Abstract
The perennial philosophical problem of freedom and determinism seems to have a solution through the widely known philosophical doctrine called Compatibilism. The Compatibilist philosophers contend that our freedom of action is compatible with causal determinism whenever we are conscious of having acted as wanted. However, the proponents of this view seem to avoid certain crucial questions. Is our freedom just a matter of having acted as wanted, despite the causal nexus involved? In other words, is it sufficient to believe that freedom lies where wants do not necessitate actions? For, though we may be free to do what we want but are we free to want what we want? The alleged absence of causal necessity in want-action relation appears as merely a feeling of freedom rather than genuine freedom. Traditionally, genuine freedom of action meant the possibility of an antecedently uncaused action, entirely dependent upon an agent’s choice. This, however, was held as impossible in a deterministic universe. Nevertheless, doubting freedom meant erosion of individual’s accountability, while denying causal determinism entailed lawlessness of nature and thus impossibility of knowledge. Compatibilism emerged to resolve this contradiction. However, if compatibilism is a coherent thesis, it cannot avoid the most embarrassing question whether we can act otherwise than what we want!
Dr. Zahoor H. Baber, . (2012) The Incoherence of Compatibilism , The Dialogue, Volume 7, Issue 3.
-
Views
323 -
Downloads
37
