Abstract
This paper examines the association between corporate governance mechanisms of IPO firms and the likelihood of becoming involuntarily delisted from the French market. Based on a sample of 139 French IPOs over the period 1999-2007, including 38 failures, it is concluded that a significant negative association between the likelihood of exchange delisting and the proportion of independent directors, the size of the board, and the quality of audit. Research also finds that the CEO/Chair role duality increases the likelihood of exchange delisting. However, research finds no evidence to suggest that the IPO failure risk declines with the presence of an independent audit committee at the IPO time
DJERBI CHIRAZ & JARBOUI ANIS. (2013) Corporate Governance and Delisting Risk of French IPO Firms, International Review of Management and Business Research, Volume 2, Issue 1.
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