Abstract
The free human agent’s capacity to make conscious, intentional and voluntary choices is compared to the deterministic causation of natural events in the framework of a causal chain. It is termed as agent causation by Clark and O’Connor, endorsed by Chisholm and defined as the idea that new causal chains that are not pre-determined by the prior conditions of the physical laws of nature can be initiated by the agent. Such a metaphysical agency is based on what is called the Origination Argument. The agent control and the causal relation between him and his actions may be undermined by indeterminate causation. Agent causation can neither be reduced to event causation, and therefore, as pointed out by Inwagen, cannot offer a solution to the free will dilemma. His Mind Argument furnishes him the ground to term agent causation as metaphysically incoherent, impossible and mysterious. It is argued that a genuine concept of agent causation should, at least, help to explain human behavior. It should be capable of playing a useful role in a theory of the production and explanation of human action. The major issues that need to be addressed act of origination may be explained and that of cause without being caused. The paper concludes by claiming that an act of origination cannot be explained as an effect of a prior cause and it cannot be explained in the context of scientific cause-effect relation

Naheed Saeed . (2014) FREE AGENT AS THE CAUSE AND THE ORIGINATION ARGUMENT, Al-Hikmat: A Journal of Philosophy, Volume 34, Issue 01.
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