bhutto always kept check on Khan Research

Laboratories (KRL) and money routed through a committee of which expenditure was properly monitored (The Nation, 2004, February 12). She revealed that "I undertook the official visit to Pyongyang in December, 1993 but did not swap any technologies but we bought the missile technology for cash" (The Nation, 2004, February 12). Regarding her visit to North Korea, former Ambassador of Japan to Pakistan told in an interview to author:

> I started from the episode in 1993 when Benazir Bhutto decided to go first overseas tour to China obviously it was o.k. as it was good neighbor and very intimate friend of Pakistan. But later in December, 1993, it was suddenly announced that she will go to North Korea. We became very dubious. We knew the facts that in Islamabad we started to see many North Koreans and relations between Pakistan and North Korea getting closer. I asked A. Q. Khan, when he came to see me one day, that what are you dealing with North Korea. He answered me directly that he somehow hinted at doing the short range shoulder carried anti aircraft missiles. He said very fast imported and improved on it and made a better product than original one.
>
> I questioned it was Chinese or North Korean made that somehow blocked [A.Q. Khan]. He did not say anything when I asked directly if you are not thinking of negotiating with North Korea to get their program. He said we do not.
>
> I asked him what you are doing in your laboratory uranium enrichment. He again did not make direct answer. He almost denied doing anything nuclear there.

> But when it became apparent what he did and confessed. He came to see me and at that occasion he mentioned that a department of technological institute near the Punjab and the North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhuwa) border is going to be named as Ghulam Ishaq Khan Institute of Technology and asked for cooperation to it.
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> Of course we knew at that time that Pakistan is doing nuclear weapons and question is how many nuclear weapons Pakistan has already built at that time. My best guess was that Pakistan held its first experiment of cold test in 1987 and 1988 so by that time when I arrived Pakistan must have built about 2 to 3.
>
> Before visit of Benazir Bhutto to North Korea in 1993, there was a talk of missile coming from North Korea to Pakistan that was exactly the copy of Nodong Pakistan has. When Nodong was brought to Pakistan then that was the time when A.Q. Khan started to cooperate with North Korea. I think his trips started to North Korea in very early 1990s as far as I have heard (K. Muraoka, personal communication, 2010, January 26).

The nuclear cooperation between the two countries was further confirmed from a statement made by spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan who said that C-130 military air craft flying to North Korea in 2002 carried shoulder to shoulder fired SA-16 missiles (The News 2004, February 9). Such statement came in view of U.S officials' claim that satellites spotted Pakistani military transport planes in North Korea (The Nation, 2004, February 6).

It is also alleged that economy of Pakistan was so poor that it could not pay price of North Korean missiles in shape of money. Consequently, it had to share nuclear technology with North Korea.

Quoting South Korean intelligence sources, the *Mainchi Shimbun*, a leading Japanese newspaper wrote that North Korean engineers visited Pakistan in 1999 to study uranium enrichment technology. The purpose of the visit was to study how to prevent radioactive damage in the process of uranium enrichment (Dawn, 2004, January 2). The *Shimbun* newspaper in its another edition wrote that under a deal concluded with Pakistan at the time of visit of Howang Jang Yop, former Secretary incharge of International Affairs of Korea's Workers Party, North Korea initiated weapon program in 1996 based on uranium. Pakistan denied any help extended to North Korea on nuclear issue. When North Korea claimed that it has undertaken atomic explosion in 2006, spokesperson of Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that North Korean nuclear program is plutonium based whereas Pakistan's on uranium which clearly defused the allegation.

On the appearance of news of nuclear proliferation, Government of Pakistan started debriefing session of the alleged nuclear scientists including Dr. Khan. He told the investigators that then Chief of Army Staff knew about the scientists who were assisting nuclear program of Iran and three other supreme commanders of Pakistan Army including General Pervez Musharraf granted approval for his efforts on behalf of Pyongyang (Rediff, 2004, February 3).

The U.S Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage and Assistant Secretary for South Asia, Christina Roca told then President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf in a meeting held on 6th October, 2003 that Pakistan's failure of taking action would put Pakistan's relations with the U.S in jeopardy. They claimed that nuclear proliferation had taken place either in shape of individual or collective as a country and world should know that it was an action of some individuals (The News, 2004, Feb. 8).

