Abstract
The free human agent’s capacity to make conscious, intentional
and voluntary choices is compared to the deterministic causation of natural
events in the framework of a causal chain. It is termed as agent causation by
Clark and O’Connor, endorsed by Chisholm and defined as the idea that
new causal chains that are not pre-determined by the prior conditions of the
physical laws of nature can be initiated by the agent. Such a metaphysical
agency is based on what is called the Origination Argument. The agent
control and the causal relation between him and his actions may be
undermined by indeterminate causation. Agent causation can neither be
reduced to event causation, and therefore, as pointed out by Inwagen, cannot
offer a solution to the free will dilemma. His Mind Argument furnishes him
the ground to term agent causation as metaphysically incoherent, impossible
and mysterious. It is argued that a genuine concept of agent causation
should, at least, help to explain human behavior. It should be capable of
playing a useful role in a theory of the production and explanation of human
action. The major issues that need to be addressed act of origination may be
explained and that of cause without being caused. The paper concludes by
claiming that an act of origination cannot be explained as an effect of a prior
cause and it cannot be explained in the context of scientific cause-effect
relation
Naheed Saeed . (2014) FREE AGENT AS THE CAUSE AND THE ORIGINATION ARGUMENT, Al-Hikmat: A Journal of Philosophy, Volume 34, Issue 01.
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