In 2009, Obama’s administration signaled to hold talks with
moderate Taliban leadership but no success was achieved. After each
failed talks, the Taliban would intensify insurgency for achieving a
greater share in the Afghan affairs as they considered the Afghan
government a puppet of America. They wanted to establish their own
version of shari’a government but the Afghan government had its
own reservations regarding the Taliban and the US-Taliban talks.
Such dividends approaches of both the stake holders made all peace
overtures irrelevant for a long period of time. Even after the USTaliban Agreement, the intra-Afghan negotiations could not be held
which again caused escalated insurgency. The current research paper
is an attempt to answer the question that what were the objectives
of US and Taliban behind the peace talks and agreement when peace
itself remained a distant reality, and insurgency and violence has
escalated instead? It will also analyze the success and failure of those
talks and the future prospects for peace .