Abstract
In 2019, India and Pakistan were once again embroiled in a military
crisis that demonstrated the willingness of both sides to engage in a
sub-conventional conflict while avoiding a major war. India attempted
an aerial surgical strike across the Line of Control (LoC) into mainland
Pakistan and claimed to have called its nuclear bluff. Pakistan, on the
other hand, refused to indulge in nuclear brinkmanship despite the
nuclearism behaviour from the other side, and responded with a
proportionate surgical strike demonstrating its capacity to inflict
sufficient pain to the adversary. The crisis eventually dissipated
validating the significance of nuclear deterrence in maintaining
strategic stability in South Asia, besides restoring the credibility of
Pakistan’s conventional deterrence against an adversary that enjoys
sufficient numerical advantage. In view of the lessons learnt from the
Balakot crisis, where conventional and nuclear deterrence were both at
play, it may be useful to analyse different deterrence models that have
helped maintain strategic stability during the various crises since the
nuclearisation of the region, including the most recent 2019 one, and
whether these models will remain relevant in a future India-Pakistan
crisis, especially when one side is continuously introducing innovative
war-fighting concepts and new technologies to complicate the regional
deterrence matrix.
Dr Adil Sultan Muhammad. (2020) India-Pakistan Crises and the Evolving Dyadic Deterrence Model, IPRI Journal, Volume-20, Issue-2.
-
Views
613 -
Downloads
71