It is further alleged that Pakistan had acquired Nodong ballistic missiles and their TEL vehicles (Bermudez, 1999). Such acquisition

also included technical support i.e. missile launch and technology crews. At the head of emergence of news in U.S media about Pakistan-North Korea cooperation in missile technology, Pakistan's President Prevez Musharraf made statement of ending such cooperation between the two countries (Dawn, 2003, November 7).

The military relationship between the two countries emerged during the 1970s when then Premier of Pakistan Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto paid special attention on establishing bilateral ties with Pyongyang (Carbaugh, 2003). This connection eventually gave birth to nuclear ties. After 20 years, his daughter and then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto visited Pyongyang which gave boost to the relations (Carbaugh, 2003). Such visit was aimed at discussing the purchase of ballistic missiles for which agreement was signed in 1995 (Carbaugh, 2003). Changwang Sinyong Corporation (CSC) gave delivery of missiles in 1996 to Pakistan. It was claimed that DPRK Foreign Minister, Yong-nam visited Pakistan and discussed a number of issues including missile cooperation and sales of Hwasong and possibly Nodong missiles (Carbaugh, 2003). Such assistance enabled Pakistan to establish a project for purchasing Nodong missiles (Carbaugh, 2003).

North Korea had exported 24 to 50 Nodong missiles to Iran, Pakistan and Libya (Bermudez, 1999). In return Pyongyang acquired advanced missile technologies and parts through Egypt and Pakistan (Young, 2004). It is estimated that Shehab-4 in Iran and Pakistan's Ghaznavi are the same model as North Korea's TD-1 and Iran's Shehab identical to TD-2 (Bermudez, 1999). Thus, it can be said that North Korea is pushing forward with the development of long range missiles hand in hand with Pakistan, Iran and Egypt (Bermudez, 1999).

Japan questioned Pakistan about alleged nuclear proliferation. Japan's such reaction was mainly due to two reasons. Firstly, being only victim of nuclear catastrophe, it opposes nuclear proliferation.

Secondly, Japan enjoys strained relations with North Korea due to variety of reasons. It considers North Korea's nuclear and missile armament as threat to its security and dangerous for peace on North Korean peninsula. India's nuclear proliferation record is quite clean but Pakistan's is not ideal and nuclear issue is sensitive for Japan (T. Hirose, personal communication, 2010, January 12).

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Fujasaki, during his visit to Pakistan in 2004 (Government of Japan, 2004), discussed the issue with the President of the host country. The President promised that Pakistan would share information along with other countries concerned.

Proliferation is not Restricted to Pakistan

Pakistan is not the only country involved in nuclear proliferation. European countries including Germany etc. also committed proliferation of nuclear technology. On the occasion of the moot of World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, then President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf told in an interview with Cable News Network (CNN) that some countries, individuals and international black markets were involved in nuclear proliferation and expressed that media was creating a perception that "Pakistan is the only culprit around the world. This is not the case" (The Frontier Post, 2004, January 24). UN Disarmament Commissioner, Therese Delpech said, "naturally, it is not the Pakistani state that is going directly sell this information. Private proliferation is often a front for public proliferation. In reality, these private networks allow states to hide" (The News, 2004, January 26). Some Japanese companies are also involved in nuclear proliferation and they have provided equipments to North Korea and Government of Japan has verified it. The Government is taking action against them but it is not highlighted (Anwar, A., personal communication, 2010, January 16).

