Abstract
Pakistan and Afghanistan’s relations have always been marked by mistrust and this lack of trust
could never be abridged. The mainspring of this lack of trust has been the irredentist claims of
Afghanistan over parts of Pakistani territories. Resultantly, Pakistan has been apprehensive of
Afghanistan and always considered it to be a potential threat to its territorial integrity.
Empirically Pakistan’s fears of Afghanistan to its integrity have been misplaced because
Afghanistan never had the means to wrench away Pakistani territories. Although Pakistan has
always been fearful of Afghanistan but before 1970 it had had adopted an off-hand policy
regarding its western neighbour. Sardar Daud, who championed Afghan irredentist claims on
Pakistan, capturing of power in Kabul in 1973 effected fundamental change in Pakistan Afghan
policy. Islamabad started cultivating Afghan mullahs to serve as its protégés. After December
1979 Soviet Union occupation of Afghanistan, Islamabad organized Afghan resistance on its soil
thus started Islamabad’s profound entanglement in Afghanistan’s quagmire. The experience of
Pakistani military and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-
1988) attracted them to take full advantage of the softness of the Afghan state and the political
vacuum thereof to locate ‘Strategic Depth’ in Afghanistan. However, the ‘Strategic Depth’ policy
backfired and Pakistan had to take a U-turn on its Afghan policy in the wake of September 9,
2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. This paper analyzes the gradual shift in Islamabad’s policy
towards Afghanistan and its implications bringing out hitherto some unexplored aspects of
Pakistan’s policy regarding Afghanistan.
