Abstract
Deterrence stability is a theoretical concept. There are tangible
and intangible factors that affect the concept. If nuclear
deterrence fails, escalation control becomes the paramount
factor, but there is no reliable remedy once a crisis transitions
to hostilities. Fortunately, despite the trust deficit between the
US and the former Soviet Union, a credible nuclear triad was
seen as a guarantor of deterrence and stability. But, the Cold
War nuclear deterrence model cannot be replicated fully in the
South Asian context because of many factors. Nonetheless,
both India and Pakistan have already recognized the
effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. It is primarily because of
this factor that the two countries could avert going to war over
several serious crises that surfaced over the past 40 years.
Unfortunately, the emerging political and security scenarios in
the region do not fully ensure that nuclear deterrence will
remain effective in the medium to long term. India‘s offensive
security doctrine backed by its nuclear weapons is a serious
setback to the existing nuclear deterrence stability in South
Asia. In view of India‘s massive investment in the defence
sector, it is highly unlikely that Pakistan will be able to match
India in the coming years. There is yet another phenomenon of
‗No War No Peace‘ which has existed in South Asia with
varying intensity during the last few decades? We are
witnessing a synchronized use of economic, psychological,
diplomatic, political, information, intelligence and military
tools by India against Pakistan which is only causing
frustration, a factor that may lead to brinkmanship. However,
India and Pakistan have no other option but to resolve their
outstanding disputes in the interest of their development and
prosperity.
Khurshid Khan. (2013) Deterrence Stability, Security Doctrines and Escalation Control in South Asia, IPRI Journal, Volume-13, Issue-2.
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