Nusrat Mirza in his article entitled, "Pakistan Bashing" drew the map of involvement of Holland, Germany, Soviet Union, France, India and other countries in nuclear technology as follows, (Mirza, 2004):

> Centrifugal nuclear technology was very commonly used by Holland, Germany, Soviet Union and France and other countries. It was not a secret one. Its basic design was published in Zipp report in 1960. German design was published by Stockholm Institute of Research (SIPRI). One can say that the design, which Pakistan had adopted, was available in the advertisement. Germany, France, India, South Africa and Russia and other countries have supplied nuclear material to different countries such as North Korea, Israel, Iran and Iraq. Taiwan customs seized 1000 tons of North Korea bound aluminum oxide manufactured by India used in making shelves for nuclear device purposes. Americans charged India in December 2003 for supplying important nuclear components to North Korea. India also supplied chemical, biological and uranium to Syria in 1992. Thirty tons of tri-methyl phosphate was supplied by United Phosphorus Ltd of India to Iran in 1993 and in early 1992. India also supplied Iran thydieglycol and other chemicals. As per report published in international media, Germans constructed Iran's Busher atomic plant and Russian supplied highly enriched uranium. Not only this, other countries like France transferred technology to Israel enabling it to construct 100 kg uranium plant. In 1976, a news item became the flash point when a ship loaded with 200 ton yellow cake (uranium coke) was found missing.

> That ship was supposedly landed on the shore of Israel.

The official statement of the United Kingdom revealed that the U.S and U.K undertook massive proliferation in the Weapons of Mutual Destruction (WMD) fields. Their involvement in nuclear trafficking is clear breach of their international treaty obligations at the level of the state itself. The report contained admittance of Dutch Government that sensitive nuclear technology developed by a Dutch company might have been transferred to DPRK, Iran and Libya (Mazari, 2004).

Nuclear Issue as Divergence between Pakistan and Japan

The internal, regional and international pressures and behavior on the situation arose in May 1998 compelled Pakistan to tit for tat. Probably, Japan failed to understand Pakistan's stand and logic behind it.

Though, Japan has appreciated self-moratorium imposed by Pakistan on further nuclear development, it will remain alive as divergent in the relations of the two countries. Its strategic, security and defense interests will not allow Pakistan to roll back its nuclear program or keep it alive for energy purposes. Unless and until India does not give up its nuclear program, which seems was in reaction of the Chinese nuclear program, Pakistan will be going on the same footings. It has now become compulsion for India to keep up the program to meet with its global aspirations.

Kashmir and Nuclear Issue

It would be naïve and rash to link Kashmir with the nuclear issue, although temporarily one could use the current interest in South Asia for drawing the world attention to Kashmir problem (Ali, 1999). Japan has expressed its apprehension that Kashmir is flash point of South Asia. And if war begins between two rival countries

of South Asia on the issue, it will not remain restricted to conventional weapons. Either country may use nuclear option as a last resort to defend itself. The eruption of nuclear war may affect the entire world due to its long ranging consequences. In this situation, Japan will have to cut traditional options of normalization of the relations such as holding of international conference, urging both the countries to solve their issues through dialogue, building one sided pressure on Pakistan to solve the issue in the light of Simla Agreement and Lahore Declaration etc. It will have to come out from diplomacy based on self interest. Its interests in South Asia do not allow it to put pressure on India for sitting around the table sincerely and explore the likely avenues/options for resolving the issue.

Japan should treat Pakistan at par with India at least in Kashmir context. First, it must evaluate and analyze the stands of the two countries on the issue and build up its firm opinion about justified and unjustified without considering its interests in the region. Then, it should move sincerely for convincing the disputing parties to develop unanimous solution and road map for ending the problem.

Conclusion

The information shared with Japan, establishment of National Command Authority on nuclear assets by Pakistan and steps taken by the Government of Pakistan for uprooting of nuclear proliferation network have convinced the Government of Japan about its sincerity. Japan is worried about political instability in Pakistan which may lead falling of strategic assets in the hands of the terrorists. However, it is satisfied with the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Japan restricted its reaction on nuclear proliferation to expression of grave concern and condemned arms race in the sub-continent. The issue failed to be focused in bilateral talks on the level of heads of either government or state. Moreover, Japan did not take any stern action as taken in view of nuclear tests

in May 1998.

No doubt, Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs may remain divergence in the relations between the two countries till Pakistan's accession to NPT or CTBT. But it will not create tension to such an extent that cordial and amicable relations will suffer setback. Pakistan and India should be involved in Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) (T. Ito, personal communication, 2010, January 16). If India does not have nuclear weapons Pakistan has never been. India will never join CTBT and NPT if it may be after joining of U.S and China (T. Ito, personal communication, 2010, January 16).

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